

RARE BOOK

THE ABSOLUTISM OF F. H. BRADLEY.

Thesis of Dhirendralal Das, M.A.
(Submitted for the Ph.D. Degree of
Dacca University).

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ABBREVIATIONS.

A. R.	Appearance and Reality. (Second Edition).
T. R.	Truth and Reality.
P. L.	Principles of Logic. (Reprint.).

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P R E F A C E .

The present study, from beginning to end, is an attempt to appreciate Bradley's main thesis. Lest any one should expect to find in it one more attack on the philosophy that has provoked all manner of criticism ever since it saw the light of day, I must make it clear that I have nowhere attempted to argue against Bradley. In a meeting of the Dacca University Philosophical Association some years ago, where I had the honour to read a paper criticising some ideas of Bradley, Prof. G. H. Langley, the then Vice Chancellor who presided, made one concluding remark " You can not dismiss Bradley easily," he said, " you had better try to understand him". As I advanced further in the study of Bradley, I came to realise the weight of that remark of the learned Professor, and decided upon the attitude I have maintained in this work. Although Bradley has been much criticised, about the originality of his thought there are no two opinions. " Whatever else this volume (Appearance and Reality) may be ", rightly observes a critic, " and whatever arguments we may have to make upon it, it is no easy reproduction of another man's thought : in the sweat of his brow its author has conceived and executed it." (Pringle Pattison, Man's place in the cosmos. pp. 94-95).

I suppose such a speculative achievement as this richly deserves to be elucidated, and one's labour in trying to

(ii).

labour in trying to follow its main argument is well worthwhile. My Professor, Mr. H. D. Bhattacharyya Head of the Dept. of Philosophy, Dacca University, under whose guidance this work has been done once said to me that should any one attempt one day an elaborate annotation of Appearance and Reality in the line of the commentaries on Kant's Critique, a remarkable contribution to idealistic literature would be made. I daresay every one acquainted with Bradley's acute dialectics will admit that Bradley explained would be more useful to the student of idealism than Bradley criticised. It is interesting in this connection to note the attitude Bradley bore to the criticisms made on his philosophy during his day. Appearance and Reality was first published in June 1893 ; the second edition of the book came out four years after, in 1897, and its last reprint fell in the year 1902. In the course of these nine years several criticisms of this work appeared in Mind and elsewhere - the most telling criticism seeming to be that Bradley professes scepticism. And in his characteristic way Bradley observes thus in the appendix of the second edition. " It is to myself a matter of regret that generally in this point I have been so little helped by my critics and I am compelled to do most of my scepticism myself" (p.560). The same strain of unshaken confidence about his own ideas is perceptible in the replies he, in later years, has made to various other criticisms, (Some of these replies are now available in one place, in the Collected Essays published after his death.)

Indeed, the manner in

(iii).

Indeed, the manner in which he has dealt with the criticisms shows that his was the conviction upto the last moment of his philosophical career, that his critics had not done justice to him.

The chief distinction of Bradley seems to me to lie in his strong anti-intellectualism, although this has come in for a lot of criticism. The truth that he has endeavoured to bring home to his readers (as well as to himself) is that ultimate reality is not transparent to the categories of the intellect, that it is not the translucent calm of thought, but is something more, experience or life as a whole. I strongly maintain that an Absolutist philosophy cannot but be distrustful of the intellect. The recognition of contradictions of the world of knowledge, the inadequacy of human thinking is the very starting point of such a philosophy. And therefore, the Reality or Truth that it establishes must in a sense transcend the process of human thought and striving. It is true that Hegel has taught that the Absolute is the immanent principle of the dialectic or the world process ; but since that process is incapable of exhausting the absolute, it, the dialectic, turns out to be no more than a transitional process in pursuit of the Absolute, a series of necessary errors which must be transcended to arrive at ultimate truth.

True, the pathway to the absolute lies through the contradictions of empirical experience, but the contradictions must disappear, that is to say, the finite intellect must cease to be what it is in empirical life before

(iv).

empirical life before the goal in the Absolute is reached. This is the quintessence of Absolutism. (Prof. Muirhead has called it Platonic tradition). And the merit of Bradley is that he has given a clear and unhesitating expression to this thesis of Absolutist idealism.

In course of my discussion I have occasionally referred to Indian thought, particularly to the ideas of Samkara, the exponent of Advaitism or Non-dualism. But that is intended only to clarify the particular points raised. Bradley has, of late, aroused interest in Indian philosophical circle and that is mostly due to the affinity between him and Samkara Vedanta, the affinity brought home to us by Prof. Radhakrishnan whose own philosophical attitude has, in no small measure, been influenced by Bradleyan idealism. But I have nowhere gone into any detailed discussion of any concept of Indian philosophy I have referred to, that being outside my main purpose. It at first occurred to me that in a work on purely western thought references to Indian philosophies may be felt out of place; but, then, I have thought that, thanks to the elaborate studies in Indian philosophy by both eastern and western scholars in recent years, the main concepts of Indian philosophical schools, particularly of the Vedanta, are now the common possession of all who are interested in philosophy, so that a reference to Samkara is not likely to be less agreeable than to Plato or Aristotle.

Dharendra Lal Das

Chapter I

IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE.

While closing his last article on immediate experience Bradley wrote, "I regret to repeat here once more what I have urged through so many years and so often. But as long as what I hold to be fundamental fact is much ignored, I have no choice but from time to time to repeat what seems to me indubitable". (T.R. p.200).

Immediate experience is the central tenet of Bradley's Epistemological Approach. This thought must commence with the consideration of the same. to Reality. It is the ultimate conception whereby all the diversities and contradictions of the Universe are sought to be explained by him. This concept occupies exactly the same place in Bradleian thought as concrete notion in Hegel or self-consciousness in Green and Caird. Just as Caird regards self-consciousness, 'the transparent unity-in-difference', as what contains all the keys by which we may unlock the secrets of the world, so also immediate experience with Bradley 'opens the one road to the solution of ultimate problems'. (Mind 1903, pp 41-42). Throughout his philosophical search, Bradley is, so to say, haunted by this notion, and it serves for him as the indubitable criterion in the estimate of all the diverse aspects of the universe. But without anticipating what we shall have to say later on the significance of this concept in his system, let us proceed to understand the doctrine of immediacy as presented by Bradley.

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Bradley's reiterant advocacy of immediate experience is clearly the result of his attitude
attitude

attitude to the two rival philosophical theories he was confronted with. These were Associationistic and Idealistic views of knowledge. According to Associationism knowledge is the linking of psychic facts such as images that are atomic particulars. Sensations and impressions are the sole constituents of the mind and our knowledge of things is nothing more than groupings of these elements, determined by certain laws of behaviour appertaining to the psychical contents. Beyond these contents, and their modes of behaviour, there is nothing present in the composition of knowledge. Against this atomism of Hume and others, T.H. Green asserted about the role of a spiritual principle in the construction of knowledge and the Universe.

Bradley dissociates himself from both these views and criticises them with equal severity. He approaches the problem of knowledge from the side of Psychology*, that is, examination of consciousness and arrives at results very different from those of the atomists. Although atomism was exercising a great influence in the field of psychology, and endeavouring to provide a new orientation to the science of mind, it, Bradley thought, gave a wrong picture of the mind.

The view that

* Before the formulation of his metaphysical position, Bradley had occupied himself with psychological topics. For years he wrote upon them and entered into long-drawn controversies with Bain, Ward, and James. According to him, psychology must precede metaphysics. "The metaphysician who is no psychologist runs great dangers. For he must take up and must work upon the facts of the soul, and if he has not tried to learn what they are, the risk is very serious".

The view that "our mind is a train of perishing existences" is irreconcilable with fact. It is not true that "as they (the psychic atoms) exist they have separate being, and so to speak coupled by another sort of things which are called relations". (Mind, O.S. No.47, p. 357). Because "if we turn to what is given this is not what we find, but rather a continuous mass of presentation in which the separation of a single element from all context is never observed". (Ibid). But he agrees with the associationists in one important point, namely, that presentation is the ultimate datum; that we can not go beyond sentience, that is, whatever is experienced immediately. What he is unable to allow, however, is that the presentations are discrete particulars. "What is immediately experienced is not a collection of pellets or a "cluster", as it used to be called, of things like grapes, together with other things called relations that serve as a kind of stalk to the cluster". (Mind N.S. No.33, p. 36). What at any time is experienced is a continuum. "The mind is its states but these are connected together in a manner, as little analogous to a series of beads upon a string, as they are to a succession of films in a cinema entertainment. A mental life has not parts analogous to the atoms of physical things". (Dawes Hicks, Critical Realism, p. 47).

In Bradley's acceptance of the ultimacy of senseawareness and denial of its discreteness at the same time, lies also his opposition to the idealistic Epistemology of Green and Caird. Green held that Associationism was the outcome of the empiricist's effort " to

effort " to eliminate" the work of mind from the world of knowledge. According to Hume mind is a congeries of states and the connection and regularity that characterise these states is due to the associating qualities by which ideas introduce one another.

These links between ideas are not to be regarded as permanent and inseparable, but merely as "a gentle force that commonly prevails". There is no abiding relation anywhere - substance, causality and the like are fictitious, having no objectivity. The essence of knowledge is accordingly to be found in pure sensations "denuded of relations". This position Green assails. Relations, he urges, appear to be fictitious, because the relating principle to which they belong is lost sight of in the over-emphasis on the particularity of Experience. Their preconception about the discreteness of sense-experiences blinds the empiricists to the abiding principles that underlie human cognition. Sensations, according to Green, have no existence apart from relations which proceed from the activity of the self-distinguishing consciousness 'which combines the various elements of Experience as mutually related facts'. They are not merely the ways in which ideas are found to behave in respect of one another, but are those in which the spiritual principle unites and organises sense-contents. It is not correct to say, says Green, that one idea succeeds another, co-exists with another; we should rather say that there is a combining agency or unifying principle which, while maintaining

which, while maintaining the terms distinct, makes up a real unity of the manifold by putting them in relation to one another, viewing them as successive or co-existent, as similar or as related in the way of cause and effect. If you dismiss these relations, experience dissolves itself into nothingness. Unrelated sensations are meaningless myths. They exist nowhere.

But to Bradley this doctrine of the self-distinguishing spiritual principle as the foundation of human experience, with which Green combats atomism—the doctrine that apart from relations or the relating activity of the self there is no experience; that there is nothing like a primitive awareness independent of the operation of the organising principle; that nowhere is there even 'a prick of sense round which all the swathings of thought are wrapped'* -- this appears to be the other extremity of error. This relationism is a straight denial of experience. In spite of certain faulty presuppositions of the atomists, it must be said to their credit that, far from being guilty of any falsification of experience, they start from and end in what is immediate and given. Atomism bases itself on the givenness of presentations and so far it is right. Truly also they deny the ultimate character of relations. Green by making the relations paramount protests that presentations as such have no place in knowledge or consciousness and thus in the place of living sentience furnishes "a spectral woof of impalpable abstractions". With Bradley, "the idea of a self or ego joining together the atomic
atomic

* Seth - Kant to Hegel, pp. 7-8 .

the atomic elements and fastening them together in some miraculous way not involved in their own nature, is quite indefensible". (Mind, N.S. No. 33, p. 37).

Now this his difference from the atomism of Hume and Mill on the one hand and the relationism of Green on the other finds expression in his conception of immediate experience. Relations which are the result of the operation of thought do not signify the original psychical datum. Below the relations there is what is immediately felt. Out of this immediate feeling-base terms and relations develop. And this original psychical stage is not to be regarded as atomic impressions. The primal sentience is a whole and indivisible totality. It is feeling, because it is one with pleasure and pain. "The whole that is given, however poor that may be, does expand and contract, and feels pleasure and pain". (Mind, O.S. No. 47 p. 365). The undividedness of affective experience enters into the primitive consciousness and as such the possibility of its being constituted by discrete particulars is barred out.

II .

"In the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented, what is and is felt, or is rather felt simply. There is no memory or imagination or hope or fear or thought or will, and no perception of difference or likeness. There are, in short, no relations and no feelings, only feeling. It is all one blur with differences, that work and that are felt, but are not discriminated".

discriminated". (Mind, O.S. No.47, p.363). Feeling is thus an undivided experience, the ingredients of which cannot be regarded as in any sense conjoined or connected through relations, but are fused into a unity. It is a self-dependent totality. ~~There~~ mere feeling of immediate presentation we have the experience of a whole. This whole is not parted by relations". (A. & R. p. 159). The undividedness of pure feeling is easy to illustrate. Immediate awareness of three colours is a unitary act, that as immediate ~~it~~ is not separable as three elements. Quantitative distinction is no part of that act of awareness. In its form it is the same as if the experience was of a single colour. All the three elements are indistinguishable from one another when they are simply felt. There being no terms and no relations, discrimination as one, two and three is impossible.

Yet, it is "more than bare simplicity, we experience a concrete whole as actual fact". (A & R, p. 104). Although the elements constituting the feeling whole are incapable of being discriminated within that stage, their diversities may be felt. The "endless wealth" of sentient experience makes itself felt or there could be no experience at all. Feeling whose contents are not felt would be bare nothing.

Feeling is many in one, mutiplicity in one integral intuition. It is not undifferentiated and without details. "The immediate union of one and many is an ultimate fact from which we start and to hold that feeling because immediate must be simple, is a doctrine quite untenable" (A. R. p. 569). Feeling is a process-content, not an empty

empty process, it includes all the diverse contents in an undiscriminated form, that latterly develops into my world. "At any time all that we suffer, do, and are, forms one psychical totality. It is experienced all together as a co-existing mass, not perceived as parted and joined by relations even of co-existence". (A.R. p.224).

The integral character of primeval feeling is described by James as follows :- "The baby assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, at once feels it all as a blooming, buzzing confusion". This original fusion of sights, touches, pains and the like which constitute the child's first awareness is "diversity and unity in one whole", unanalysed and unparted.

Coming to adult experience, an ordinary emotional whole that comes to us as one is not simple; it has diversity that is not distinguished and sundered into relations. There may be had other examples of undiscriminated multiplicity. Suppose A returns from the cinema after seeing a film that was thrilling. His mind is full. His consciousness is, so to say, worked upon by the scenes with their diverse emotional tones which constituted the picture. Going a little way he enters a cafe, takes a good drink, looks over the evening papers, and sets out again. Meanwhile the scenes and events that might have been recalled in their original chronology, do not exist as such; yet his consciousness is not a blank. The state of his consciousness would not be what it is, had he not been to the cinema to see that particular film. His consciousness at the moment is different from what it would be if he had

be if he had been returning from office after a long day's routine work. His mind now is filled with the after-effects of the film experience which he cannot distinguish, but he is nevertheless aware of their congestion in consciousness.

All immediacy is essentially many in one, a "sensuous abundance" inhering in one process. But the elements that constitute immediacy are not conceived as many, as coming one after another, as being of this and that tone and colour. The occurrence of multiplicity does not synchronise with analytic understanding. "The earliest impression", says James, "is given by a set of thats and its of subjects of discourse with their relations not brought out". It may be objected here that to allow diversity within feeling is to ascribe plurality to it. And if feeling is characterised by plurality, there is no way of avoiding relations in between the plural contents. To this the reply is that feeling owns diversity; it, so to say, assimilates plurality. The very form of immediacy in which the diverse contents inhere precludes the possibility of any discrimination of the inherent details. Immediacy is the very antithesis to discrimination. At the moment of my immediate perception of a piece of music, it is impossible to analyse it into its constituent notes. For my immediate awareness of the music is equivalent to my absorption into the undiscriminated musical whole. As soon as I begin to distinguish the feeling-contents, the immediacy is destroyed and the wramth of experience disappears

An emotion as it is

An emotion as it is experienced is an undivided state and as such immediate. But as soon as we attend to it, its life is gone and it is not the same thing as the emotion we feel. What remains is a cold, dispassionate intellectual perception. Reflection and analysis separate the components of the experience and in so doing rupture the unique integration in which they lay, and there is the end of immediacy. So immediacy is indiscriminatedness. Unmediated feeling is, thus, a Unity holding multiplicity in a unique manner.

Ward has objected to the description of feeling as unity. He says, "an experience which is a unity and below relations is not an experience of unity". (Mind, 1924). Unity of experience is one thing and experience of unity is quite another. The idea of unity implies thought and if at the immediate stage, the operation of thought has not set in, it is wrong to speak of unity at that stage. But here Ward ignores the distinction between two types of apprehension of unity, - unity as felt and unity as thought. Without thinking out in judgment, 'this is one', it is possible to experience oneness. The primal awareness that is a unitary and undivided process, is felt as one in the course of its being lived. The lived unity, if we may say so, is beyond doubt. That I am one identical soul is not revealed to me in my intellectual judgment, 'I am one'. The individual psychical life which is mine reveals itself as one as it flows on. The revelation of consciousness is a part and parcel of its very being, of what it is. This character of sentience has been
very aptly

very aptly described by Dr. Das Gupta in his treatment of the Vedantic self as "revelatory inwardness" (Indian Philosophy, Vol. II). This self-revelatory character of the sentient process precludes the necessity of conceptual operation for its apprehension. It is absurd that there should be a conscious process that is not felt as one. Being so felt and feeling mean one and the same thing. Then again, unity of consciousness is a specific unity. "It is a mobile unity" beyond the grasp of intellect (Henri Bergson by Chevalier, p. 159). We recognise it only when we place ourselves in intuition. To intuit this unity is to coincide with it. Here there is no difference between the knowing and the known. As Bergson says, "Intuition is mind itself". So long as we do not by an intellectual effort objectify any aspect of the conscious process, and thus place ourselves in opposition to ourselves, so long as we live and do not endeavour to conceive or know, the genuine unity which is one entire primordial consciousness, cannot escape us. The unity of conscious life is not the systematic unity in which the contents are, by the thinking apparatus, organised and inter-related. The immediate unity, we speak of, is prior to the emergence of thought, and as such is not categorised, logical unity. This book is one in a sense fundamentally different from that in which I am one undivided sentience. The former is a cognised unity, the latter a unity felt and enjoyed.

Feeling is the primitive awareness that possesses an 'identitative' character, if we may use such an expression. This identitative process underlies the entire psychic existence and makes it what it is. And the multiplicity of contents are interwoven into

woven into it and pervasively coloured by it. The nearest analogy of this process is coenaesthesia that is vague and pervasive and incapable of being objectified. "What we ordinarily call bodily pleasures and pains and bodily appetites", says Stout, "are in the main connected with organic sensations. Such sensations constitute a large part of our immediate sensuous experience in every moment of our conscious lives. Our vague total awareness of bodily well-being or discomfort, our "feeling well" or the reverse, depends on an indefinite multitude of impressions reaching the brain from the internal organs, giving rise to sensations which in the main are subconscious, and only confusedly apprehended". (Manual, p. 234, 3rd Edition). Bradley is reminded of this coenaesthesia in course of his treatment of feeling as unity. "Feeling is not one differentiated aspect, but it holds different aspects in one. And though a view of this kind naturally calls for explanation, I am bound to doubt the wisdom of ignoring it wholly, for if it is difficult it seems hardly so difficult as to take our inward coenaesthesia as throughout one object". (Here object is used not in its technical sense but as felt existence).

III.

Here we are led to the consideration of the most essential implication of the above. The unitary character of feeling implies that there is no subject-object differentiation. At the thought level, there is invariably present a knower and something known, a subject comprehending an object. This separation of subject and object, self and the world, is involved in the thinking process. But in the immediate experience this opposition does not appear.

Here knowing

Here knowing and being are one. No object stands over against the subject apprehending it. Subject and object are not there at the beginning of soul-life. This distinction is a subsequent growth out of the original immediacy. What is given at the start is mere this and mine. 'Experience in its early form, as a centre of immediate feeling is not yet either self or not self'. (A. R., p.525). Subject-object distinction is a relation and a relation can not take place without qualitative distinction. A psychic content to be an object must be distinguishable as a quality or system of qualities or in other words made into an idea. Unless I can speak of a content as having such and such character it is not an object. To be able to say so I should distinguish it not only from the subject but also from other objects. And thus we come to have relations. All relations, we have learnt from Kant, are forms super-induced upon sense-experience, that is, a term of relation is no longer a fact, it is an attribute, an adjective.

But at the immediate stage there is no thought-operation qualifying and abstracting a content and thereby rendering it a cognisable element, detached from the original integration with the process of experiencing. So there is no object. And if there is no object, there is no subject either. For only in interaction with an outside is there the knowledge of self. It is only when a content has shot from the whole of feeling and come to be encountered thereafter, that the subject begins to apprehend what is no longer itself. This point will be elaborated lower down. The absence of subject-object distinction is

distinction is the very sine qua non of immediacy. With the emergence of object immediacy is ruptured. The Vedanta & Buddhism that believe in an indeterminate immediate experience (Nirvi Kalpa) recognise no distinction at that stage. According to Vedanta "In indeterminate perception all determining attributes are left out of view. No distinction exists between S and P as in the propositions, "that art thou", "this is that Devadatta". (Radha Krishnan, Indian Philosophy, The Advaita Vedanta of Sankara, p. 491).

According to the Buddhist logicians also "indeterminate perception is free from preconceptions, (Kalpanapodham determination of thought). It does not apprehend the qualifications of the object such as generality, substantiality, quality, action, name, but simply grasps the specific individuality of the object, its Svalakshana ... The moment we say something about the felt real we bring it into relation to something else (We objectify it) and the real thus loses its nature, becoming overlaid with inventions of the intellect. We hear the humming which alone is true, but that it is due to the fly or the distant steam-whistle is our imagination" (Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, Logical Realism of the Nyaya, p.p. 60-61). The absence of any kind of determination in the immediate experience is described by Bradley as the non existence of the distinction of that and what, act and content. In immediacy that and what are inseparable. It is experiencing and experienced in one. When we characterise a thing as red or yellow, we do it by thinking

do it by thinking operation that consists in isolating the quality red or yellow from the whole feeling of the red or yellow thing. Before thinking started no such separation was possible, and hence there could be no cognition of an object qualified by redness or yellow. The object of cognition is nothing but a determination wrung out of the initial experience. So long as such determination or characterisation is not accomplished there is no object before the knowing subject. The object of the external world is nothing but a kind of dismemberment of the hitherto undivided process-content or in other words, the divorce of the content from its inherence in the process. Immediate experience precludes such divorce; therefore there is no cognition of an object no characterisation and qualification of any kind. It is Nirvikalpa or indeterminate. Here it is necessary to consider a new realist's conception of immediacy. Dawes Hicks following Brentano and Meinong holds that immediate experience is an act, the content whereof is not the content that is subsequently apprehended. "Immediate experience is used to denote the special kind of experience we each of us have of the occurrences that are phases of our mental lives". (Symposium on Immediate Experience, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supplementary Volumes, IX, p. 176). In my being aware of blue, immediacy is confined to the act of awareness and this awareness does not include blue qua content. Blue is the object or the "intention of the act". "The content of the act of cognising blue is not

blue is not blue, but the awareness of blue, just as the content of the act of perceiving primrose is not primrose, but the awareness of one". (Critical Realism, p. 16).

According to Dawes Hicks that immediacy is the that, the experiencing merely; there is no what inherent in the that. Yet he would distinguish the awareness of blue from the awareness of red. This seems difficult to understand. If both the awarenesses are acts merely, having neither of them any content like blue or red, how can each as awareness be distinguished from the other? He, of course, says awareness by itself is neither blue nor red but is awareness of red or awareness of blue. If the blue is not allowed to characterise the awareness as content, in what sense is the awareness an awareness of blue. If it is an awareness of blue and distinguishable from any other awareness on that score, it must include blue character, it must be, if you choose to say so, blue. Without allowing this, all awarenesses shall be indistinguishable from one another. The difficulty with Dawes Hicks in recognising blueness inside the act is that once the content is allowed in the act, the affirmation of an independent physical order becomes difficult, if not impossible. Yet it is anything but intelligible how the content that remains outside colours the act without interfering with the immediacy of the act which is never in question. So long as the level of immediacy is not transcended the content must remain inseparable and unseparated from the act of enjoyment thereof.

thereof. Mere enjoying would be little removed from enjoying nothing, if the content were not given into it from the very beginning. The contention that the awareness of blue is not blue is beside the point. For such contention implies a previously made conceptual distinction between awareness and the object of awareness and the consequent affirmation of their independence of each other. But keeping strictly to the immediate level, one can not perform such dissociation of the process from the content and assert that the process is not the content. Only after having been furnished with a togetherness of process and contents, integration of feeling and the felt, does it become possible to hold apart in thought, the two components. But such apartness is without any application to the prior stage and therefore the assertion that the process is not the content is out of place.

IV.

Bradley suggests that the genetic study of animal consciousness may give support to the doctrine of undifferentiated feeling. In animals consciousness might have been present in the form of a vague non-relational consciousness which in the course of evolution has been differentiated into relational consciousness such as we find in man. Bradley, however does not pursue the point further. It may be of interest to develop the point here and examine Bradley's suggestion in the light of modern knowledge of animal mind. There are three camps of animal psychologists. The conservative school represented by Romanes holds

by Romanes holds that animal consciousness is developed in respect of every faculty. The other extreme associated with the name of Loeb and in our days with Watson denies consciousness altogether. The third school steers a middle course between the two extremes. The extreme humanising tendency of Wundt and Romanes is abandoned and a rudimentary consciousness is attributed to the lower state of life. There is a world of inner experience in animals, but this is not, as Romanes would have us believe, relational. There is no thought or conception; there is only what Lloyd Morgan calls sentience or sense experience. The entire animal behaviour, however complex, is guided by sense experience, not by thought and judgement.

The animal's is what Stout calls a perceptual consciousness. And the chief characteristic of perceptual consciousness is that "there is no apprehension of the general or Universal as such in distinction from the particular cases or instances, discrimination of the universal from the particular is absent". What exists is "an implicit awareness in which the universal is not separately apprehended as a distinct object of thought". (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 369, 370). At the perceptual level there is "no judgement in which subject and predicate are mentally sundered from each other". Thought-work in the form of discrimination of alternative possibilities is also absent.

The instinctive

The instinctive action of an animal belongs to the perceptual stage. Instinct is a perceptual activity; it is the development of one original conation that is more or less blind. The different stages of an instinctive action that may to the outside observer appear isolated (and hence requiring the cement of thought to connect them) are really knit up by attentive unity and appetitive continuity. Take for example the train of actions involved in a kitten's hunting a prey. "The kitten will first assume the attitude of watching or lying in wait; it will then steal up to the ball of thread or other object which forms its play-thing; in the next place it gathers itself up for a spring and pounces on the quasi-prey. The several acts of lying in wait, stealthy approach, crouching for a spring, pouncing, are phases in the development of the same activity". (Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 366). We may distinguish the phases in thought but to the animal who performs them they are not marked out in thought, they constitute one indivisible act. The animal feels or rather lives the differences; it does not think them out. The different phases of the action are not different in the sense in which the three successive acts, not connected by any conation, would have been. From outside it may seem that the ideational process is at work. But, as a matter of fact, there are no ideas.

When the

When the moorhenchick pecks at small objects it has no idea of what it has to deal with nor does it know that it is pecking at an object which is such and such. It has a congenital disposition to peck, and because of that it works with as much nicety and delicacy as man with precise, clear ideas. The turns and twists that the instinctive process undergoes may also seem to be due to ideational process. But, as a matter of fact, it is the conation, nature's gift, that pushes forward and works out its own destiny; the turns and changes are due to the sense experience that guides and controls the conative process. "Train of free ideas is not bound up with bodily behaviour in relation to a given situation". There is no such thought that because these are the circumstances such and such course should be taken. "None of the animals," says Hobhouse, "showed the least understanding of the how and why of their actions". (Quoted in Stout's Manual).

There is no distinction of subject and object in perceptual consciousness. "Let us suppose," says Lloyd Morgan, "that a puppy has an impression of a bone. For the puppy there is neither object nor subject, there is merely the impression as a bit of real vivid experience. But we who wish to explain the puppy's impression, submit it to analysis. And in the conceptual field of our thought it becomes, so to speak, polarised. At one pole there is the objective bone, and at the other pole the subject-consciousness of

consciousness of the puppy." On the basis of such analysis we have no grounds for saying that either the object or the subjective consciousness thereof, is capable of independent existence. "The object and subject, involved in sense impression, are like the colour and the scent of a rose, distinguishable in thought, but they are not separable in experience" (Introduction to comparative Psychology, pp. 312-13) Thus we find that the perceptual process in animals approximates to Bradley's immediate experience, inasmuch as it is non-intellectual, many in one, and without subject-object differentiation. It is the biological utility of the consciousness that is responsible for the over-estimation of the process. On this account we are apt to regard the long perceptual process as involving reason and thought, discrimination and differentiation.

V.

Immediate experience with Bradley is not merely the initial cognitive stage. It is a stage not only prior to but existent after thought or relational understanding. Immediate feeling persists even in thought. It is not a stage passed and ceasing to exist. Each distinction and relation still rests on an immediate background. (T. R.) It is true that the mind cannot be limited to mere blurred feeling, to an awareness that is not articulate. A total musical impression that is immediately received, is too elusive

is too elusive for its hearer to grasp; he therefore by means of reflective analysis tries to understand the relation between one part of the musical structure to another, the relative position of all notes. Though in this way one tries to transcend feeling, it cannot be wholly transcended. In other words, it is not possible to reach a stage which is pure thought free from all touch of sensitive experience. Even when the different aspects of the musical theme are understood in relation to one another, and the whole theme is set over as an object, there can be no denying that the music is being enjoyed, felt. Bergson holds that the moment discursive understanding works upon a total intuition, the warmth and intimacy of the integral experience wholly evaporates. But according to Bradley the separating process of understanding must work within the feeling which is ever the underlying substratum. It cannot be distorted into thought crystals but can only be undulated into ripples. Knowledge without an abiding feeling is impossible. Kant and Green both ignored feeling. With the former, brute experience-manifold is thoroughly metamorphosed by understanding, so that knowledge is practically the product of understanding, a mind-work. Green denies feeling altogether and makes knowledge or universe a congeries of relations. But Bradley emphatically asserts that in knowledge feeling must be burningly present; relations without feeling are an abstraction. To return to the above example : In thought I discern that the note X is succeeded by

succeeded by Y, Y by Z, but underlying ^{the} knowledge of such discrete units there is the immediate feeling T which links them up. The cognised X, Y, and Z are of T, they are felt and at no time can cease to be so

"At every moment". says Bradley, " my state whatever else it is, is a whole of which I am immediately aware. And object and subject and every possible relation and term to be experienced at all fall within and depend on such a felt unity." (T.R. p. 175). This basic feeling seems to us to be like what a patient completely under chloroform feels. He has no ideas, images, no thoughts. There is merely an awareness which is not of anything. The chloroform state can be best described by the expression "it feels". This feeling which is fundamental is the criterion of cognition. At no state can it disappear; if it goes, knowledge goes with it also. When there are ideas in me about certain objects, these ideas must be felt, if they are to be any part of me. Take, for example, my thought of the next day's lecture. I am weaving out ideas one after another, and arranging them in accordance with the main drift; but collateral with the marshalling of ideas is the awareness, however faint, of these ideas, which affiliates them to a definite mental context. The ideas by being felt become mine. When Bradley says that the entire relational consciousness is experienced as falling within a direct awareness, he means that the ideas and their relations are run through by what James calls " a single pulse of subjectivity."

The same conclusion

The same conclusion may be arrived at in a slightly different way. I say, the idea a comes after the idea b in my mind. The word 'after' is without meaning if there is no reply to the question, where and whence does it come after ? We do not usually say that an idea in my mind comes after the idea in your mind. Why ? Because there is no common feeling-medium in reference to which the words ' before' and 'after' might have any meaning. I can say that you come after me because both you and I are situated in a common spatial background. Without the pervasive feeling I would have known no before and after. And this feeling stream is the root of my conscious unity. " On this felt background," says Bradley, "depends the unity and continuity of our lives lost hopelessly by associationism." (T & R, p. 195). This criticism of the associationist position is suggestive. Associationism that resolved mind into atomic units was bound to ignore conscious unity. "Traditional psychology", to quote James's famous passage, "talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it." (Principles, Vol. 1, p. 255). The free water of consciousness is the feeling, the immediate mental stuff; while the ideas are isolated and diverse, this is continuous. "No

analysis into the

analysis into the relations and terms can ever exhaust its nature." (T. & R., p. 176). The direct awareness is foundational; it escapes all attempts to exhibit it as one or more elements in a relational field. "Whenever you go to analyse the general awareness, the original feeling, you find that the very act of analysis is being felt; this instead of its setting the feeling over against itself, belongs to feeling." Immediate experience serves as the basis on which the analysis is made. Itself is the vital element within which every analysis still moves." (Ibid).

Here it may be pointed out by some that the above is merely a description of the commonplace fact that all thoughts and ideas must have a reference to self, the unity of apperception. To understand that it is not so, it will be necessary first of all to refer to Bradley's view of self. Green conceived this self as timeless in nature; Kant too gave a contentless ego. But Bradley disagrees with all those for whom the ego is not essentially qualified by this or that psychical matter, and writes : "The ego that pretends to be anything either before or beyond its concrete psychical feeling is a gross fiction and mere monster and for no purpose admissible." (A & R., p. 89). His view of the concrete and contentful self Bradley illustrates in the following way. "Take any case of perception or whatever you please, where this relation of objects to subject is found as a factthe object at all events is a concrete phenomenon. It has a character which exists as or in a mental fact. If we turn from this to the subject, is there any

is there any more cause for doubt ? Surely in every case that contains a mass of feeling, if not also of other psychological existence. When I see or perceive or understand I (my term of relation) am palpably and even painfully concrete. And when I will or desire it surely is ridiculous to take the self as not qualified by particular psychological fact." So he concludes, "Evidently any self which we can find is some complete form of unity of psychological existence." He adds that whoever wishes to introduce it as something (now or at any time) apart or beyond does not rest upon observation. This according to him is a metaphysical chimera. (Ibid, p. 90).

It is necessary in this connection to recall that Bradley does not regard the distinction between self and not-self as original. "Every soul has existed at a stage where there was no self or not-self, neither ego nor object in any sense whatever." (A & R, p. 90). This distinction as all others has emerged from the whole of feeling given without relations. Self and not-self are actual psychological groups that subsequently develop; there is first an internal group or core formed by the abiding bundle of feelings known latterly as "internal sensations". One main characteristic of the group is that the sensation which constitutes its foundation continues to be feeling, in the sense of being one with pleasure and pain (here it is necessary to note that feeling or undifferentiated experience is described as the unbroken whole of sensation and affection).

This is the self-group. This characteristic (of being inseparably united with feeling) distinguishes this group from the group that is not self. The not-self is detached from the feeling background, it is the non-feeling group. By means of shock or collision the feeling aspects of some part of the initial blur are loosened ; they become estranged, so to say, from the soul life and become opposed as object or not-self. (Mind O. S., No.47. p. 365).

The self thus becomes the nucleus of the feeling mass. From this a great consequence follows. The self is felt. It can never be made into an object. It is possible of course that some or other feature of the self takes its place in the not-self, but still there will always remain some aspect of the self that is beyond objectification. But " the object is never wholly identical with the subject and the background of feeling must contain a great deal more than what we at any time perceive as self that the whole self can be observed in one perception would be merely chimerical..... in the felt background there remains an obscure residue of internal sensation which I perhaps at no time can distinguish as an object." (A & R . p. 109).

These considerations will further show that what we call consciousness cannot exhaustively describe experience. Consciousness is the being of an object for a subject - it is a relation. Relation implies two terms which must both be given. There is no denying that the object is given. But can the subject be

subject be similiary given ? No. The subject ceases to be a subject if it is objectified. "The real subject is always felt. It can never become wholly an object, and it never at any time or in any case ceases to be felt." (T. R. p. 195). The not-self or object that opposes the subject can not be said to be related to the subject - its opposition to the self is felt. " Between the felt subject and the object there is no relation at all. What Bradley means is this : The object or not-self, can not be without reference to self; by its very nature it can come only as an other to self. But self is inside a whole of feeling. Therefore in every knowledge feeling in the form of a felt non-objectifiable self shall be present; this feeling can never be got over. The object though loosened in a sense from the feeling mass is still in feeling. Its being an object of knowledge does not negate its being felt as opposed to the central nucleus.

The relation (so to express ourselves) of the felt whole to the contents that transcend it must be, says Bradley, 'taken as a fact'. It can neither be described nor explained" since description necessarily means translation into objective terms and relations. "It is an error to speak of a relation between what is immediately experienced or felt and that which rises above it except by license." (T. & R., p. 173). It is according to Bradley merely a mode of speaking necessary to our reflective thinking, but is not in the end defensible. A relation exists only between terms, and
those terms

those terms to be known as such must be objects. And, as we have said, the felt core is incapable of being made an object. Therefore self and not-self appear on one whole of experience. We might say their relation (to use it for convenience) is an intuitive certainty, non-intellectual in character. It is of course true that the object content is not in unbroken unity with the felt whole : had it been so there would have been no sense in calling it an object. But what is necessary to note is that the breach or opposition that is caused is not same as itself, and can not be, an object. "The subject always is felt, neither itself, nor its actual distinction from the object can be got out and placed before it as an object". Bradley illustrates this point in the following way : "Take such an experience", he says, "as ordinary desire". Beside pleasure and pain we have in this state, I presume, a relation of something, that is, to an idea in me. These terms we certainly agree to call objects. But beside the above is there nothing experienced in desire ? I should say, yes, the whole experience is felt as one, and in that unity there is a background which is not an object. Desire for me is a felt whole containing terms and a relation and pleasure and pain. But it contains besides an indefinite mass or the felt, to call which an object strikes my mind as even ludicrous." (T & R. p. 107).

The so-called

The so-called self therefore is not the same as the finite centre. It is not original. We have first a felt whole without subject-object differentiation, "a blurred beginning." Next there is self and that when within the finite centre there is the knowledge of an object. But where we find an object against a self, this opposition is still felt within a totality of feeling. And the relation (so to speak of it) is not an object. The self here is no object but it is an experienced content. Bradley holds that the view for which self is transexperiential leaves it unknown and hence non-existent. Self, the felt content, is in unbroken unity with feeling; it is felt immediately.

The up-shot of all this is that at no stage of mental development is the mere correlation of subject and object actually given. (This would be possible if the self were not felt implicitly in the inexhaustible sentient mass). "Whenever this or any other relation is experienced what is experienced is more than the mere relation. It involves a felt totality and on this inclusive unity relation depends. The subject, the object and their relation are experienced as elements or aspects in a one which is there from the first". (T & R. p. 200).

VI.

To sum up the whole discussion: At the beginning experience is indeterminate - it is immediate with no distinction

with no distinction of my awareness and that of which I am aware. Immediacy is the palpable character of such mental states as pleasure, pain, desire, volition - of these we have undoubtedly direct awareness. Not only at the earliest stage and in regard to the phenomena of emotional life, immediacy accompanies experience at every phase. The felt unity environs and includes the entire relational consciousness. Experience even at the developed stage can not be simply reduced to relational consciousness. Immediacy thus is at the start and also remains at every stage of mental development. It can not be wholly transcended, it does never vanish.

Immediacy which is a felt totality, many in one, by lingering on affords guidance to thinking or discursive understanding which deals with plurality. But before we explain this point we should sketch the development of thinking, and that in the next chapter.

Chapter II

DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT.

1.

Immediate feeling " while it remains as a constant basis nevertheless contains a world which in a sense goes beyond itself " (T. R. p. 173 ff). Its character is such that we are forced beyond it to an altogether different mode of experience. There is no agreement between the content of feeling which is confused in itself, and its form which is immediate oneness. It comes to us as one, but it turns out to be many; it appears to be an undifferentiated unity but is really full of endless diversity. The content exhibits its essential relativity. It depends, that is to say, in order to be what it is upon something, not itself. Promising to be something all in one and self-contained, if not simple, feeling includes matter the adjective of and with reference to, a foreign existence. This is manifest in change which appears necessary and implied in its being, seeing that feeling is never at rest. (A. R., p. 106).

Now, change, it is easy to see, means that a content of experience slips and becomes something else; it passes into what it is not. Considering that this shifting occurs within the vehicle of feeling, the inherent discrepancy of this stage comes out at once. A passes into B and B into C
and yet they are all

and yet they are all felt as belonging to one process. This is inconsistency and calls for remedy. Therefore the necessity arises for the transcendence of the unstable unity of feeling for a stabler one which will not fail to gather up completely the multiplicity of contents. The remedy sought is briefly this: The mutable contents are held in a scheme and treated as entailing each other; that is to say, through relations they are woven together in spite of qualitative differences, and thereby their restless dissolution is prevented from baffling us. In fine, the indwelling tendency outward of given contents, manifested in change, starts the movement of thought towards a relational unity in place of the unstable sub-relational unity of feeling. Thus the stage next to feeling is entered.

II.

It should be borne in mind at the outset that the shifting contents of feeling as such cannot be detained and fitted into any scheme. What goes, goes irrevocably, so to say. The relational order that is spoken of can not include the felt manifold undistorted. Rather, it is the meanings of the sense-particulars that furnish the terms of the relational complex. And the meanings by their very nature are general and universal. So what thought waves together

waves together is never the unique, felt particulars, but the universal significations 'distilled from their being . Thought is connection of meanings or general ideas.

We have, of course, learnt from the associationist that the sense-particulars leave traces which are also particulars, and thinking consists of the latter. "We may divide, " says Hume, " all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. By the term impression I mean all more lively perceptions, when we hear, see or feel, love or hate or desire or will". The difference between ideas and impressions is therefore one of degree not of kind; " all our ideas or more feeble perceptions, being copies of our impressions or more lively ones." The materials of thinking are nothing other than such copies or images, and thinking is nothing " but the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting and diminishing the materials as afforded us by the senses and experience." Then, the ideas become compounded, transposed etc. according to " a principle of connection between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind". (Hume - An enquiry concerning human understanding, sections II & III). There is a certain degree of method and regularity in their appearance; they introduce each other by the law of association such as resemblance, contiguity and the like.

Thinking is merely

Thinking is merely the association of ideas, the ideas associated being the same psychological phenomena as the impressions, affections and desires.

Bradley formulates his view of thought through his opposition to the sensationist standpoint given above. Although he recognises association as the mechanism of the operation of thought, he denies outright that ideas are psychological items. An idea is a meaning that inheres in a psychosis. Before the meaning has been distinguished from the immediate being of the latter, we have no idea. An image is certainly a particular just as a sensation. But thought is not linking of images with one another in certain regular ways. What constitutes thought is the quality or the meaningcontent which transcends the that of the psychological modifications of the moment. The idea is the 'what which so far as it is a mere idea, clearly is not, and if also were, could so far not be called ideal. For ideality lies in the disjoining of quality from being.' (A. R. p. 163). Idea can never be identified with image. The image is, it exists, but an idea serves to qualify what exists and so can not be itself an existence. When I say, it is a rose, I mean to qualify the particular existence that appears in my perception, by the idea of rose or roseness which is not an existence presented to me as that of which it is affirmed. It forms no part of my conscious flow of the moment. And because it does not, it can be used as a predicate. What qualifies an other can not be a fact which is just

which is just what it is; it cannot be an image either. For 'an image is just as real as any sensation; it is merely a fact of another kind, and it is not one whit more ideal' (Ibid). True, an image is inside my head, but being inside my head cannot make it ideal. For then it is no more than an event fixed into a series of events and as such cannot be used as an adjective. But an idea is not an event. "Ideas do not exist, they cannot exist, if existence means presence in the series of phenomena. The idea does not happen and it cannot possess a place in the series. It is a mutilated content which as such cannot be more than an adjective." (P. L. Vol. II. Book III. p. 584).

An adjective is that which bears reference to a good many existents and lives, so to say, in that reference. Yellow is an adjective qualifying a number of things such as gold, sulphur, straw, but my image of, say, a yellow rose that someday drew my eyes from the wayside has no reference to anything other than itself; it is just of that rose experienced and of nothing else. That is to say, it is an existent unique and singular, holding a place in the psychical stream. Only when the discernment is made as to what the image is, and it is found that yellow is one of its features, that the factuality of the image is at once transcended by the ideality of the adjective, yellow, which now
is attributable to

is attributable to a lot of things of the world. Idea is the adjectival content isolated from the psychical being, a logical signification widely shared. There is no idea till the discernment of such signification or meaning. The sensationist's identification of image with idea is due to his inability to notice the universality or what may be called the adjectivality of idea as distinguished from the unique existentiality of image.

Approaching the question purely from the side of psychology we can again show that meaning is different from the image. In analysing my knowledge of, say, the University of Dacca the only image that I possibly discover is that of the white central building. But the University is to me much more than the central building- my idea of the university cannot be equated with the image that I possess. I am perfectly certain that my idea is fuller than the fragmentary image, and conveys to me all that the University stands for. Even if one is a visualiser par excellence, one's knowledge of the University cannot be exhausted by images; for there are aspects of the University which cannot be imaged at all, e. g., the corporate life of the University, the tutorial system, the peculiar atmosphere and the like.

We are, therefore, bound to admit an element besides image. This is meaning. The tiny image of the white building means the entire corporation with the various aspects that have revealed themselves to me. Even if the image were far more

fragmentary, were

fragmentary, were it no more than the northern wing of the building, the university idea would not have been any the poorer. For it is the meaning that makes the idea what it is. When one thinks of Duke of Wellington, the image that one possesses is the pale outline of an aquiline nose. But this, of course, is not one's idea of the Duke. The idea is what the image stands for, the life and personality of the Duke. If one had been thinking of some other person with the same characteristic nose, the image might remain the same. Yet the idea would vary inasmuch as a different type of character and career would be meant. (Stout's Manual of Psychology, pp.529-30).

Take again you idea of wealth. It is not unlikely that you will not have any clear-cut image. Even when you have any, you may not find any other person sharing the same image with you, although there may be quite an agreement with regard to what is understood by the term wealth. Then, the image or images that one may possess are inadequate for the object intended. One may have the image of a Rolls Royce car, another of a splendidly furnished drawing room. But how very small an item of wealth either of these images is! As to persons who have no idea of wealth, these very images may stand for quite different concepts, - the image of a Rolls Royce may serve for the idea of a

idea of a motor car.

Now the different images meaning the same thing, the smallest image material sufficing for a complex object and lastly, the same image in different persons meaning differently, all go to prove that the main constituent of an idea is something which though rooted in the being of the image, points away from it, and in so doing, invests it (image) with an intricacy and richness of import which it (image) by itself does not possess. This something is the meaning that transcends the that or existence of the psychic item, the image.

III.

This view of the nature of the idea will be confirmed by a proper understanding of the doctrine of Association which has been the bed-rock of sensationism. " The fashionable doctrine of Association according to which particular images are recalled and unite with particular images" is held by Bradley to be totally wrong. An experience is surely modified by a prior experience. But this modification is never effected by the prior experience in its particular form. "Nothing ever is associated without in the process being shorn of particularity". Images there certainly are and they are particular. But Bradley contends that these particulars
as such do not

as such do not determine the extension of experience. I see a patch of green and know it to be grass. Hence the rudimentary green-sensation is extended into the knowledge of grass. The sensationist will say that according to the law of association the traces of my past experience of the qualities of grass reappear in particular forms a b c and modify the presented green into the knowledge of grass. But a little reflection will show that this can never be the case. It cannot be that the whole of the previous psychological occurrence which I call my experience of grass (in the past) is reinstated at the moment of my perception of grass. That is impossible because every experience worth the name involves endless ramifications, the revival of which in their entirety would hinder mental development instead of helping it. Yet it is these details that constitute the particularity of the experience. Let us now see if what is revived is not unaccompanied by those details. The grass that I had perceived might have been wet with the last shower that had washed it; it might have been trodden by unknown feet; again the morning breeze that blew might have carried the fragrance of wild flowers from the neighbouring bush. But such and such-like details do not reappear and work in the modification of the present perception of green. We have instead a shadowy outline that symbolises any grass that I or any other observer might see; and this alone is used in the apprehension of the present green as grass. It is not supposed, however, that the elaborate context in which the percept appeared disappeared altogether from the mind. What is meant is that it is never used fully.

is that it is never used fully. What is used is a portion of the content of the percept "that is permanent amid differences which later becomes the universal meaning". It is the grassness embodying such general features as colour and structural peculiarity, that operates on the present experience, and as such the operating content is merely adjectival to the original perception, and is no particular psychical atom or atoms as the sensationist supposes. The presented green also in so far as it is assimilated by the revived elements does not remain a unique green continuous in its turn with a psychical context. It mingles with the reproduced grassness by virtue of its identical character of grassness. Here as in every case of reproduction a common identity works, an identity transcending "the distinct perceptions and distinct existences" of Hume.

Bradley illustrates the thorough ideality of the process of reproduction by means of the following example :

_____ A dog comes to a place where he had fought a cat or another dog. It is said the perception of the place calls up associated ideas and he runs eagerly forward. Let us suppose his experience was of a white cat or a black dog with a brass collar. To-day images are called up, not so definite perhaps but still certainly with some detail, and we will suppose the detail reproduces the experience. Today it is a black cat that is found in the place,

found in the place, but with an ordinary dog that will make no difference. The whiteness of the image is quite irrelevant for his purpose. Or again if today another dog be perceived and if only that dog be not glaringly different, the less intelligent he is, the more catholic is his action. For it is not the whole image, but a portion of the content which operates in his mind. He may turn from a small dog or a white dog or a smooth-coated dog, but, size, blackness and roughness are the typical ideas which will operate. If it is argued, that it is the fault of the animal which does not distinguish between two situations, Bradley would reply, "Why does it fail to distinguish?" If it is argued again the dog does not attend to the difference between a white and a black animal, it is at once allowed that "the differences are not used but remain inoperative. What operates and what is used is a portion of the content and as such typical. It is the type that operates, not the image." (P.L. pp. 36 - 37). The instance as such never works. It is the connection of certain contents belonging to it that works away from it.

Bain explains reproduction in the following terms. * Actions, sensations, and States of feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together, or co-here, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt

the others are apt to be brought up in idea." (P.L. Vol.I. Second Edition.p. 312). But he fails to recognise that what is brought up in idea is deprived of " some features and some clothing of its qualities," and being detached from the elaborate context by which the particular fact is made particular, is altogether a different stuff from the original perceptual experience.

Bradley regards the law of Redintegration as a correct statement of the working of the mind . It runs thus : " Any part of a single state of mind tends, if reproduced, to reinstate the remainder; or Any element tends to reproduce those elements with which it has formed one state of mind". (P.L. Vol. 1. 2nd Edition. p. 304). The phrase ' one state of mind' suggests a point of view different from atomism. The implication is that the unity of an experience to be retained is accomplished through the connection of its contents a b c d . After the presentation has been lived through there remains not an individual psychical atom or existence, but at best a disposition of the mind which works " as a tendency to pass from content to content. It is a connection not between this a and this b, or this c and this d, but between the universals a and b, or c and d. It is a quality of the mind which manifests itself in the fact that if we have one part of the content which appeared in X (the original presentation) then although everything which particularised

which particularised that content in X and gave its existence, has disappeared, this bare universal a, b, c, or d when given with a different set of particulars (in the second presentation that occasions the revival), may reinstate by its ideal identity any other of the universals a, b, c or d" (Ibid . p. 307). Smoke reminds one of fire. But it is undoubted that it is never a specific fire that is recalled. The smoke of the fire that I have seen before may not have been so voluminous and dark. Yet the present smoke which is thin and light-coloured, reproduces that. For in spite of the specific differences in volume and colour, there is likeness between the two smokes in respect of the common elements that make both of them smoke. It is these elements operating outside the specific differences that effect the extension of the present perception of smoke into the recognition of fire. May be, the fire that is thought of on the basis of this thin smoke is, in proportion to it, a small one. But that, Bradley holds, is due to the present mental setting which reparticularises the reproduced universal content (Cp. Stout, Manual p.563). But this setting " is not the bond which works in reproduction; what works is the connection between universals, and the basis of that working is the ideal identity of some element in what is present and what is past" (P.L. V 1, p. 307).

Even when we consider the revivability of an
intense experience

intense experience association proves to be no more than " the marriage of universals". Suppose there is castor oil and the feeling of sickness is recalled. But it is never the old feeling of sickness. " The old feeling was the event it was by its presence in a certain series of events. It had a number of accompaniments, conditions and circumstances which belonged to it as this feeling. The psychological environment was in great part different". Yet if we call the two feelings same that is because we mean the sameness of character. "The feelings of sickness are the same in the main, that is, they have an identical content which is the same though contexts are different. The first conjunction of castor oil and sickness has no longer the smallest existent as fact. But it gave rise to a connection of elements in the mind, which elements are an identical part of the content of this fact. The new presentation of castor oil is a fact which is certainly not the old fact; yet it has a content which is partly the same. The ideal identity of this castor oil with that castor oil recovers ideally and in an universal form another element of the original form. And so far as mere reproduction goes, nothing but the universal could be called up". (Ibid.pp. 307- 308).

The conclusion that we are now led to is this. Mental development takes place by way of reproduction. The transition from pure experience to the next higher

to the next higher stage is possible because the result of previous experience determines the nature and course of subsequent experience. This determination is effected through the operation of universals, and it marks the birthdate of ideality. Ideality, that is to say, takes its rise "when a present perception has one part of its content identical with the past, when this common universal reinstates another part of the original context". (Ibid). The Sensationist psychology also ascribes mental development to reproduction according to the laws of Association, but its central error lies in the failure to recognise the ideality of the reproductory operation, and therefore, the distinction between the psychosis and the idea, feeling and thought.

IV.

That thought is not a transition from image to image as the sensationists suppose, but is out and out an ideal process, is brought out more clearly by Bradley by an independent consideration of the nature of judgment in which thought is present in its completeness. " In judgment an idea is predicated of a reality. What is predicated is not a mental image. It is not a fact inside my head which the judgment wishes to attach to another fact outside. The predicate is a mere what, a mere feature of content which is used to qualify the that of the subject. And this predicate is divorced from its

from its psychical existence in my head, and is used without regard to its being there. When I say 'this horse is mammal', it is surely absurd to suppose I am harnessing my mental state to the beast between the shafts. Judgment adds an adjective to reality, and this adjective is an idea, because it is a quality made loose from its own existence and is working free from its implication with that." (A.R. pp. 163- 64). Prior to making the above judgment I must have possessed the image of a mammal, say of a cow. But the bare possession of the image is irrelevant to the judgment as such. The mammalness as a quality must be distinguished and conceived as transcending the particular image of a cow. When this has been done, the floating adjective or idea is attributed to what in perception is presented as sharing the identical quality of mammalness, that is the beast called horse, and the judgment 'the horse is a mammal' results. The factual existence of this idea of mammalness, as of every other idea consists in a sensation or perception or an image which includes it as one of its contents, or as an aspect of its what. But it (this content of mammalness) becomes alienated from the that of sensation, perception or image and attaches to another reality sensed or perceived immediately. "Such movement is ideality" and yields judgment. Hence it may be noted in passing, that this movement is nothing " outside of facts, something imported into them, or imposed as a sort of

as a sort of layer above them". Every fact shows looseness of content from existence. The what of a fact cannot be held within its being. The what is forced beyond the given that and is made to qualify something outside it. The mammal feature of the cow, in the above example, carries itself beyond the given that (of the cow) towards something else. " The essential nature of the finite is that everywhere as it presents itself, its character should slide beyond the limits of its existence" (A. R. p. 166). Thought or judgment is the product of this division of what from that.

When we consider that the object of judgment is truth, it comes out clearly that the contents of judgment are disparate from psychical facts or existences immediately felt. I say, for example, Wealth is desirable. But there would be no question of truth or falsity if the judgment were merely a combination of sensations or images, if, in other words, it were a psychical connection between the experience of wealth and the experience of a longing for it. It would then be an out and out factual complex and as such would be neither true nor false. A fact is neither true nor false; it merely is; only the signification is either true or false. The sun's rays, for example, are merely out there; it would not mean anything to say that in themselves they may be either true or false.

Now if the affirmation, wealth is desirable, is a judgment in the right sense of the term, it
is because

is because the whole thing is intelligible only as a meaning complex which transcends the immediate psychical being, and refers beyond. And in this reference beyond originates the possibility of truth and error. The essence of the judgment consists in the movement of the meanings or ideas, towards an outside existent. The truth or falsity of the judgment arises from the appropriateness or otherwise of this movement outwards, which appropriateness or otherwise is dependent upon the aptness or otherwise of the connection of contents effected within the judgment. When the connection of contents finds a home as it carries itself away, there is truth; when it does not there is error. Returning to the judgment, the horse is mammal, if we ask, Do you believe in the idea of mammal ? It is at once obvious that the inquiry is not made about the psychical fact, the image of a mammal. Rather the possibility of a definite order of things being qualified by the universal mammal content which is a logical not a psychological element, is in question here. In all judgments, therefore, the ascription is always of a meaning, not of an image to the universe of discourse. The surrounding objects, to use an analogy, are not illumined by the tinlamp which is as good an object as they are, but by the light it shoots. Similarly the cognitive halo that the image emits, exceeding as it does the physical bounds of the image is the stuff of which thought or judgment is constituted. Just as the light and the lamp are different in character, one being energy and another matter, so also the meaning and image are essentially unlike each other, the one being a fact

being a fact, the other an adjective.

V.

We should now pass on to the consideration of another characteristic of thought. Thought is not merely an idealising process but it is also an objectifying process. To be more accurate, to idealise is also to objectify. "Objectivity means a control proceeding from the object (of thought)". When, for instance, I say 'rainy weather is wet weather', I am thinking or judging, and thinking or judging about something; and this something as it has shaped itself in thought is independent of the psychical process at the moment of the judgment. The wetness of the rainy weather I am compelled to accept as true, regardless of my dislike and discomfort, if any; it is, in the words of Bosanquet what 'I am obliged to think'. When we enquire what the obligatory character is due to, and turn to sense, we at once find that sense experience, being perpetually shifting and becoming what it is not, cannot, owing to its very nature, exercise any coercion. Until what it has been and what it becomes, are conceived as unchanging ideal contents, no control can proceed therefrom. The controlling object "is any portion of the psychical process so far as it bears and subserves a certain character. It must in the first place have a meaning, an ideal content which is distinct from its existence as a psychical occurrence. And further the content must preserve its identity. It must from beginning be a self-same whole which keeps together

keeps together without any foreign assistance. We must be able to say, from the beginning, it has been and still is merely itself". (Collected Essays Vol.1 p. 208). And this can be said only if it is a universal and not a shifting particular.

In my judgment, Rainy weather is wet weather, the terms rain and weather signify such universals and their being together is no psychical co-existence but a matter of logical entailment. 'Rainy weather is wet weather' does not express the feeling of any particular individual nor refers to any particular rainy day. Hence its intelligibility is not confined to any one individual. Far from being an incommunicable private experience, it is as Joachim has said "the common inheritance of many and all of us." The universal intelligibility which issues from the operation of universals carries the irresistible implication of irreversibility. What is intelligible universally is incapable of being altered or made otherwise. That is, I am compelled to extend assent to it in all circumstances of my private existence. No more than this unalterability is meant by saying, here is the world, or the objective order independent of the subject.

True, reality appears in the immediate presentation. But it cannot be confined within the given spot or point of sensuous contact. What I mean by the real world is never this amorphous datum that is this and mine, but is such an enlargement of it as is mine as well as else's. Until the conviction that what I experienced is also the experience of every other possible experiencer, has emerged within knowledge, there is no world to be known. When I say I know
the moon,

the moon, I cannot but at the same time hold that what appears to me as the moon is the identical moon cognisable by all other persons. From bare sense contact such conviction is absent and hence there is no knowledge of an object. This can be illustrated from a common-place experience. I see a speck in the sky and think it is a high soaring bird, but immediately it disappears. I then hesitate to call it a bird, and say, it is all a subjective error of vision. That is to say, the speck cannot be an object for me since I am unable to assert that it would be similarly perceived by any other percipient from my position.

Now going into the cause of such conviction we find, it is due to the operation of ideal meaning abstracted from the given presentation. The judgment, Rainy Weather is wet weather, is an outcome of a process of abstraction by which the features rainness and wetness are distinguished as mutually implicatory significations of the rainy day. This apprehension of a necessary connection between being a rainy day and being wet is all that is necessary to produce the conviction that rain is wet invariably and for all and also that it does not at all lie with the individual percipient to assent or not to assent to it. Every one is, now, obliged to recognise this as a phenomenon of the objective world, the sense of obligation coming not as an idiosyncrasy of any body's psychological apparatus, but as a universal logical compulsion superior to one and all. Thus rain and wetness acquire objectivity through the judgment, that is to say, through the logical linkage of meanings.

An object is never

An object is never the given or the felt. It is that of which some affirmation can be made and made necessarily. "Our world" in the words of Bosanquet, "as existing for us in the medium of knowledge consists for us of a standing affirmation about reality. This affirmation about reality may be described as the continuous affirmative judgment of waking consciousness". (Essentials pp. 32-33). Omit this affirmation and there is no world or objective order. The common sense view that objectivity is externality is unfounded. According to it the sun is an object because it is out there independent of the cogniser from the beginning. But the weakness of this position is seen easily enough. The sun, it may be said, is an independent thing prior to the sense-contact that makes it felt in a finite psychical centre. But one may ask whether its so called independence of and priority to finite experience, is any more than an affirmation of the subject that thinks of it in terms of those adjectives. The answer is, no. Independence or pre-existence merely indicates the character as it has been shaped out of the original sense-experience by the thinking apparatus of the individual. In the sense-contact, there is no priority or independence given. Sense-experience does not coincide with any knowledge of such determination. It is simply felt. So on the basis of sense-experience, pure and simple, one cannot find independence which is a product of the subsequent ideal interpretation of what is immediately felt. Even if we leave out Bishop Berkeley's forceful contention which has not been successfully refuted up to this day, namely that externality is but a complex idea of sense,

idea of sense, externalness means not an absolute independence of a thing of the knowing process, but an obligatoriness in respect of the individual that knows, which obligatoriness is an outcome of the working of thought. The sun is independent and self-maintaining in the sense that it is apprehended by the intellect to be definitely and unalterably yellow, warm, spherical and so on. Its independence consists in the logical necessity by which the judgments attributing these qualities are made about it, but never in spatial or existential apartness as such. The world of things is made, it is a construct of knowledge, and endures because it is so. Kant has said, Understanding maketh nature, Similarly says Bradley, "Nature is but one part of the feeling whole which we have separated by our abstraction and enlarged by theoretical necessity and contrivance. And we set up this fragment as self-existing, and what is sometimes called science goes out of its way to make a gross mistake. It takes an intellectual construction for independent reality" (A. R. p. 267). The objective order is not already-made something waiting to be discovered by the cognising mind. It is a system in which an idea is linked to the rest by a relation of logical entailment, which is meaningless without the activity of thought. "The real world, as a definite organised system," says Bosanquet, "is for me an extension of present sensation and self-feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such

and sustain such extension" (Logic, p. 77). We have have no world until an interrelated ideal complex has been superinduced by thought upon the primal feeling, until, in other words, meanings have broken out of the feeling and combined themselves into an order of their own, sustained by logical implication.

VI.

Here it is necessary to consider certain criticisms urged against Bradley's conception of the objective order or for the matter of that, discursive knowledge.

Dawes Hicks observes, "The statement that the existence of my horse is a content which has broken loose from my psychical being is non-sensical. My horse never existed as part of my psychical being and could not therefore have broken loose from it. But it is in truth no less non-sensical to speak of the content I am aware of in such a case as having broken loose from my psychical being, i, e, from my act of awareness." He substantiates his objection in the following way : " When I assert that the rose is red, no scrutiny, however, careful, will reveal a process of first discerning redness as a quality of a mental state of mine of then detaching it from the state; and finally of transferring it to something entirely different. The redness seems to be as little a content of my mental state as the rose. So far from thrusting upon the latter a characteristic of my mental state I appear to be detaching redness as a property of the object". (Mind 1925 His article on Bradley's nature).

In the same line

In the same line with the above criticism, Mr. Strange contends against Bradley's theory of knowledge. (Mind, 1911). If we take the judgment, the paper is white, "in whole concrete situation of my affirming that this paper is white, I can discern myself as in a certain state, namely, the state of predicating whiteness of this paper. Myself as in this state is an existent thing of a certain character. I can also discern the paper about which I can make the affirmation, again an existent thing with a content part of which content I detect and affirm as belonging to the paper. But the content of my mental state is not the paper, nor the whiteness which I predicate of the paper, any more than the whiteness I detect and assert as belonging to the paper is my act of affirming whiteness of the paper. Describe the character of the mental fact involved in my predicating whiteness of this paper as fully as you please, and you cannot find whiteness as part of that characterWhen I judge that this paper is white I do not spin out of myself or loosen from my state the whiteness. Whiteness is a character which I detect as belonging to certain objects which are not myself as, for example, paper and snow. The notion of content divorced from (psychical) existence is a fiction".

The basic assumption on which the above criticisms are made is that the object is already standing over against the conscious subject, that it has never been an

never been an ingredient of the subject's psychical being. Knowledge, accordingly, is the detection of the contents of the independent object by the equally independent knowing mind. The distinction of subject and object is thus made absolute and ultimate, and immediate experience of the kind Bradley holds is completely discounted. "At no stage in the history of mental life there was such a mode of experience" in which no distinction of subject and object existed. But we have seen in the last chapter that Dawes Hicks also believes in immediacy which, of course, he describes as a bare awareness of contents that are apart from the awareness. Strange also admits "it is possible to detect the flow of consciousness occurring in a psychical centre as a series of this-now-mines or immediate presentation". But this immediacy is only a portion of the concrete knowledge - situation of which the object forms another part. But neither of the above critics has cared to prove that even at the very beginning of soul life the whole complex situation involving a distinction of awareness and an existent thing to which the awareness refers, was present. That is to say, it has not been established that the distinction between the psychical and the material exists the two components of the concrete situation, is what knowledge started with. Speaking of the early stage of knowledge, Dawes Hicks himself says, "It may be granted that the distinction between subject and object would not there have been recognised by the conscious subject and that the content

and that the content perceived would have been crude and obscure in the highest degree". If this was the condition of the beginning of cognition, it is hardly possible to hold that object is fundamentally distinct from the awareness thereof, except retrospectively, in the light of the subsequent cognition of an object or an objective world. For, there is no meaning in the assertion that there is an object unless it is recognised as having a certain character. The paper is an object only because it strikes me with a definite character. The admission that the object could not be recognised is tantamount to saying that a definite thing was yet to appear. So is the admission that the object was crude and obscure in the extreme. Yet there is no gainsaying that it was a definite psychical stage despite the fact that recognition of the object was absent. When subsequently the knowledge of the thing with a definite character develops it is quite sensible to say, here is an object, the character of which is unalterably what it is, and which is distinct from the thinking of the same; but it is certainly illegitimate to push backward this distinction to a stage where admittedly no discrimination of the object was possible.

If one will undertake an investigation of the growth of knowledge, unbiassed by any pre-conceived theory, one cannot but admit the fundamental nature of sentience. This sentience is not merely an act or merely the mental counterpart of the non-mental in knowledge-situation. It is a whole of that we sense, feel, desire and fancy - a whole where 'will and thought and feeling are all one' (A.R. p. 160).

The character of this

The character of this continuum has been elaborated in the preceding chapter. So we should not dwell on it over again. But what is necessary to understand in this connection is that the knowledge of the world which we possess together with the knowledge of the self as the knower is not the beginning of soul-life. Before reflective mechanism begins to operate there is just a psychical stream, a stream of conscious modifications expressible neither in terms of the world of interrelated objects, nor of the cognising ego. My thought of this paper as white is preceded by a stage where the consciousness of the paper was of a piece with a psychological setting from which it being isolated becomes the so-called independent white thing it is. "Our actual sense-experience at any moment", says Stout, "forms a continuous totality. Particular impressions of touch or temperature form an unbroken unity with the mass of impressional experiences due to the constant excitation of the sensitive surface of the skin over the whole body.As regards sight, each particular visual impression is part of the total experience due to the stimulation of the whole retina, and the entire mass of visual sensation is bound up with tactual and muscular experiences due to the position and movement of the eyelids and of the eye-ball in its socket. All joint, tendon and muscle sensations enter into the general "consentience" as we may call it. Finally, all the special sensations of touch, sight, sound, taste, smell, tendon, joint and muscle are intimately united with the organic sensibility and its varying modifications".

modifications". (Stout, Manual, pp.534-35). If immediacy is regarded as what has been called 'consentience' instead of as a bare awareness, it is not at all difficult to understand what Bradley calls loosening of a content from the psychical being.

The idea of redness, for example, is called a content loosened from existence in the sense that being a universal it is no part of the totality of mental states that constitutes an individual's existence. The criticism that this loosening of content is non-sensical or fictitious owes itself to the want of a genetic approach to knowledge and the consequent inability to see that beyond the concrete situation of subject and object, the self and the world, there is consentience or what may be called the psychoplasm which alone is genuine being. Dawes Hicks' remark noted above that redness is no more a content of my psychical being than rose, would be easily answered by Bradley. He would have said, "Your so-called thing rose has not at all along been what it is. Originally it was a unique experience undefined yet as a rose. There it was a felt existence in a series of existences without the distinguishable character which now makes it an object thinkable as rose. The rose, therefore, was originally indistinguishable from the psychical series". It is really impossible to refute Bradley when he says that to exist "is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience". Animals, plants, inorganic masses, greater or smaller, all exist in so far as they are bound up with my psychical being, are of a tissue with my inner life. Apart from my psychical existence,

existence, there is no genuine existence, anywhere. The truth of this assertion does not easily commend itself to us, because we do not carefully analyse what existence means. We say, it is a bird, here is a maiden, and we suppose that we have spoken of things that exist without, and are no constituent of our inward existence. But it is sheer blindness on our part not to see that we are all the while laying stress on the what or the character of both bird and maiden to the exclusion of their that or being. Besides being a bird and a maiden respectively, they are, they exist, and this their being or existence is nothing, if not felt as a unique psychical matter of fact. A thing we commonly speak of is a complex of adjectives or characters, and so far it is not existent. Sugar, for example, is sweet, white and smooth, but the predication of these adjectives merely reveals to me the characters of sugar. Although they can make me wise enough about it, yet I do not reach the existence of sugar within these predicates; for this, I must undergo the experience of unique taste and feel and sight of sugar; that is it must enter my psychical life before it is an existent for me. Existence is no character like whiteness or smoothness or sweetness; it is an undefinable 'that' revealed only in the feeling of a finite psychical centre. "Reality of which all categories are descriptions can only be experienced, immediately known or lived. To such reality or factual existence there is no logical bridge " (Hegelianism and Personality. Seth. p.119). There is an interesting story, current in Bengal, of a blind man who wanted to have knowledge of milk.

milk. On being told that it resembles the heron in colour, the man asked about the heron. Learning that the heron resembles the scythe, he wanted a scythe to be brought. Touching over the scythe he remarked innocently that milk must be a curved thing like the one in his hand. What the story suggests is that description of its attributes is not equivalent to the that of the thing which can appear only in my experience. "My way of contact with Reality is through a limited aperture, For I cannot get at it except through the felt 'this' ". Every piece of existence must be felt 'burningly in this one focus', (A.R. 260). There cannot be any existence other than the felt.

Both Dawes Hicks and Strange believe that there are two types of existence. Dawes Hicks says, "Feelings, process of knowing and willing - these are the components of the individual mental life and they have an existence of their own - a mode of existence that is both numerically and generically distinct from that of things or of other mental lives. By means of certain of these processes, those called cognitive, the finite centre in which they occur, is or appears to be made aware of the being and nature of existents other than himself". Strange similarly says, " An object of thought is as much existent as the mental fact which thinks it, and has a that in its own right apart from, though related to, this mental fact. (Objects) are existent things with a certain content apprehended by the thinker who is also an existent thing with a certain content". But there is no answer in any of the above observations to the question whether the existence of a thing is conceivable unfelt, or

conceivable unfelt, or in other words whether a thing's being is separable from being felt. At the moment the finite centre is 'made aware of an existent' immediately that existent becomes a phenomenon of its inner life. The mental occurrence is nothing like a copy of the extramental thing; the two are identical. There is certainly knowledge of the thing as an independent entity, but^{it} is no knowledge of the unique existent. That knowledge consists of a system of contents that are ideal and hence universal. Both the above critics have affirmed the division of experience and the experienced, that really is an aftergrowth, as original, and have confused objectivity with existence. Could they recognise the fact that existence is that which tingles with an inwardness, and objectivity is what coerces by an ideal force, it would not have been difficult for them to understand Bradley when he says that the object is a content projected out of the psychical concourse of the this-now-mine. It is their realistic bias that forbids them to carry to its logical end their recognition of the psychical existence. So they fail to acknowledge the originality as well as the totality of sentience, and hold on to the duality of knowing and being as ultimate.

VII.

To sum up the results of this chapter. Owing to its inner inconsistency immediate experience breaks up into ideas. Ideas get loosened from the original context by the mechanism of association.

As loosened

As loosened they are no longer particular but are universal. Ideas are not mental states. They are meanings or adjectives. The world that is common to all of us and that is treated by common-sense as an independent existence, is, in fact, throughout ideal a system of universals evolved by the operation of thought from the immediate whole. It is not original it is a construction. The original psychical existence having been transcended, we have before us objects with definite characters. Prior to the working of reflective thought no such objects were present. In the words of James, "In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection, 'lo ! '), the infant encounters an object in which all the 'categories of the understanding' are contained (Principles of Psychology, Vol. II. p. 8). The categorised world is "an amplification and an implication of that first simple germ' (James). Bearing in mind that the knowledge or the world that thought furnishes is a development from the sentient basis, we should now proceed to estimate the value of this handiwork of thought.

Chapter III.

FUTILITY OF DISCURSIVE THOUGHT.

I.

The work of understanding or thought as we have seen, consists in the articulation of immediate feeling or sensepresentation by discriminating the adjectival aspects therefrom and setting them out in a relational complex. Thought thus strives to develop the embryonic whole of sense-perception through the mechanism of ideas and relations, but it never succeeds. For, its operation being confined to symbolical ideas or universals, it cannot comprehend the real that is substantial and unique. "The real", says Bradley, "is inaccessible by way of ideas". They cannot convey the uniqueness of feeling. No ultimate satisfaction of the theoretical endeavour to apprehend the real is possible through the operation of thoughts the character of which is disparate from the individuality of reality.*

Then are we to end in scepticism ? Is the quest of the ultimate nature of things to be abandoned as futile ? If ideality is for ever distant from reality, and the disparity between the two is incapable of being overcome, then
metaphysics is

* This easily follows from the above discussion of distinction between existence and idea.

metaphysics is clearly impossible. But thought according to Bradley is not the only mechanism available in the ultimate enquiry. It does not mark the limit to the cognitive activity of the mind, nor is thought inherently impervious to a superior fruition. On the contrary, the logical movement of mind which is ideality or thought, carries within itself an unmistakable implication of an end in which all quest of the real must meet with fulfilment. When thought is analysed, it discloses an inner striving, a nisus towards a whole, gathering momentum from its very inadequacy. May be, it is beyond the power of thought as such to attain to such a consummation, but that certainly does not make such an end impossible. It is possible to think of an ultimate mode of apprehension in which thought enters and loses itself, and there all the deficiency of thought is entirely remedied. Bradley does not stop with proving in detail the impotency of thought but draws its implications and envisages a superior destiny for it. Let us amplify this point.

II.

The beginning of consciousness is characterised by an unrest and instability which leads to the operation of thought consisting in the manipulation of ideal symbols for the purpose of consistent comprehension. In going to comprehend the world of presentation, thought has recourse to breaking up the original unity in which things appear. This is
the unity of

the unity of that and what, existence and quality. But this rupture of the first unity of presentation is not performed purposelessly. The function of thought consists in seizing upon the ideal contents that they may be woven into a system in which that theoretical satisfaction will be found which the bare immediacy fails to give. Judgment in which thought is completed and crystallised is not to be regarded as a blind idealisation of a presented fact. It essentially implies re-union of the two sides, what and that, provisionally estranged and has behind it the inner urge of the mind to master the presented datum in its entirety. That this is so will appear at once from the fact that thought does not rest with an isolated judgment in regard to a particular subject. It irresistibly goes forward from one judgment to another in order to reach the widest comprehension of what is presented, or in other words, to hold the subject in its entirety within the precincts of the predicates. Thought "takes the road of indefinite expansion", because the presentation carries within itself an infinite richness of contents, the whole of which is waiting to be intelligised. Let us take the judgment, Love is divine. This judgment aims at comprehending the reality of love by attributing divineness to it. But does it express love in its distinctive nature and does it satisfy all our enquiries about this profound emotion ? It does not. The judgment by itself does not tell us any more than the judgment. Kindness is divine. When we frame another judgment and say love is a passionate attachment between two persons,

between two persons, again we find that friendship is also a passionate attachment between two persons, or that there may also be passionate attachment between a brother and sister. The second judgment thus helps little to distinguish love from other types of attachment and fails to comprehend its unique essence. Many more judgments will, therefore, follow to get at the unique reality signified by love. All the characteristic features of love will be loosened or understood apart from the original undivided love experience and these separated qualities or features will constitute predicates of newer judgments till what may be called a system of thoughts is evolved on the subject. "It (thought) seeks to find an arrangement of ideas self-consistent and complete and by this predicate it has to qualify and make good the reality". (A. & R. pp. 360-361).

This continuous weaving of thought patterns in order to grasp the real in its fullness reveals a point of importance. Every judgment that is made about love relates it to some other fact and thus enlarges its scope. The first judgment, Love is divine, establishes its affinity with kindness and the like that also may be thought divine. It is thus immediately suggested that there may be some identity of essence between love and those other types of experience justifying the common predicate 'divine'. In the same way, the judgments that follow link it up with other phases of experience. As thought progresses in its working upon its datum more and more of the world is brought into connection with it.

And this process

And this process is directed towards building up a consistent system of ideal contents. A tendency to expansion is thus inherent in thought - a tendency to appropriate every quality or relation that fits in with the subject in hand. What appears as an undivided intuition comes, through the mediation of thought, to have numberless affiliations to different aspects and phases of the universe continuous with its original being. In and through a network of relations thought advances and what was originally a confused co-existence is replaced by a body of inter-related ideas, that is interminably widened and enlarged. Let us express the same thing in another way. Given a presentation, the discursive intelligence conceives a feature thereof and predicates it of the presentation. In this way the first judgment is made. But the idealisation of a single feature and its attribution to the presented fact are utterly inadequate for the comprehension of the presentation that carries a wealth of contents. So the unfoldment of one feature after another proceeds and at last thereby grows up an ideal construction. And this construction hardly ends. For the unity in which the sense-presentation originally appeared and which has broken up in consequence of the operation of thought, must be reinstated at the thought level, if the knowledge of the fact in question is to be in any sense complete. The movement of thought, therefore, continues with the object of achieving the goal - restoring the "broken whole".

The striving of

The striving of thought "to enlarge by all means its domain, to widen in every way the world of knowledge" is markedly present in inference. Indeed, inference is founded upon the inner urge of thought to pass from the present to the future, from the known to the unknown. When the judgments, S is P, K is P, T is P are presented to us, the mind is forced by an inherent impulse to the judgment, all M is P, that is, all M's that are presented to-day together with those that were and will be in future, are P. When we try to get at the pulse of the inference, we discover that thought strives to reach an infinite totality embracing the past, the present and the future in an ultimate synthesis, "to appropriate everything from which it is not forced off". "It is a law", says Bradley, "when we have a subject A and with this a possible predicate B, when this predicate B is left alone, the subject appropriates the predicate and openly appropriates to itself as a possession that will accompany it in the present and in the future under all circumstances". (P. L. p.451). This movement of thought towards a completed system of contents is the *sine qua non* of every possible inference.

III.

Yet thought as such never attains the end of its striving, the consummation it aims at. The operation of thought in judgment as well as in inference affords no comprehension of reality, the only perfect system. The ideas simply represent the general characteristics belonging to the sense-presentation which is the beginning of conscious life.

life. These characteristics fall off from their psychological existence and by the very fact of being abstractions cannot stand by themselves. In other words, they are adjectives whose only function is to relate themselves to a world of existence. It is true that the sensible reality would have been a mere nothingness, if character-contents which go into the constitution of ideas, were not there though in a undifferentiated manner. Yet at the same time it is true that these qualities when detached by thought process from the original perceptual integration and distinguished and conceived apart, do no longer possess that aspect of life and individuality which they did while coalescing inside the experience. Therefore, they are not equal to the world of existence. In the words of Broad, "What I started to understand is a perceptual whole. What I end by understanding is a propositional whole. The difficulty is not merely that the detail is infinite but what we understand, namely, the universal was not as such present in what we were acquainted with". (Mind 1914. p.359).

Intellectualistic idealism ignores the fundamental sentient basis on which the concepts or ideas operate. And what is more, it regards the latter practically as the essential elements of cognition and for the matter of that of the universe. According to this the system of concepts which is the work of the thinking principle is in every sense ultimate and the datum of experience, though recognised as the starting point of knowledge, is without any place in the intellectualist system of thought. The

the intellect. The intellectualist attempts to prove that reality is nothing beyond an arrangement of qualities; and experience, if conceived apart and prior to the principles or categories of thought, is a blind brute datum as good as nothing. An intellectualist of Green's type will go to the extent of saying that the sense datum is a fiction like the atom of Physics. No sooner do we attempt to isolate this sensation than it eludes us and loses itself

into thought-relation.

It is the same world of experience which considered as a manifold object may be called feeling and considered as a subject presenting itself may be called thought. The given is not the self-subsisting pure matter, but matter formed, universalised, related one to another and characterised by relations. The determinations that knowledge displays cannot be overcome to arrive straightaway at experience or sense-datum. In fine, the intellectualist constructs a world by abstract thought or mere universals.

To render knowledge into a body of ideas or concepts and to propose to rest wholly in it is nothing other than overruling the inner evidence of the soul in favour of a world of shadows or phantoms. In a previous chapter we have seen that immediacy is an enduring basis of conscious existence. The persistency of a feeling background which is other than the contentless ego, the bare "I think", or any logical postulate of sense-datum, must reveal itself to a self-examination freed from intellectualist bias. It will then be found that the

sense-manifold is not a

sense-manifold is not a logical limit merely, without any psychological status of its own. Though the burning awareness of the sensuous presentation cannot be detected in the finished conceptual construction which is equivalent to an intellectualist universe, it is not to be supposed that sense-differences have been neutralised in the identity of thought or have suffered themselves to be transmuted into that system beyond redemption. On the contrary, they constitute an infinite, Other that no idealising can absorb or transform into a system of universals, and that it is so is clear from the endless progress of thought.

Experience is too vast and overwhelming to be schematised into the universality of apperception, the economy of logical symbols, as Hegelians like Sterling would have us believe. It is incapable of being exhausted by thought that works by means of ideas or adjectival contents. In fact, thought vainly makes use of the ideas or concepts to comprehend that abiding sentient real which for ever remains out of it. The analysis of love, for example, into its characters or qualities cannot reinstate or represent exactly the unique feeling of love that one experiences within oneself. Ideas or judgments may be multiplied but they do not help in the comprehension of the real love experience. All thought patterns about this feeling are after all an external survey of an individual mental event, reflecting no fragment of its inner essence. That immediacy which is the soul of this sense-presentation as also of any other is absent from the ideal survey and

the ideal survey and this lack of immediacy, that is original and foundational, vitiates thought and rebuts all its claims to be the vehicle of the cognition of the real in any ultimate sense.

Coming to a common sensuous presentation, such as, a white horse, we find that the unfoldment of its qualities is nowhere near the individual awareness of white horse. And by no judgment can we specify the particular horse that we are aware of, and that is distinct from the rest of its kind. The intellectualist will here join issue saying that the general features of the animal are the truest and the best knowledge about it ; that it is vulgar to stick to the particular sensations of discrete things that are perishable. Thus he will come forward with the stereotyped Platonic world of intellectual symbols, the world of classes and kinds wherefrom our individual and unique feelings have been turned out. But the question of questions is that in spite of the system of concepts, we cannot get rid of the awareness of the white horse which persists. And it is because of this persistency of the feeling that the propositions about the white horse convey any meaning to us or to anybody else. Without being coloured by the underlying feeling stream the propositions or concepts are barren.

It may again be argued that the judgments somehow possess specific reference to the sensuous fact. In the judgment, the horse is white, it may be argued, nothing other than the particular horse before me is meant. But it cannot be so. The term 'this horse' may equally refer to any other horse anywhere else. Nor is the term 'white' unique in its reference in any

its reference in any degree. It is easily referable to the white of the chalk or milk or of a crane. Both horse and white are general names, not individual things. (Had they been things or facts, predication would have been out of the question, we predicate qualities, not things). The terms therefore bear upon them no distinctive stamp of particular existence. The judgment presents a general ideal complex as ascribed to a fact that appears in my feeling. We proceed to making further judgments with other predicates, such as, the height or size of the horse. But however we may try to qualify the presented fact, the predication will never become specification of the fact. The thought about the horse will never coincide with individual horse-essence. Aristotle clearly recognised this fact when he was obliged to bring in unknowable matter to explain individuality. On the contrary, the qualities that are gradually attributed to the presented fact drive thought further away from it. The predicates being devoid of existence cannot hold the existent fact within themselves.

This distrust of judgment has not arisen in the traditional logic. And that is because the traditional logic has not asked itself the question, what is the genuine subject of predication ? It was satisfied with the grammatical subject of a judgment and held complacently that whatever was said was said of the grammatical subject. If, therefore, the grammatical subject is the aim of the predicate-content, there does not arise any question as to whether the ideal predicate is equal to it or not, or whether between the subject and the predicate there is any

there is any discrepancy of nature. The subject term is taken to be homogeneous with the predicate and the union between the two is effected by the miraculous copula. It was not enquired how logical thinking starts and what occasions the process of judging. So the important fact that reality confronts the mind in perception with its multiplicity of contents, and leads the mind to endeavour to apprehend it was left out of consideration. The logic that refuses to turn its eyes beyond the symbols it deals with, is bound to be formal and hence futile. Only with that insight afforded by analysis of experience, can it be seen that even in a judgment, such as, this bird is yellow, it is not the grammatical subject that is meant. On the contrary, the grammatical subject, bird, serves simply to distinguish and qualify a definite perceptual fact which alone is the real subject. And to this subject the quality yellow is attributed. Both the grammatical subject and the predicate are employed by thought to qualify the real as perceived. The subject term isolates a part of the environment and gives it the quality of birdness and the predicate term ascribes the quality of yellow to the portion of reality so characterised by the subject term. The subject and the predicate are thus both ideal contents; and the presented reality is the substratum of the ideal contents. To this substratum the judgment refers them (contents) and of this they are held to be true. The genuine subject is not the bird in the present judgment but the real as it is encountered in perception. Accepting this interpretation of judgment it is at once clear that the true subject of the judgment which is reality remains beyond the act of judgment and that the judgment furnishes merely the qualities that are

referable to the

referable to the real, but have not absorbed its concrete being. The distinctive real that is conceived as owning the predicates does not communicate itself in toto through the ideas. And there is no escape from the thought that it remains outside, and is much more than the characters that are attributed to it. The characters are of and about the presented reality. They are not the reality itself. Apart from the characters that it possesses and that this that or other judgments attribute, the subject possesses a being that is continuous with a self-subsisting background. It is impossible for any thought or judgment to exhaust that aspect of the sense-presentation through the medium of the predicates.

The sense-complex that is sought to be grasped in judgment is too vast for an ideal content that is affirmed of it. "And it is evident at once that the idea we use cannot possibly exhaust the full particulars of what we have before us. Description, we all know, cannot ever reach to a complete account of the manifold shades and the sensuous wealth of one entire moment of direct presentation" (P.L. p - 94). When we commence judging, we analyse and distinguish some features of the given from others. We sunder and separate the original sensible totality. And this separation of some elements for the purpose of judgment is by its very nature a distortion. The judgment, the bird is yellow, is utterly schematic, considering that the sensible reality of the yellow bird was inseparable from the external setting of, say, a green

say, a green orchard or a sunny spring day, as also from the psychological setting at the moment of observation. From this two-fold setting the bird is torn off and manipulated for the purpose of thought, although what is given is never this abridged fact of a lone yellow bird without even a sparkling sunshine upon it! The real that appears in feeling _____ and that is the genuine subject of judgment _____ is not exhaustible by ideas, so and hence it cannot coincide with the ideal conjunction, in the judgment. It is rather a cross-section of a vast self-centred sentient whole, ever resisting specification by ideas. Nor is it a bare 'that' - a logical limit that can have no reality prior to qualification by thought. The earlier epistemologies found it easy to allocate a paramount position to thought making it self-sufficing in knowledge, because, as we have noted before, being or the datum of knowledge for them had no status beyond the ideal system constructed by thought. "No fact", says Caird, "which is in its nature incapable of being explained or reduced to law can be admitted to exist in the intelligible world". They failed to know that the reality is never an empty point of reference revealed only to a post-mortem analysis of the completed intellectual synthesis. The real is experience which thought strives to enter and possess but which remains ever out of it.

And this distance between judgment and thought on the one hand and the real on the other is inevitable. Here lies the very life of thought. Where that and what, existence and quality, are inseparable, there is no judgment

there is no judgment or thought, and hence no question of truth. There being no separation the question of the possible validity of a quality related or referred to the real does not arise. The question of truth would be unwarranted if the content were not held apart and then attributed to a real basis. When we say, this milk is warm, it is perfectly clear that warmth has been discriminated from the feeling and converted into an idea that never warms the human touch. It is then that warm becomes fit to be ideally related to the fact denoted by milk and the judgment, the milk is warm, follows. And now the ground becomes ready for asking about the validity or otherwise of the relation of the content warm to the particular sensible fact. Without separation of the quality from existence it would be no thought or judgment. Thought predicates a content of reality, or what is the same thing, thought qualifies the real by means of the ideal content. If the content were not distinguishable from the real there would be no possibility of qualifying or characterising the real. Thought gives a character to a reality. To accomplish this give and take, what is given must be different from that to which the gift is made together with the process of giving that is obviously inseparable from the gift. "There always remains something outside and other than the predicate" (A. & R. p. 544).

And this apartness, inevitable though it be, constitutes also the weakness of thought and "failure of thought" as a mechanism of cognition. The real cannot be apprehended by the predicate which being
adjectival cannot

adjectival cannot embrace the former that is substantial. It is beyond thought's competence to rejoin the subject and the predicate into a solid unity. "You can think of subject but you cannot get rid of or substitute mere thought for it ". Thought is bound to be faced with the predicament that however far the process of idealisation advances the ideas that are abstract " are not the same as the subject for which you must predicate them". Ideas will never reach the real, they will at best point to the real which is sensuous abundance. That abundance thought cannot reinstate by the ideas that for ever possess external reference.

IV.

The inadequacy of judgment or discursive thought may be reached by investigating purely abstract thought. Every judgment is a union of differentials. No judgment is of the type A is A, but it is of the type A is B. Taken by itself this union is contradictory, A being conjoined with what is not A. This contradiction is avoided by furnishing a ground for the connection between A and B, that is to say, by conceiving the differentials as belonging to a system, the necessary implication of which is the relation between them. A is B because of the presence of X. In judging, the mind must arrive at such a basic unity holding together the elements of judgment. But though such a ground is the inherent demand

the inherent demand of thought and only by positing it can it make the connection of differentials intelligible, the ground in its turn is never self-explained and consequently not anything but external to the connection it tends to support. For, if it is asked why does X warrant the connection between A and B ?, the answer is not present fully in X, that is to say, it is not self-explained how the ground X stands to the differentials A and B which are connected by it. May be, for practical purposes the above 'why' is unnecessary, but the speculative need remains unsatisfied by the bare positing of X as the unity of differentials A and B. True, it is possible to find a core C through which X is related both to A & B. But how C again is connected with A and B needs further explanation. For the identity of C with A and B is not found to issue from the internal necessity of its nature. And for this explanation we have to go beyond C towards a third something, a higher unity, if speculative satisfaction is to be reached. The new problem that arises is two-fold, the warrant of the connection between C and A and also of the connection between C and B. For the connections by themselves are not self-evident, and because they are not so, we cannot categorically state C is A or C is B. All that can be said is that there being A there is C, and there being B there is C. The categorical assertion would have been possible if C had included within itself all the conditions justifying its connections with A and B. But this it does not and cannot do. Thought advances in search of these conditions in a superior ground.

superior ground. but there also it is found that the relational pattern does not spring solely from the unity of the new ground, there being still unknown conditions without which it remains external to what is sought to be understood. What intellect wants is a whole complete in itself, the principle of whose unification is internal to the whole, a ground that is self-explanatory, because it embraces all the conditions of what is and what is to be known, the ground which being attained, will provoke no why. But such a complex is unattainable at the level of thinking. The thinkable ground is always external or other than the differentials. Thought or understanding will only arrive at a linkage between the conditioned and the condition, but never at the unconditioned and the all-inclusive which for understanding will, at best, remain a postulate.

Echoing what Kant declared in his 'Transcendental Dialectic', Bradley says, " No fact or truth is ever really self-supported and independent. They are all conditioned and in the end conditioned by the unknown. Everything finite is because of something else. And where the extent and nature of this something else cannot be ascertained 'the because' turns out to be no better than 'if'. There is nothing finite which is not at the mercy of the unknown conditions. Finite truth and fact, we may say, is throughout hypothetical". (A & R. p- 540).

V.

We thus seem to arrive at a dualism between thought and reality that has been the failure of Lockean Philosophy. If the ideas cannot comprehend the real, and the correspondence between them is nothing genuine, are we not confronted with Scepticism ? But Bradley would not call himself a sceptic. What he has endeavoured to suggest is that thought, in so far as it is restricted to ideas that are character-contents referring to the real, is incomplete. And because of this incompleteness reality is beyond thought, if not wholly, at least partly not wholly because the character-contents are not alien to the real. But these contents as predicated by judgment, owing to lack of existence and self-dependence, are disparate from the real, that is permanently self-existent. And there is no denying this fact. "The that of the actual subject will for ever give a something which is not a mere idea, which is different from any truth, something which makes such a difference to your thinking that without it you have not even thought completely". But the otherness between thought and reality is not to be understood in any ultimate sense. The characters that judgment proposes to give to the real are nothing incongruous or incompatible with it. They are the natural adjectives which do qualify and point to the real, though they cannot individualise it. The real does not reject the qualities ; on the contrary, they had been

they had been essentially one with it at the feeling stage. But it is one thing to think of the real and quite another thing to exhaust and absorb its concrete existence. The latter is not the destiny of thought as such. The ideas by which judgment operates are inadequate to grasp the real in its completeness and this engenders the otherness between thought and reality. "The reality that is presented is taken up by thought in a form not adequate to its nature and beyond which its nature must appear as an other" (A. & R. p. 179). The duality that appears is not due to any inherent foreignness of the contents themselves but to the inadequacy of the form of apprehension. It is also to be noted in this connection that reality or being is identified by Bradley with experience or with sentience in its widest meaning, so that even if the real be outside thought it is not outside experience, that is, not transcendental in the usual Kantian and Spencerian sense. And this otherness is possible to extinguish if the ideas get endowed with that **aspect** of the real which they fail to appropriate, and if thought can rectify this defect the ideas suffer from. The possibility of the reformation of the ideas to make them commensurate with the life of the real is visible in the working of thought. It unceasingly moves towards a totality and is never content with fragments and piecemeal cognition. In art, literature, science etc., where thought is at work, there is no stopping short of a ^{yst-}schematised comprehension. And this is the result of

the result of the urge of thought towards "the enlarging and making harmonious its own ideal content," so that its pursuit of actual living facts and experience might meet with a consummation. It is not at all arbitrary and abrupt to hold that this urge for realising the ideas meets with success.

The subject that is an other at the thought stage is, in the first place, immediately given. Next it includes "sensible and compulsory details" and lastly is part of a self-subsistent unity. It thus possesses three features - immediacy, multiplicity and self-subsistent unity. Now analysing thought in its highest reaches we may discriminate therein also these very features tentatively present. When the subject is presented for thought it passes into a congeries of qualities which are taken up by thought into the relational form. The relational form when examined clearly consists in forcing together the diversities to effect a compromise between the plurality and unity. The primeval unity in which the presentation appears and which subsequently gets ruptured cannot be reinstated. So a substitute for it is set up through the relations. Next it must be perceived that the differentials that relations conjoin, must remain intact or there can be nothing to relate and relations themselves would vanish. Then as to the relations, they are not beyond the terms, nor are they lost in them. In the latter case, there would be no holding the differentials in unity, the terms would automatically fall asunder. In so far as, therefore, the relational consciousness includes diversities as the end-points of

as the end-points of relations, there is a kind of givenness. The differentials or diversities are given to the relations, not constituted by them. That there is multiplicity of contents also is obvious. Then also the character of unity follows from the relations that hold together the diverse elements. So there are givenness, plurality and unity, though of an imperfect type, in the relational consciousness. Of course, the relational unity is not a restful unity inasmuch as the terms or qualities which appear as solid end-points of relations tend to break out into an infinite process, and an endless search of the relation and the terms ensues.

But this restless infinitude itself affords a fore-taste of the coming stage where the wild-goose chase of terms and relations will end. Or why this unrest and incessant wandering out? Thought that has worked itself up into relational pattern, that shows the above three features approximating to the real ones of the subject, cannot stand baffled. It must transcend itself, lift itself up to a form in which the diverse contents will have their pseudo-givenness perfected into genuine immediacy, will, in other words have the feeling of flesh and blood. Consequently, instead of being about the subject, these will be the subject itself in its totality. And relations and terms will be so transformed that the endless race between them will find its rest in an all-inclusive harmony.

Thought at this final stage will be discursive no longer; it will transcend the form of apprehending the real by discriminating and distinguishing ab extra and the futile

and the futile endeavour to attain to the original unity of the real in the relational complex of qualities will end. Instead of objectifying the real through the mediation of ideas it will become the real, that is, place itself in full possession of it. Thought when absolute changes into intuition with the subject-object differentiation completely obliterated, that is to say, of duality between itself and the reality overcome. This consummation of thought is suggested by the very impulse that has pushed it forward till the unity of relational consciousness is reached. It is all through driven by a vague notion of the ideal unity conceived after the pattern of sub-relational unity of immediate experience out of which ideas and relations have emerged.* And when the unity of relational consciousness is found to fall short of that original unity, thought pushes itself further, trying to cure itself "homoeopathically". And at last gets transformed into the highest mode of apprehension that has the unity of primitive feeling without its changefulness, the organisation of diversities without the restless infinitude of the relational mode, the maniness of contents without existenceless adjectivality. "The nissus of thought itself projects thought out of

* The primitive feeling whole cannot be completely ruptured. At the background of thought-operations there endures a feeling mass, and individual unity of diversities. "The All Important", says Bradley, "is that the unity of feeling never disappears" (A & R . p. 110). This unity, as it were, haunts thought throughout its movement and furnishes it with something like a standard to evaluate its contents and construction. In fact, it moves it forward till a way of apprehension superior to discursive thought is reached. (See the 1st Chapter).

projects thought out of the sphere of thought into that actual existence" (Seth) and the immediacy that is absent from the logic comes "to balance the admitted mere mediacy of the finite categories" (Metagart) in the absolute cognition.

It may be urged against such fusion of ideas and existence, into which thought enters, that "such anticipated self-transcendence" of thought is an other to thought; consequently the dualism persists. Thought as such must function through difference of that and what. ~~When~~ a higher intuition ^{is} conceived as the end of thought, that consummation is naturally beyond the nature of thought, and hence world apart from the world of ideas.

The reply to such objection may be anticipated from what has been stated in the foregoing pages. It is nowhere suggested that the absolute knowledge is different from the knowledge at thought level in respect of its contents or that in the higher intuition no finite elements characteristic of thought find any place. "Reality is above thought and above every partial aspect of being, but it includes them all. Each of these completes itself by uniting with the rest, and so makes the perfection of the whole. And this whole is experience, for anything other than experience is meaningless". (A. & R. p. 555). Thought being only an aspect of experience, the real which is experience, is beyond thought in the sense that the whole is beyond the parts. The absolute knowledge is not a total newness in comparison with the finite knowledge. The differences inside the ideal consciousness have not to be

consciousness have not to be destroyed to make room for the emergence of the absolute consciousness. The differences are, every one of them, contained in the intuitional whole. The most noteworthy point is that the differences within thought are taken up in the absolute knowledge, or we should now call it the absolute, in a new arrangement or form, and the deficiency and contradiction that mark the finite constituents are transmuted into a harmonious whole. In that higher unity no fraction of finite knowledge is lost or debarred from entering. The Absolute of the highest intuition is not absolutely transcendental out of connection with the finite and the relative. The finite contents are transfigured in the absolute knowledge with their imperfections removed. "And experience, I suppose, can override understanding only in one way, that is, as a subordinate element somehow within itself" ; so says Bradley. (A. & R. p. 109).

It must be admitted that it is impossible to know how this transfiguration is effected and how the ideal differences and distinctions are harmonised in the highest immediacy. Remaining within the limitation of finite thought one cannot contemplate in detail the consummation that thought will attain to. If this was possible, thought would no longer be finite. Only, "thought can form the idea of an apprehension, something like feeling in directness, which contains all the character sought by its relational efforts" (A. & R. p. 181) and this is only an idea in the barest outline. " We cannot imagine how in detail its outline is filled up. But to say that it is real, and that it unites certain general

unites certain general characters within the living system of one undivided apprehension, is within our power." (A. & R. p. 183).

VI.

Here one is reminded of Kant's intellectual intuition,* highest mode of knowledge revealing reality as it is in itself. Conceptual knowledge of the finite mind wrought through the operation of space, time and categories, does not embrace ultimate reality, that remains beyond and unfathomable by way of ideas or concepts. While thought is simply formative, intellectual intuition is creative of both form and matter. The entire world we know through intellectual categories is the world of appearance; it is not the world of ultimate reality. If we imagine that we can know reality as it is in itself through the forms of thought, we are doomed to delusion. To know the reality we must take recourse to a way of apprehension fundamentally different from the mode of discursive understanding. In their distrust of the conceptual knowledge, both Bradley and Kant appear close to each other. And in their contemplation of a supra-intellectual approach to reality also they are very much alike.

The manner in which Kant establishes the imperfection of discursive understanding is, of course, different from that of Bradley. But when closely examined, their stand-points do not appear dissimilar in fundamentals. Kant repudiates the absoluteness of human understanding on

* See Appendix

human understanding on the ground that it owes its matter to a reality outside understanding. The matter of knowledge cannot be produced by thought; it is given from an outside source. According to Kant the passivity of knowledge is its imperfection and this passivity arises from the receptive character of mind in respect of the datum of knowledge. The datum of knowledge is not genuine self-subsistent existence, it is a reflex of an other. Consequently knowledge as a whole is infected with this lack of self-determination. The contents of knowledge, in other words, are mere logical abstractions that lead to no ultimate point of certitude. Thought or conceptual knowledge is not reality, things in themselves. It is impossible to deduce the latter from the former, because while one is individual, self-sufficing, the other hangs, so to speak, in the air, being devoid of being or existence. When Kant complains of the passivity of the datum for ~~which~~ as the matter of that construction of thought, he means nothing other than that concepts and categories are adjectives ever needing a real world of existence to supplement them. And this is, as we have seen, the very charge levelled against logical thinking of Bradley. Although, Kant has not given the features of the things in themselves, yet as the very name things in themselves suggests, they are individual self-sufficing existents. So when he rejects thought as a means to their comprehension, he does so because thought and its modes lack that aspect of the real which makes it self-sufficing, that is, unconditioned existence. The world of thought is not things in themselves because, from the former, existence is absent. The forms of thought being bare
universals

universals without the filling of existence, they have not the power^{of} individualising, and, consequently, the individual things in themselves forever escape the network of forms by which thought wants to enclose them. Viewing Kant in this light we clearly perceive that his problem is the same as that of Bradley.

And the solution also is no less akin. If reality is to be grasped in its specific essence, the mind should not only work by means of categories but should also be capable of creating being or existence, the substratum of the categories. The datum with which thought deals is not genuine inasmuch as it is a brute modification of consciousness occasioned by the real. It is only the effect of existence, not being in itself. "Our mode of apprehension", says Kant, "is called sensibility because it is not original, that is, not of perception through which the existence of the object is given". Since its being is derivative merely, it is as much an abstraction as the categories. In the absolute knowledge which is intuition the genuine being will mingle with the forms of thought. The distinguishing characteristic of intellectual intuition would be according to Kant, that "the objects and the representation should at the same time exist". And this is exactly what Bradley wants for his highest intuition. For him also idea and existence must unite in a harmonious whole in order that the positive determination of the ultimate reality may be attained. In essentials therefore the intellectual intuition of Kant and the higher immediacy of Bradley, are identical, both having the missing aspect of existence restored to ideas.

There is however a

There is however a difference between their attitudes towards the highest mode of cognition. Kant does not consider it possible for human cognition to attain to the absolute level of thought, while Bradley conceives such consummation within the range of the spirit. But it is quite possible to argue that this diffidence Kant was ultimately able to overcome. On the other hand, it may not be improbable that the contemplation of higher immediacy on the part of Bradley is a veneer of faith, if not agnosticism which he is unwilling to admit. But this point will be taken up at the sequel in fuller detail. Meanwhile we should proceed to consider we have the dialectical approach to Reality.

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Dialectical Approach

to Reality.

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Chapter IV.

The Traditional Approach To Things.

I.

Earlier philosophies have sought to understand things by means of the distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities. The spatial aspects of things are the Primary qualities -- they are original. The other aspects, such as colour, sound, smell and the like are Secondary -- they are derivative, the effect of the Primary.

But the matter is not so simple as is supposed. The Secondary qualities are conditioned by a complex of extraneous circumstances without which they cease to be. Colour, sound, smell etc. are qualities (of things) that depend for their existence on the sense organs of the eye, ear, nose etc. respectively. Omit the sense organs and you lose those sense qualities. In themselves these are neither colour nor sound nor smell. They derive their respective characters from the sense organs or the action on the sense organs of an outside complex.

But the Secondary qualities, possessing as they do conditional being, are not intelligible. Since a thing possesses Secondary qualities only in relation with something other than itself, it has them only sometimes, not constantly, that is, only so long as it is in contact with an outside something. A thing appears coloured to the eye; that means the thing is colourless, apart from the eye to which it appears

This is

This is equally true of hot, cold, sound and smell. The question therefore arises, where lies the quality ? It is certainly not in the thing. If it were so, there would have been no necessity for the thing to depend on the contact with the eye in order to be characterised by the quality of colour. Its possession of the quality being conditional it will be unjustified to assert that the thing has the quality.

Then, does the sense organ possess the quality ? No. The ear that hears the sound is not aware of the sound when the thing is removed. There is no incessant generation of sound in the organ of audition irrespective of the external object which is referred to by common sense as the source of the sound.

The Secondary quality is thus neither in the thing nor in the sense organ. We may say that it is in the relation between the thing and the sense organ. The sound is the outcome of the two being together. But what does it lead to ? We have seen the thing is not coloured nor cold by itself ; it appears to be so when placed under the condition of connection with the sense organ. This means that the quality is no part of the original constitution of the thing and that it is only incidental to a condition that determines it from outside. We have no means to know the nature of the qualities beyond the above condition of contiguity with the sense organ. We cannot think of them apart from our perception of them and as 'things in themselves'. And this inability to conceive

inability to conceive them independently is tantamount to repudiation of their reality. For that which is dependent for its being on outside lacks intelligibility.

It may be urged that the reality of the secondary qualities is not disputable simply by the fact that they cannot impart themselves except in perception. They may themselves remain constant in the things, no matter how they appear. But such a position does not bear scrutiny. If the qualities are not known beyond their appearance to the sense organ, if, that is, they are known to us only in a specific connection with the sense organ, any assumption regarding their possible independent character is illegitimate. If we cannot go beyond the appearance, we cannot say that they are there, independently of their appearance to us (whether they appear to us or not). Nor would it be any truth to say that the secondary qualities are in themselves constantly just the same as they appear. For when we consider things of common perception we find that there is no constancy in the secondary qualities themselves. Let us take the case of taste or smell. It is well known that pleasantness or unpleasantness goes into the constitution of their character *. To hold that affective value forms a constant aspect of the things tasted and

* Here obviously is a confusion of sense quality and affective quality. In Bradley we often find that the two qualities are considered inseparable.

the things tasted and smelled, or of the sense organ that tastes or smells them, would be an error. For the affective characters appear differently to different persons and are variously felt by the same persons under varying conditions. The conclusion therefore becomes incontestable that secondary qualities lack self-dependence and constancy and are hence unintelligible if taken as real. They are mere appearance.

But are the primary qualities any better than the secondary ? Let us see. The primary qualities are taken as forming a different class altogether. Extension or spatiality is an attribute of things which is independent of any sense organs. A thing is extended in itself without requiring the previous operation of any outside factor. Unlike colour which becomes what it is in contact with the visual apparatus, extension, it is believed, is out there needing no modification by any sense organ. It is therefore self-dependent.

But when you go deeper into the nature of the primary qualities, we find they are not what they are taken to be. It is an uncritical materialism that holds extendedness to be the essence of the thing, and equates reality with extended things. "What is extended together with its spatial relations is substantive fact", according to this view. When this substantive, original fact, comes into relation with the sense organs we are said to find the secondary qualities, which are thus the appearance of the extended reality. But the question at once arises, what is the relation

what is the relation between the primary quality, extendedness, and the secondary quality? When we call the secondary quality appearance, we do not mean that it is removed from existence. The appearance must be of the real that appears, and here of the extended thing. Secondary qualities do exist as a part of experience, and as such must fall within the real. Outside the real there is no place where they can live. But where does the assumption of the relation between the secondary and the primary lead us? If the relation between them is admitted it at once follows, that the real is qualified by the secondary which is appearance. And to be qualified by what is appearance is to allow an unreality into the being of the real. If the extended thing is red or yellow, then the thing invariably partakes of the inconstancy of the red or yellow, and consequently its substantive character is vitiated.

If this difficulty is sought to be obviated by disowning the secondary qualities altogether, that is by holding that the secondary qualities do not characterise the real object, then reality suffers a terrible diminution. A monotonous extendedness that has no colour, sound, taste and smell, will take the place of the real in utter denial of the fullness of experience. Even supposing the impossible, that the secondary qualities form no part of the real, the primary quality cannot hold its own. The same argument that disproves the reality of the secondary is equally

secondary is equally damaging to the primary. There is no truth in the claim of the advocates of the primary quality that it stands independent of perception. For, just as unheard sounds, and unseen colours have no existence, so also unsensed extension has no place anywhere. Apart from the sensibility of the human organism, there can be no awareness of spatiality or extension. Even the extendedness of the body itself is not known by any 'miraculous intuition'. This is also the effect of tactuo-muscular sensations.

Extension is not of the thing if the ~~the~~ thing is taken by itself, nor is it a quality of the sense of touch. When a thing is brought into contact with, say, the skin and subjected to tactuo-muscular movement, there arises the awareness of spread-outness or extension, in the same way as colour results from the connection of the visual apparatus with light. Extension no less than colour being conditioned by perception possesses the character of appearance. Since the primary quality like the secondary presents itself only in perception any assumption that it has its character intact beyond perception, is unwarranted.

Another objection to the independent reality of the primary is that it cannot be presented except in unison with secondary qualities. There is no perception of extension pure and simple. When we speak of pure extension we ~~merely~~ indulge in abstraction. In the perception of the extension of the blue screen hung before me, it is undeniable that visual qualities do enter into the knowledge. Not only that, without them the knowledge of the screen as spread and extended is impossible. Similarly in the case of felt extension

felt extension sensations from skin, joints and muscles - all combine to produce the perception of space. We "cannot think of extension without thinking at the same time of a 'what' (a sense quality) that is extended". This dependence of the primary on the secondary quality completely negates its claim to originality and self dependence .

So we find that the distinction between the secondary and primary qualities gives us no truth about the world of things, that may satisfy the intellect.

II.

Another attempt to understand the world's contents has been made by grouping them into things and properties, substantives and ~~adjectives~~ adjectives. Reality is viewed as a system of substances that have qualities of various kinds. But this method of arriving at reality is found on examination to lead to hopeless confusion. Of a lump of sugar, we say that it is a thing which is hard, sweet and white. Obviously we do not mean that sugar is any one of the qualities singly. It is not simply sweet. If it were simply sweet, it would not be white and hard as well. Nor is it meant that sugar is severally hardness, sweetness and whiteness. It is something above the qualities taken severally. Its reality lies in a specific unity of the above qualities. But this unity again cannot be reached

cannot be reached by analysing the particular qualities, nor by searching for it beyond the qualities. It is impossible to find something to which the qualities cling, in the same way as the picture belongs to the paper on which it is imprinted.

If the unity is neither in the qualities themselves nor in any entity outside, we must look for it in the relation between the qualities. We are to say that sweet, white and hard are related and in their being so unity consists. But this does not clear the confusion. When we say that the qualities are in relation to one another it can never be our meaning that they are merged in one another. Relation must be between different; without differences there would be nothing to connect. Qualities being different, there arises the necessity to hold them together. Now we say the quality A is related to the quality B. Do I by saying so mean that A's existence is equivalent to being related to B? That is, can I replace the verb is (in 'A is related to B') by the sign of equality, = ? I cannot. It can never be that A exists solely by virtue of its relation to B. A is an original distinctive quality and hence cannot be identified with its relatedness to B which is dependent upon that original character of A. To escape this difficulty, it may be said that Relation is a predicate of both A and B -- A and B have the relation. Obviously, relation is held different from both A and B. In that case what justifies the attribution of the different to them? So long as the ground of the predication of the different is not furnished, the predication leads to contradiction (Law of Contradiction). If it is suggested that

it is suggested that relation though predicated is not different, then nothing is predicated at all.

Further, A and B 's having the relation severally as a property means that both the terms possess relation between themselves as a property. Coming to actual qualities of the above example of sugar we are obliged to say, according to the above view, that sweetness has as one of its properties relation with whiteness and vice versa. But we recoil from such a position. We know that qualities are distinguished from each other by their individual differences -- they cannot be identified one within other. If this is true, it is absurd to include in the being of a quality as its constituent content a relation with another quality. Clearly enough, such inclusion tends to disrupt the unity and individuality of the quality by incorporating an otherness into its existence. And this cuts at the root of the existence of qualities as such, and hence makes the business of connecting qualities unmeaning in the extreme. If a quality is what it is by virtue of its relation to another then it can in no sense be regarded as having a character of its own. Consequently the question of relating the qualities or characters does not arise. We get lost in a maze of relations in which terms have disappeared.

What happens if we turn to the opposite view, namely, that the relation C which is independent of both A and B holds them together, externally? We have seen above that considered different the relation cannot be predicated of the terms. But when we say that A and B stand in the relation C, it is undeniable that some sort of

that some sort of connection between A and B on the one hand and C on the other is assumed. Otherwise to speak of the terms and their relation would be without any meaning. When we do not ascribe relation as an attribute to the terms, the connection is possible only on the supposition of another relation, D which will have C as its one end, and A and B as another. Yet there is no end of the perplexity. If D is external and independent too, how to conceive of its connection with its terms C and A and B ? This leads on to E and so on endlessly. So we find it is far worse with relation considered wholly apart from the terms. When a thing is resolved into properties, and we, in order to preserve the oneness of the thing, are obliged to speak of the thing and the properties, we cannot leave the properties to themselves, nor can we view their connection as extrinsic. To hold that the properties stand in a relation that nowise matters to the terms' inner nature, is to be for ever barred out from the unity underlying the properties, the thing. The relation that remains external to the terms is incapable of bringing them under a form of unity. Sugar is the unity of sweetness, whiteness, hardness etc. This unity is impossible to attain in a relation that remains independent of the qualities -- an external if not accidental conjunction . If such a conjunction could give the thing, sugar, we might say sugar is sweetness and whiteness and hardness *.

* This is the view held by phenomenalist metaphysics and Associationist psychology --- a thing is regarded as a bundle of attributes.

But my experience convinces me of something more in sugar than the severality of the qualities. And that is the unique unification of the qualities. In a word, a relation that keeps the terms apart from itself in spite of connecting them, does not lead us to the unity of diverse properties, which alone is the thing.

The other alternative of taking the relation as intrinsic, as inherent in the properties, which holds somewhat at the expense of the terms is a nearer approach to the unity of the thing. The relation penetrating as it does the terms, the terms that are connected by it tend to become one, while the external relation keeps the terms apart. The internal relation places the diversities of the thing in an arrangement that approximates to the wholeness in which the thing comes to us. The immediate experience of a thing is a totality in which diversities are felt. Sugar is one experience having a diversity of aspects at the beginning. But at the feeling stage the diversities, though belonging to one whole, collide against one another and fluctuate incessantly, and consequently the unity lacks concord. In my first experience of sugar, for instance, I do feel oneness and diversity at the same time, but that diversity I am unable to comprehend, with the result that the immediate experience of sugar breaks up into a number of properties. But since the awareness of wholeness does not perish, relations are set up to bind together the plurality of properties into the unity of an object, and the ideas of substance and attribute are the result. Yet this relational arrangement is a mere device, inasmuch as the immediate unity in which the experience originally comes

experience originally comes and which is still the background of the terms and the relations, is never recovered. The relational unity is merely a substitute for the primal unity of experience, and however much the conception of thing and property, substantive and adjective, may be helpful in special sciences, on ultimate analysis this is found to be unintelligible and beset with confusion.

But this is a practical necessity. The immediate feeling having been unable to hold the diversities within itself, the conflicting contents are attempted to be made harmonious by the help of relation that coming between them prevents them from collision. To avoid the conflict of diversities in feeling the relational arrangement of the contents is resorted to as a compromise. "The thing with its adjectives is a device for enjoying both variety and concord" (A & R. p. 23). But the unity that relations lead to is "a pretence," a prolific source of perplexity and is not identical with the immediate unity.

It is thus seen that the distinction of substantive and adjective fails to give us truth and reality in the ultimate sense.

III.

The difficulties of quality and relation appear more glaringly when we go further into the examination of their natures. We shall then be invariably driven to a vicious circle of relations presupposing qualities and qualities relations.

There can be no qualities without relations. When we speak of qualities, we surely mean contents each characterised by a differential feature. Without difference there can be no quality. Sweet, hard, soft are qualities in that each of them signifies a specific character. If there were no such specific character, then all would be one blur where soft, hard, sweet as such would never exist. Now from the character differences, which are, in fact, qualities, another conclusion follows. A difference must be definite as well, without definite limits within which the character takes its rise difference is unintelligible. When we think of sweetness we certainly mean that it is throughout identical with itself and is in a way self-contained. And this identitative character of sweet is maintained by its distinction from say white or soft. Unless differences are distinguishable as well from one another they are not differences. Red is not different from red and two reds are not also distinguishable. If there were nothing else than red it would hardly be a quality. But red is different in so far as it is distinguishable from yellow. Since the qualities have each a definite character of its own, they must necessarily be distinct. Their characters so to say, delimit them in

delimit them in respect of one another. When we say A & B are qualities, each possessing a definite character we cannot help viewing them as distinct from each other. If A & B are different from each other, the difference must fall somewhere, that is, effected through something in some manner. We then at once see that they must be held distinct to keep their differences intact. And this is possible through relation of distinction. "It is not possible to think of qualities without thinking of distinct characters". Differences that are same as qualities, in order to remain differences, must be thought as standing in relation of distinction, or all diversities and differences must fall into one, and be an undifferentiated brute matter out of which the world of variegated experiences will have to be conjured up by magic.

The same conclusion may be reached in a slightly different way. We are satisfied about the many-ness of qualities. But this manyness is incomprehensible without holding the qualities distinct, without, that is, relations keeping them apart in a way. If there is no relation to distinguish the qualities there will be no plurality and hence no difference either. The absence of any necessity of relation presupposes absence of any differences to form the basis of relation. Qualities and relation must therefore go together. Yet matters do not improve. It is easy to see that qualities cannot be resolved into relations. Differences are held distinct by relation but they are not made by the relation itself.

relation itself. There cannot be any relation between 'nothings'. So the qualities must be somethings over and above the relations that subsist between them. Although it is undoubtedly true that unless the qualities are distinguished through relation, their differences as qualities come to nothing, yet qualities cannot vanish into relation. Just as the terms depend on relations so do the relations on the terms.

From this a great consequence follows. Terms related come to possess a double character. Firstly, they possess a differential character mentioned above on which the relation is based. If **A** & **B** are related each of them possesses a content on the basis of which they are connected. Next, by virtue of being related they possess another character which may be called the effect of the relation on themselves. Thus the quality **A** has first the differential content x , the basis of relation, and secondly, the content y which is the outcome of being related to **B**. **A** is thus both x and y . But if it is to be both, the features x and y must be combined and that also requires a relation. Thus we have to suppose in x a content p as a condition of the new relation and also q the resultant of the relation. X too in its turn breaks up into two and an endless process of separation ensues, dissipating the entitative character of the term. Clearly enough, when qualities are in relation, they are no more intelligible then when taken isolated.

The same difficulty is encountered from the side of the relations. It is undoubted that relations must be something, they cannot be nonentity. If they were nothing, the terms would fall asunder. But we have seen isolated qualities are unmeaning. If the relation is something, how does it

something, how does it stand to the terms ? We cannot say that the relations are adjectives of the terms. If they were so, they would be wholly within the being of the terms and could not relate the terms beyond themselves. " Nor is relation a common property, for then what keeps the relation apart ? " Then, relation being something by itself will require a third something to link it up with the term --- a new relation. Here again we are thrown into a process of discovering newer connections and infinitum *.

From the above the conclusion is inevitable that the machinery of terms and relations is full of contradiction, and as such cannot be the right approach to Reality. These are at best " the inadequate expression of an underlying unity ".

* Cp " The relation is a kind of thread along which influences can pass from one subject to another. Attributes cannot detach themselves from a substance, float in a formless void and then attach themselves to other substances This conception of a between may be considered as solving the difficulty by constituting itself as a medium which does away with the void between things But the same difficulty arises here again, since the attribute or influence must detach itself from the object and attach itself to the 'Between', and thus arises the necessity for the existence of another 'Between' between the first 'Between' and the object from which the attribute is to come ; and this difficulty is carried on ad infinitum. It is clear that if a relation is something which exists between its terms it cannot solve the difficulty..." (Lotze's Theory of Reality ---- Thomas- Lotze's Metaphysics Sec. 54)
 { Lotze too discards the conception of relation as something between the terms for the same reasons as Bradley, but he (Lotze) advocates the view that relations are states of the terms to be identified with reciprocal actions between things.

IV.

The upholders of external relation will here intervene saying that all the difficulties considered above are nothing but imaginary since relations connect terms without entering the latter's being. When A is B, the natures of both, it will be urged, remain unaffected by the relation, so that either of the terms with its unchanged nature may be related to, say, C or D on another occasion. The whole criticism of relations and terms, owes its origin to a metaphysical bias in favour of unity which Bradley misses in the relational order. But could he bring himself to accept the pluralistic universe of independent units, he might have acquiesced in the externality of relations and been spared the prolonged dialectical endeavour to prove the inadequacy of the relational scheme as a perfect expression of unity which for him is the emblem of Reality.

So, Bradley undertakes an examination of the theory of external relations, and asserts at the outset that "the relations cannot exist except within and as the adjectives of an underlying unity. Qualities in the end can have no meaning except as contained in and as dependent on some whole" (A. R. p. 573). Whenever terms are related, they are done on a common basis. If I distinguish red from yellow, I cannot do so except on a colour pattern to which both the relata belong. The terms absolutely independent cannot be either together or distinct. A relation to be relation cannot but unite some

cannot but unite some terms. When terms remain alien to one another, there is no relation.* The terms to be related, though different from one another, partake of a common character, or what has been called by Johnson a determinable. Apart from this determinable the affirmation of a relation would be simply nonsensical. Nobody hesitates to declare such propositions as 'the Indian National Congress is a white reptile' and 'a sky-scraper is honest' to be absurd. When the meanings of the **words** are barely known, it is at once patent that they have nothing in common, and are therefore impossible to relate. When we speak of two things as spatially related, we must possess the prior knowledge that they are characterised by the common determinable of extension. Similarly, the presupposition of arithmetical relations is number, of a relation of love and hate the emotional temperament of the persons related and so on. Every affirmation is an expression of relation. And by examining any affirmation, we may be convinced that it is meaningful because of what underlies the terms of the affirmation. When I say the Western peoples are adventurous, I certainly connect the western people and adventure. But this connection of the two terms has meaning for me only because they are apprehended within the context of the particular sphere of their activities as also of a particular aspect of their past and contemporary racial history. The theory of externality of relations, therefore, seems plausible so long as the whole underlying the relata escapes notice.

The objector may

* I owe this argument in this form to Prof. Ewing's Idealism, pp. 128-29.

The objector may persist and ask whether within the whole, and subject to that, terms can enter into further relations, and not be affected by them. In support of his position he will cite relations of spatial position and comparison. That we do not change what we compare or rearrange in space seems to commonsense beyond question. But difficulties appear on a careful examination of the question. "In a mental act, such for instance as comparison, there is a relation in the result, and this relation, we hear, is to make no difference to the terms. But if so, to what does it make a difference, and what is the meaning and sense of qualifying the terms by it? If, in short, it is external to the terms, how can it possibly be true of them? To put the same thing otherwise, if we merely make the conclusion, is that conclusion a true one? But if the terms from their inner nature do not enter into the relation, then so far as they are concerned, they seem related for no reason at all, and so far as they are concerned, the relation seems arbitrarily made. But otherwise the terms themselves seem affected by a merely external relation". (A. R. p. 575).

Turning to alterations of position the difficulty is no less. It is said things are related in space now in one way and then in another way. Yet they remain unaltered by this change. Now the question that can be legitimately asked is, why this change at all, if it makes no difference at all to the terms that are related? If, in other words, the terms contribute nothing to this process and its result, it is to be thought a meaningless affair. If they do contribute,

they do contribute, they are so far affected internally. Then, every spatial arrangement has a qualitative distinction. Every change of arrangement is a change in character as well. Now, "if things by a new arrangement produce a fresh aspect of quality, of what are you going to predicate that quality? If the terms contribute anything whatever, then the terms are affected by that arrangement." (A. R. p. 576). The character of the space-pattern does not consist barely in terms or based in relations, but in the fact that "the parts throughout are interrelated in every possible position, and reciprocally so determine one another." (Ibid). The advocates of external relations confidently put forward the spatial world in support of their theory because they ignore the concrete space with its distinctive qualitative aspect, or the configuration

Yet perhaps their objection will not cease. An appeal to facts in the spatial world will be made by them to show that things remain unaffected by relations. The familiar billiard balls will occur to them at once. "The billiard balls on a table may be in any position you please, and you and I and another may be changed respectively in space, and yet none of these things by these changes is altered in itself". But Bradley points out that here an important distinction is overlooked. "For a thing may remain unaltered if you identify it with a certain character, while taken otherwise the thing is suffering change. If, that is, you take a billiard-ball and a man in abstraction from place, they will

of course ----- 89

of course ----- so far as this is maintained ---- be indifferent to changes of place. But on the other hand neither of them, if regarded so, is a thing which actually exists; each is a more or less valid abstraction. But take them as existing things and take them without mutilation, and you must regard them as determined by their places and qualified by the whole material system into which they enter. And if you demur to this I ask you once more of what you are going to predicate the alterations and their results. The billiard-ball, to repeat, if taken apart from its place and its position in the whole, is not an existence but a character, and that character can remain unchanged, though the existing thing is altered with its changed existence ". (A.R. pp. 577 - 578). To fix upon the character and affirm its independence is an useless abstraction seeing that the character cannot exist independent and naked.

The upholders of external relations may now seek support from relations based on comparison. Things, it may be said, may be felt the same, and so far there is no relation at all. When they are compared there is relation, but that relation falls quite outside of the things, that is things remain what they were prior to relations displayed in comparison. But Bradley insists there is an alteration of things with the institution of comparison. When two things are felt to be the same but not identical, the feeling of sameness is a whole. When next they are compared and related by a point of identity there also a whole is present, but it is a different whole. But the difference of this whole is unintelligible if it is not admitted

it is not admitted that the terms that are of it, become different and by becoming different contribute to the altered character of the whole. To illustrate. Two red-haired men are first seen with red hair but they are not identified in point of red hairedness and, there after it is affirmed in the judgement that the two men are the same in so far as they are redhaired. " In each case there is a whole which is qualified by and qualifies the terms, but in each case the whole is different. The men are taken first as contained in and as qualifying a perceived whole, and there redness is given in immediate unconditional unity with their other qualities and with the rest of the undivided sensible totality. But, in the second case, this sensible whole has been broken up, and the men themselves have been analysed. They have each been split up into a connection of redhairedness with other qualities, while the red-hairedness itself has become a subject and a point of unity connecting the diversities of each instance, diversities which are predicated of it, and connected with one another under it. And the connection of the two men's diversities with this general quality, and with one another through it, I must insist, is truth and is reality however imperfect and impure. But this logical synthesis is a unity different from the sensible whole, and in passing into this unity I cannot see how to deny that the terms have been altered". (A.R. p.580). Only when we take by abstraction a quality A, B, or C, it is possible to think of that abstract quality to be unchanged. But what become the terms of relations are, in point of fact more than such

fact, more than such symbols or abstract characters. The terms are contributory elements to a synthetic unity which replaces the first unity and are so far altered, though regarded in the abstract they will appear to be unchanged.

Although it may appear that the correlation of red-hairedness and the other qualities and circumstances in the two men lacks a rational or logical foundation, yet it is no mere chance. If our relational knowledge had expanded so as to embrace the full details of personal history and of the world, the necessary link between red-hairedness and those other qualities would not be hard to detect, and reasoning from the knowledge of the quality of red-hairedness, we could envisage the entire nature and character of all the redhaired men, if not the whole human race. Let us explain this point. The flower in the cranial wall, the poet speaks of, does contain within it the explanation of the entire physical system since its nature could not be understood without bringing in the physical universe as a whole. This is the most elementary scientific fact : the growth of the flower is determined by terrestrial conditions which in their turn are dependent upon the character and constitution of the whole solar system. Could a perfect knowledge of the physical system be accomplished, it would be clearly possible to reconstruct the whole world from the nature of the cranial wall flower. Similarly there is no inherent absurdity in the claim that given perfect knowledge we could start internally from the character of redhairedness to the rest.

Anticipating the objection

Anticipating the objection of some one possessing red hair, that he is not altered in fact when he is compared with another red-haired man, Bradley replies, that being a finite individual he must remain ignorant of his full reality and such cannot reach any thing like absoluteness about his knowledge of himself. His being is certainly not exhausted by certain abstract qualities which are taken by him to be what he is. "We do not possess ourselves entirely" 'Nons ne nons tenons Jamais' (Bergson quoted by Bosanquet in *Individuality and Value*. P. 259). A person is inextricably bound up with a process of history and by a tissue of connections with a world beyond his narrow personal existence. "A redhaired man who knew himself utterly would and must, starting from within, go on to know every one else who has red hair, and he would not know himself until he knew them." (A. R. p. 581). Unless he knows how and why he has red hair, and how or why a different man possesses the same, unless, that is, he has insight into the ground of the relation, his knowledge of himself is bound to remain very partial and abstract, and his claim to independence and externality is merely dogmatic.

What we come to is this. Relations are never external. Even the apparently most pronounced external relation, such as of comparison and spatial position, is found on analysis to have penetrated the terms related. That is to say, the world is not an assemblage of independent atomic particulars, but is a whole, a unity. But the unity which the world is, cannot be attained in the relational complex since, the very notion of relation, however internal, lacks ultimate validity.

ultimate validity. Bradley discovers a contradiction in every relation. What he concedes to the internal relation is that it is a good deal nearer the truth to regard relations as internal than external. But this concession leaves his fundamental position in regard to relations unaffected, namely, that they lead to endless perplexity, and, though necessary *, are in the end most indefensible.



When we consider other widely accepted categories of knowledge such as space, time, change and causality we shall find, says Bradley, that they are so many instances of the dilemma^m of terms and relations.

A self-coherent idea of space, to begin with, is impossible to form. It contradicts itself. "Space is a relation which it cannot be ; and it is a quality or substance which again it cannot be". That space is not a mere relation is evident from the fact that any space must be composed of smaller spaces. A space is a collection of parts which are themselves spatial. And though the collection necessarily implies relation between the components, " the relation would join spaces which would not be mere relations". We cannot arrive at the notion of space by merely concentrating on the relations, yet the consideration of the fact that every space is a sum of spaces makes relations paramount. Judging from the other side space is nothing but a relation. We cannot consistently think of the component spaces as

*"Relational experience is unavoidable and is fully justified in its own place as a way of life and knowledge. But on the other hand it can claim no title higher in the end than a necessary makeshift".
Collected Essays . p. 635 (The unfinished articles on Relations).

the component spaces as repulsive solids. They are obviously extended. And " anything extended is a collection or relation of extendeds which again are relation of extendeds, and so on indefinitely " (A. R. p. 37). True, there can be no relations without terms, but examination reveals the distressing fact that terms, as solid end-points do not exist. " Searching without end, we do not find anything more than relations Space is essentially a relation of what vanishes into relations which seek in vain for their terms". (Ibid). The same conclusion is suggested by another consideration. Space as we understand it must have definite boundaries. It must end somewhere. But limits can be assigned to space only on the supposition that there is an outside to it. But the outside, unfortunately, is compelled likewise to pass beyond itself, and the end cannot be reached. We are consequently left in the predicament of having a spatial order that forever wanders away into " a whole which proves never to be more than one side of a relation to something beyond". (A. R. p. 38). So we find that the notion of space as a continuum turns out to be more than the relation of itself to a new self.

Besides, a space that is not filled is a sheer abstraction. Yet we cannot consistently connect what we have got in a space with its character of extension. How the quality stands to extension baffles understanding. From all these considerations we see that space is no better than appearance.

Similar difficulties appear in understanding time when we try to think of it as a continuum made up of discrete moments; all the puzzles about terms and relation arise

and relation arise in this case as in the case of space.

Change too is little more than a fresh puzzle of terms and relations. The fundamental difficulty here as well is the incompatibility of the features of unity and multiplicity. Since it is not possible to arrive at an intelligible or theoretically satisfying expression of the co-existence of these two opposite features, change is incapable of furnishing the truth about reality. A thing that changes is, for that reason, not permanent and yet unless there is anything permanent to which the change happens change loses all its meaning. If P is what it is, it is unchanged and if P becomes q, r, s, etc. one can very well challenge the legitimacy of regarding P as P when q, r or s appears. So it comes to this that we cannot bring together permanence and change, one and many. True, in actual fact we are not embarrassed by this incompatibility, but that practical easiness does not resolve the theoretical uneasiness with regard to this question.

Next comes causation. We say A is the cause of B. But that is never to be understood to mean that A is the same as 'being followed by B'. How then are we to understand the connection between the different, A and B ? If the effect that succeeds is other than the cause that precedes, how can the one be affirmed of the other ? If it is said they are not different, causation ceases to exist. Nobody would say, A is the cause of A. If it is said further that causation should be sought not in A, but in the combination of A and C, the question will at once arise, Does the combination with C matter in any way to A ? If it does the position

does the position will be that a newer event occurs within A with the necessary consequence of a fresh causal link inside. Thus the original confusion will be worse confounded. Pushing the cause backwards will not improve matters since the gathering of all conditions within a temporal focus is impossible. But causation essentially implies a time factor.

If, on the other hand, combination with C does not matter to A, it becomes clearly unmeaning to endeavour to apprehend the succeeding phenomenon (the effect) with reference to the preceding phenomenon (the cause). In any case, causation is not the consistent way of interpreting experience of the world.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the categories that have long enjoyed confidence of philosophers as adequate means of expressing reality, are one and all riddled with inconsistencies; and their claim to give us truth about the real is wholly indefensible.

Chapter V

OF REALITY

The traditional ways of apprehending reality have been found to contain fatal inconsistencies, and as such cannot be trusted to yield knowledge of the real. It may now seem that by rejecting all the accepted approaches to Reality as contradictory, we have gained nothing positive as a result. We may appear to have demolished the old edifice without being able to raise a new structure instead. In other words, we have ended in Scepticism.

But Bradley denies the charge of Scepticism. He asserts that in the very rejection of the relational, there is an implicit assertion regarding the ultimate nature of things. When we say relations, space, time etc. are inconsistent, and therefore cannot express the real, there is no getting away from a kind of commitment about the general nature of what fails to be expressed by the self-contradictory categories, i.e., the real. Space, time and all are appearances and hence rejectible, because they fail to satisfy a definite criterion of perfection. There is no sense in the rejection of something unless we possess an inner conviction of the existence of an indubitable standard which has been used in the estimation of the rejected. Whenever we condemn anything as false, we perform a discrimination. But this discrimination cannot take place without the help of a criterion of truth or reality. Simple doubting would be a futile affair did it not presuppose an affirmation, however inarticulate, about what precludes doubt. In course of the condemnation of relations etc., we have,

according to Bradley,

Bradley, been guided by a criterion that, when articulated, means that " Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself ". And it is for this reason that whatever betrays contradiction has been discarded as appearance. The precondition of the condemnation of the phenomena is the presence of the standard the inability to satisfy which causes the condemnation. " We were judging phenomena, and condemning them and throughout we proceeded as if the self-contradictory would not be real ". (A.R. p. 136).

11.

This criterion of non-contradiction is absolute and unchallengeable. It is the essential principle involved in our thinking. It is impossible to doubt it without making thinking itself an absurd affair, and without assuming that very principle we have doubted. Let us consider the second point. When we proceed to doubt this principle or criterion of non-contradiction and furnish proofs for that purpose, we must take recourse to ratiocinative and critical weapons which must, if they have any meaning, imply the presence of a criterion of absolute knowledge of reality or the principle of the knowledge of the indubitable reality. Thus the whole doubt destroys itself. One who does not possess, however generally, a confidence of self-consistency is not entitled to undertake to doubt anything. The cynic that questions every human virtue or sentiment is led to do so by a pre-existing ideal of conduct or

or social reaction which is for ever his despair. Every fling that he hurls serves only to confirm the existence of that ideal.

It may now be said that the standard of contradiction as implied in our doubting may be unconditional and absolute; but it is nothing ~~but~~ negative, since it no positive information to say that Reality is not self-contradictory. What ~~it~~ positively is, the standard does not tell. But such objection is wrong in that it takes for granted that it is possible to deny a predicate of a thing without needing to depend on any positive knowledge about it. According to this view, when, for instance, I say X is not Y, I simply deny Y of X, and need have no knowledge of the nature of X. But, in fact, this is not what I do. I take my stand on some positive knowledge of the nature of X, however general and indefinite that knowledge may be. And this positive character is felt incompatible with the content of the predicate of the negative judgment I make. The judgment, This cow is not black, does not merely say that blackness is lacking in the cow; it implies the existence of a definite colour in the cow which is not-black. In the same way when it is said Reality is not self-contradictory, there must be a positive foundation of this denial. To be able to deny self-contradiction to the real, one must know beforehand that the real is something which excluded contradiction, or in other words, that being self-consistent, harmonious it must be incapable of admitting any contradiction into its being.

"Our standard denies inconsistency, and therefore asserts consistency. If we can be sure that the inconsistent is unreal, we must, logically, be just as sure that the reality is consistent" (A & R. p. 139). As soon as it is admitted that the criterion rejects contradiction, some positive knowledge about it is assured. If we know that it rejects contradiction, we know what it does. To know what it does is also to know what it is. What it does it does by virtue of what it is. It is absurd that to observe what a thing does will furnish no knowledge about what it is. 'For', says Bradley, ' I cannot see how, when I observe a thing at work, I am to stand there and to insist that I know nothing of its nature. I fail to perceive how a function is nothing at all, or how it does not positively qualify that to which I attribute it' (A. R. 139).

The objector may still persist saying that, although the criterion is positive, it is not possible to know it as it is. The real may be such as does not admit of self-contradiction, but what it in itself is, is beyond knowledge. We may have a vague notion of it but we cannot claim to have apprehended its character and contents. For all that we know is appearance, in other words, things as they appear to us, their character as vitiated with conflict and inconsistency. Reality may have a superior, and also positive character, but its exact nature is not disclosed to us whose knowledge is restricted to appearances. Then again,

126.

Then again, even agreeing that Reality is not bare exclusion of discord but is, on the other hand, characterised by harmony and concord, we do not in that affirmation have anything in the concrete about the real. To be told of concord and harmony without knowledge of the contents that are set in harmony is to know nothing very essential regarding the nature of Reality.

111.

But such an objector cannot touch Bradley who denies dualism between Reality and appearance, and does not subscribe to the division of the universe into two hemispheres, one knowable, and the other unknowable. Bradley is never tired of asserting that appearances belong to Reality, and that there is no other place where appearances can fall. Reality and its appearance are inseparable. It is meaningless to draw a line between appearance that is held to be within knowledge and Reality that is held outside knowledge. If the real is unknowable, "we could not know that such a thing ever existed..It would be much as if we said " Since all my faculties are totally confined to my garden, I cannot tell if the roses next door are in flower " (A. R. p. 129). That is to say, when my faculties are confined to my garden I cannot even say that there may be roses anywhere else or that there may be a garden other than the one I possess. No statement whatsoever is possible regarding that which cannot be known. Kant to whom we owe the conception of the unknowable reality, calls it things-in-themselves. Now if reality is many (things) the question of relation between ^{them} at once arises with all the

them at once arises with all the difficulties that have confounded us in connection with the discussion of phenomenal plurality. If this objection is sought to be avoided by saying that reality is one thing-in-itself, matters are not improved. We set up real on one side and appearance on the other, and are confounded with the question, What is the relation between the two ? If there is a relation, then it must be allowed that appearances qualify the real. If so, all the puzzles arising out of substance and quality will reappear. If it is asserted that no such relation exists, it may be asked, Has the real any qualities of its own ? If not, the real turns out to be a qualityless mere being which is for us no better than nothing. If it means nothing, has no character, in no wise does its existence matter to us, or to the realm of appearances which immediately interests us.

" Everything in our concrete world remains the same, and the separate existence somewhere of this wretched abstraction serves us only as a poor and irrelevant excuse for neglecting our own concerns (p. 130 A. R.). Reality being the highest value, it must carry within itself the fulfilment of all human interests and aspirations. To hold that it is characterless existence, is to deprive it of its very worth and importance for our intellectual and moral pursuits. That which is the ultimate truth of things must communicate itself through my experience of things. Else it is nothing which my thought need concern itself with. It must in all manner work upon my world. The reality that does not appear to me neither exists. For what is the

is the necessity of my postulating it if it is ever beyond my knowledge; in other words, of what use is the postulation of a thing that is outside my knowledge ? It is " a vain notion to set up an idol apart, to dream that facts for that reason have ceased to be facts" (A. R. p. 131).

The notion of an unknowable and characterless thing-in-itself must be discarded, if reality is to be what it implies, the foundation of things. Appearances may not be synonymous with reality, but it cannot on that ground be held that reality is wholly other than appearances and that appearances have no worth. " Our appearances may be a beggarly show, and their nature to an unknown extent may be something which, as it is, is not true of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak as if these facts had no actual existence, as if there could be anything but reality to which they might belong " (A. R. p. 132). Appearances vitiated by contradictions as they are, are not real, but they cannot be considered non-existent for that reason. Ever an illusion is. It is impossible to dismiss it out of the perceptual world. By calling a percept illusory what is meant is that its what or character is inconsistent with the reaction it sets up. But that it exists and has a being one cannot for a moment question. The mirage is illusory because the waterlike presentation is ineffective in practice. But one cannot deny the physical substratum underlying the false perception of watery expanse, nor can the waterlike character be got rid of at will. So also in the case of the

of the phenomenal world as a whole. " What appears must for that sole reason most indubitably is, and there is no possibility of conjuring its being away from it" (A & R. P. 132). Appearances therefore must fall within reality. They exist and they do so within reality which is abiding existence.

" Whatever is cannot fall outside the real " A. R. p. 140).

Yet our result so far is only an empty outline of Reality. Everything phenomenal is somehow real, But the knowledge this proposition conveys is very formal and abstract. What about the concrete nature of Reality which includes all phenomenal diversities ? To this Bradley's answer is as follows: " Sentient experience in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. We may say in other words, that there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence. Feeling, thought, and volition (any groups under which we class psychical phenomena) are all the material of existence, and there is no other material actual or ever possible.....Find any piece of existence, taken up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to the sort when the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the

than the experienced. Anything in no sense felt or perceived becomes to me quite unmeaning. And as I cannot try to think of it without realising either that I am not thinking at all, or that I am thinking of it against my will as being experienced, I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality " (A. R. pp. 144-45). The same conclusion may be reached in a different way. If reality includes appearances, the question arises, what is the nature of their presence in reality ? Do they independently coexist there ? Now if we consider them to be many, each one must be distinguished by a character of its own requiring to be related one with the other. If the phenomenal contents are to co-exist they will do so by virtue of their respective character. For the coexistence of qualityless bare reals is equal to the coexistence of nothings. It is therefore impossible to escape from some sort of relatedness. But we know that relations are incapable of satisfying the intellect. We should therefore abandon the category of plurality in envisaging the character of the real, and contemplate a mode of togetherness of the phenomenal contents, different from the relational togetherness which lacks consistency and self-sufficiency. Reality is not a system of things with relations in between them, but is that in which things are welded into a harmonious whole. And this harmonious whole cannot be anything other than sentient experience. For except in sentience you cannot find a form of unity where " distinctions can be made but divisions do not exist ". The essential mark of sentience is that it is a whole in which the contents interpenetrate

interpenetrate without needing to be linked by relations. Sentience embraces 'all differences in an inclusive harmony'. At a particular moment scraps of thoughts, emotions, memories and impulses stir up in the mind, but they are not separable, one from the other by way of relations of position, likeness, unlikeness etc. They are present in the mind in some such way as diverse smells and sounds inhabit in the air. So, when it is said appearances are lodged harmoniously in the real, it is meant that they are taken up in an all-embracing sentience. In other words, reality that possesses everything phenomenal in absolute concord can do so because it is of the nature of sentience, because it is mind which embosoms endless contents without setting them in a relativistic scheme. No other mode of togetherness except what obtains in sentience can yield that harmony and self-consistency which constitutes the basic character of reality. Every other verifiable way of togetherness involves relations and is, therefore, a source of discord.

To sum up. Reality is self-consistent and harmonious. Appearances belong to reality, that is, appearances are somehow real. The real being harmonious, appearances must be shorn of disharmony in the real. This dissipation of the disharmony is possible because Reality is "a single all-inclusive experience which embraces all partial diversity in concord". The defects of appearances consequent upon relativism, disappear because they are taken up into the unity

unity of sentient experience.

Now Bradley enquires whether over and above the above theoretical consistency there exists in the real practical harmony as well, in other words, whether the harmony spoken of above implies practical harmony also. Does the real assure fulfilment of desires and aspirations ? It may appear easy enough to answer this in the affirmative. One may claim that the existence of the practical standard or ideal at which conative life aims is self-evident. The very fact that I possess the idea of good which promises fulfilment of all my desires establishes at once the reality of the ideal. It is real and has its place in reality. " The fact of idea proves the fact of reality".

But the ontological argument, according to Bradley, cannot be accepted without doubt. " We possess a practical standard, but that does not seem to me to yield a conclusion about reality ", says Bradley (A. R. p. 148). The existence of the practical end or perfection cannot be proved on pain of self-contradiction. We may have the idea of perfection wherein all desires will meet with a pleasurable fulfilment, but that is not sufficient proof of the reality of the idea. " For if an idea has been manufactured and is composed of elements taken up from more than one source, then the result of manufacture need not as a whole exist out of my thought, however much that is the case with separate elements. Thus we might admit that, in one sense, perfection or completeness would not be present in idea unless also it were real.

were real. We might admit this, and yet we might deny the same conclusion with respect to practical perfection. For the perfection that is real might simply be theoretical ". (A. R. pp. 149-50). The theoretical perfection, that is, the absolute standard, which has been found to be the indispensable postulate of our thinking, exists of necessity. But the same necessity or compulsion is not involved in our idea of practical perfection or ultimate happiness. When we proceed along the line of intellect we are forced to postulate an ultimate principle of truth, the repudiation of which is impossible without supposing ~~that~~ every principle. This has been discussed above. But it is never a self-contradiction to question the reality of the practical or moral end. My volitional life is not forced to a standstill, if the moral end is repudiated, in the same way as an intellectual advance is made impossible by the denial of the criterion of non-contradiction. And it is a commonplace of moral philosophy that the end pronounced by it is never regarded as having actual existence. Moral end is not a fact; it is what should be but is not. Then, the evil, simply because it impedes my moral pursuits, does not become unreal. Similarly, good simply because it promises satisfaction is not self-evidently real. For the practical dissatisfaction is neither a proof of the falsity of a fact nor the practical satisfaction a proof of its reality. A thing is false because it is theoretically untenable. What is true or real is so because " While you doubt this, you

you accept it, and obey while you rebel". But this does not apply to the idea of moral perfection. The denial of it does not lead to any self-contradiction.

Thus we see that a practical standard by itself is no proof of its reality and that we cannot regard the self-consistent whole postulated by thinking as possessing pleasure or volitional fulfilment merely on the ground that the moral end or standard is conceivable. There is no passage from the moral ideal of happiness to its actual existence in Reality which has been established by the urgency of thought.

Yet this moral perfection which is a state of pleasurable fulfilment can be proved to have a place in Reality, but by a different line of argument. Reality which affords satisfaction to the intellect is a harmonious and self-consistent whole. Now the question is whether this harmony is compatible with pain and frustration. Taken intellectually reality is harmonious all through, there being no element of discord in it. In it there is no collision between idea and fact, between representation and sensation, nor among ideas and sensations themselves. Even when there appears clash or struggle, that clash or struggle is only apparent being subservient to a wider consummation from the standpoint of which the struggle is fully resolved.

Now, what is pain? Pain issues from unsatisfied desire. Pain is experienced when the idea or ideal state one aims at is felt to be incompatible with one's present condition, that is to say, when the ideal is such as never to be

never to be realised. To put in the language of modern psychology, pain results from impeded and futile conation. If, now, we allow pain to be a feature of the absolute we introduce " the very condition of instability and discord" in the life of the absolute that must be harmonious throughout. " We have in the absolute, on one side, a state of things where the elements cannot jar, where a particular idea does not conflict with presentation. But with pain, on the other side, we have introduced a main spring of change and unrest, and we thus produce necessarily an idea not in harmony with existence. And this idea of a better and of a non-existing condition of things must directly destroy theoretical rest " (A. R. p. 158). The theoretical perfection of the absolute cannot restfully dwell with pain which is the same as incongruity and discrepancy. But it is not to be supposed that the existence of pain is denied. Pain like every other phenomenon is impossible to dismiss as non-existent. It is in the real only that, being taken up in a wider context, it is counterbalanced and the result is a balance of pleasure ; what is painful in the finite experience is overruled into a pleasurable state in the Absolute. Even in finite experience the neutralisation of pain by an intense pleasure is never an uncommon psychological event. The universe as a whole possesses an overplus of pleasure which accomplishes the absorption of pain and frustration and, for the matter of that, conflict.

The harmony that is the essential mark of the Absolute means complete coincidence of idea with fact, meaning with percept, and as such it leaves no room for any discrepancy or collision between what is and what might be, nor is there a better but non-existent idea causing unrest and discomfort in the present. In the Absolute there can be no unsatisfied desire. The main tendencies and impulses of our nature must reach fulfilment within it.

" Our main wants for truth, life, and for beauty and goodness must all find satisfaction ". To deny this satisfaction would be tantamount to the denial of the very theoretical harmony which we have found indispensable for thinking, and which is forced upon us as the precondition of intellectual life. Bradley, therefore, in consonance with the Indian Absolutist (Vedantist) conceives the Absolute (Brahma) as Sat (being) Cit (experience) and Ananda (bliss or practical perfection).

Chapter VI

REALITY AND APPEARANCE.

Reality, we have said in the preceding chapter, is experience embracing appearances in perfect harmony. In this chapter we shall follow Bradley in his working out this thesis in detail, and see the distinctive character that the theory of immanence assumes in his hand.

The idea of the thing-in-itself beyond the world of appearances Bradley has rejected outright. Now he goes on to say that reality is not anything other than its appearances. "The absolute is its appearance, it really is all and every one of them" (A. R. p. 486). If appearances are not real except as founded upon the life of the Absolute, the Absolute is nothing if detached from the complex of phenomenal existence. "The absolute has no assets beyond its appearances" (A. R. p. 489). The separate particularity of the things of the world is untrue, so also is the absolute transcendence of the real. And in this general statement of his attitude to appearance Bradley is essentially Hegelian.

But he combats the suggestion that looking upon appearances as the contents of the absolute is a veiled identification of the two postulated as different. The Absolute, holds Bradley, is no numerical aggregate of the world-phenomena. Appearances are deficient lacking self-sufficiency and always referring to something beyond to sustain them. If, therefore, the absolute be

absolute be merely ' the sum of things ' it will be no absolute at all. Having all the defects and depravities of the phenomenal order, it would be indistinguishable from that order, and would consequently fail to furnish the ultimate criterion of evaluation. But we have seen that harmony and self-subsistence constitute the ultimate standard of things, that is, the Absolute. If, therefore, the appearances should belong to the Absolute, it will not do to conceive them simply as shelved into it in all their imperfections. The Absolute has the appearances, but it has them by holding them in a perfect unity when all incongruity and strife attendant on the fragmentariness of things disappear.

What is more, this harmony in the Absolute is accomplished not by the exclusion of evil, error and things like them which lie at the root of unrealness of the empirical order. Not being a " barren absence of discord," the Absolute leaves out nothing, every aspect of the world, the highest as well as the lowest, is gathered in its being and contributes to its life. The Absolute is all-inclusive, and therefore, a perfect individual. There is no outside to it. Evil, error and impotence of every sort must all be assimilated into the Absolute life. The possibility of such assimilation can be apprehended easily when the nature of these elements has been analysed.

There is nothing like absolute evil or absolute error or even ugliness; they, as we encounter them in our experience, are relative each to a province of its own.

own. Truth, for instance, is relevant only to the realm of thought, evil to practice and morality, and ugliness to the sphere of aesthetic appreciation. And they receive support and justification from these limited wholes. Outside their respective spheres they have little or no significance. Aesthetic dissatisfaction may go with progress of thought and morality, just as inconsistencies, in respect of thinking have very little reaction on morality and aesthetic enjoyment. Again, there may be immorality but its existence within its province is unable to impede any theoretical pursuit nor can it interfere with the appreciation of beauty; on the contrary in a work of art, say a realistic novel immorality itself may be transformed into a vehicle of beauty. In the same way, something that baffles me in my theoretical endeavour, does not affect any of my other sides in any considerable way. When ultimately these provinces are contemplated in the Absolute and under the law of its perfect universe, not only is mutual interference far less, the elements, however discordant in themselves, are subordinated to a harmonious whole. Evil, ugliness etc. are all in the Absolute but not being identical with any one of its fragmentary and dependent contents as such, the Absolute cannot be stamped with the depravity of those contents.

Now, to consider these elements separately, Error, to begin with, is a wrong idea, or judgment or inference. What is a true idea or judgment? An idea is true when nothing stands in the way of its qualifying a definite point in reality. 'Sugar is sweet'

is sweet' is a judgment that is taken as correct, because sweetness is appropriately ascribed to reality specified by sugar. On the other hand, it would be wrong to say that sugar is bitter because the idea of bitterness would be discrepant with facts in the particular context. This is all very plain to every body. But when we go deeper into a commonly accepted judgment we find that it is not absolutely true for it is unable to express the real as it intends to. Sugar is sweet, is a poor abstraction falling far short of the complete existence intended by the judgment. Sweetness is only a feature of that complex of qualities of which it is predicated and even as a feature it is not what it would be were it inside the sensible whole. We have discussed this point in a previous chapter and need not repeat the arguments in this connection. If truth means determination of reality in its fullness the contents of a judgment are impotent for that purpose and hence cannot claim to be true. Their only value lies in the fact that they serve as a reference to reality and in this they differ from error. In error the idea fails to qualify reality and therefore misfits where it seeks to refer. An erroneous idea is self discrepant and its predication is bound to introduce discord into facts. In the present example, discordance is between sweetness and bitterness in the same place of reality. The erroneous judgment forces the content bitter in reality where it is bound to collide with sweetness. The so-called true judgment and the wrong judgment thus both work

both work with ideas and as idea the contents of both are other than reality that is a sentient whole. Sweetness is not sweetness as felt nor has bitterness the germinal feeling character. So far both kinds of judgment are on the same footing. The difference arises in the fact that while in the case of sweetness, the qualification is consistent with reality, in the other case reality does not accept the qualification. But it cannot be said that bitterness is an idea which can never be true. Reality as a whole cannot reject the idea of bitterness though in a particular reference there may be jarring and conflict. In spite of its discrepancy an error or an erroneous idea is, it does affect us, and as such it must belong to reality. For, just as appearance cannot fall outside the real, so also error or false appearance cannot emigrate elsewhere. You may condemn errors " but your condemnation cannot act as a spell to abolish them wholly " (A. & R. p. 191). When reality is considered in a particular point of its revelation, say a lump of sugar, this content of bitterness is bound to be rejected and from the forced attribution thereof error will result. If the subject of predication is taken as **A** and its contents are a & b, the attribution of c must result in error. But when the domain of A is enlarged, accommodation may be available for the erstwhile cast-out contents, c, and consequently error may be resolved. Errors arise in a finite context only, because the innate partialness of that context restricts the ascription of any and every character to itself.

character to itself. The limited nature of a finite system makes it impossible for it to assimilate anything but a particular sort of contents. It is subject to a complex of conditions which must be satisfied if its existence is to be preserved. So it resists anything foreign to its limited nature and likely to disagree with those conditions of existence. The fact signified by sugar is so conditioned that its integrity tends to break up as soon as the content, bitterness that is antagonistic to the relevant content sweetness is ascribed to it. Its limited being is incapable of accepting the qualification bitterness, since this content cannot be harmoniously related to its constituents, and the laws that govern them. That could be done only, if the fact concerned were included in a wider whole where the presence of a variety of new details would overpower the opposites, bitterness and sugar.

The same conclusion may be reached with regard to evil. Evil presents itself in pain, frustration and immorality. As to pain, it is not difficult to conceive of its neutralisation in the perfect harmony. We have seen in the previous chapter that harmony includes happiness and that in the absolute there should at least be a balance of pleasure. It is a common experience that small pains become imperceptible in an intenser happiness. In the same way, all earthly pains are merged in the excess of the blissfulness of the absolute life. When neutralisation of pain is possible

is possible even in the finite experience, it must be many times more possible in absolute experience. Concordance and harmony being the irresistible implication of the concept of the absolute, pains as such can have no ultimate significance. Next, can the same be said of failings in practical life? It is not difficult to conceive that failure to achieve a particular end gets compensated in the achievement of a higher and larger goal. What appears as a futility in respect of one pursuit may considerably subserve a richer fulfilment. Take, ^{Take,} for example, the Indian national struggle for freedom from foreign rule. This struggle has been progressing for years through innumerable ups and downs, and the goal is not still in sight. But with the emergence of what may be called international outlook, the ideal of nationalism is losing its former force and there is a considerable feeling that the cultivation of international fellowship will lead to a greater human welfare which will be without the pangs of all national ills. In the same way, we should understand the absolute where all strivings terminate, and where the divorce between the ideal and the actual- the divorce that underlies all endeavours, does no longer exist. In that ultimate state there will be no ends as such, high or low, and consequently the evils of unachieved ideal and impeded volition would be absent.

Here we can easily understand why there is no place in the absolute for moral evil either. The absolute, excluding, as

absolute, excluding, as it does, striving towards what is not, is necessarily super-moral. Moral evil is nothing but the self's endeavour to realise itself in a wrong way, a definite effort to fulfil the self in and as contradiction. And moral effort and endeavour is the outcome of the feeling of dissatisfaction with the present state and the consequent necessity to alter it. And in the whole this state of unrest ceases. The contradictoriness of a bad action or end must be resolved in the Absolute which is fundamentally a harmonious experience.

II

But Bradley emphatically denies that the harmony of the absolute is accomplished by excluding empirical imperfections. Rather, the harmony is there because of the phenomenal variety. The perfection of the absolute is not an empty perfection, it is born of the unique fusion of the empirical contents. The diversities that at the phenomenal setting, are a source of endless contradiction, when taken up into a rearrangement and altered and supplemented, furnish a rich and profound experience. "The absolute is richer for every discord, and for all diversity which it embraces.....with every region of phenomenal existence we can say that it possesses so much more treasure." (A. & R. p. 204). The deficient particulars that constitute the finite world, each one of them contributes

contributes to the highest harmony by being organised into a whole. Nothing, however, small, need be left out. Despair and defect as well as triumph and achievement, all are equally within the absolute existence, and all changed and altered. " Every attitude of experience, every sphere or level of the world, is a necessary factor in the absolute " (A. & R. p. 487). Though considered in isolation the empirical elements show defects, the very same things, when woven into a totality, are the ingredients of the perfect experience, that is, the absolute. The drum that annoys when sounded alone, becomes musical when it is part of a band.

But it should not be deduced from the above that all things are indifferently cast into the pit of the absolute. Bradley recognises degrees of reality in the Absolute. The absolute is a hierarchy of reals, not a tedious monotony. Although the phenomenal order is defective from end to end, there is, nevertheless, a distinction of degrees or levels, consequent on the more or less of imperfection in different regions. The Absolute is immanent in every region of appearance, but it is not equally so in every region. When Bradley condemns the finite order as appearance, he does not mean that it is wholly and irremediably unreal. Appearances or what is the same thing, the different modes of finite experience, thought, will and emotion arise from the indubitable basis of feeling. They may betray discrepancies but they are not chimerical for that reason.

for that reason. That we think, will and feel pleasure and pain, is beyond doubt, only that from an ultimate analysis, thoughts, volitions and affections are found lacking in self-completion. There is defect, but nevertheless, our experience is nowhere infected by radical falsehood. In spite of the defects, the different items of experience in their own way tend to realise the Absolute. A judgment, for instance, by its very constitution is incapable of expressing the real, but it may all the same be nearer to the real than another judgment. Absolute coherence is certainly not the possession of any thought, but that does not prevent some thought-process being more or less coherent than, and thereby being superior or inferior to another thought-process. Simply on the ground that no intellectual operation is ultimately true, it cannot be said that all intellectual processes are equally deficient. In spite of the fact that all intellectual pursuits lack finality, it has to be admitted that Philosophy is nearer the central truth of things than Physics or Physiology, and that Physics of to-day is more far-reaching than the Physics of an earlier century. In the previous chapter we have dealt with the nîsus of thought towards perfect coherence. This nîsus makes itself felt differently in different thought-strata. But everywhere thought operates in a whole and proceeds by the enlargement of its domain. Throughout all judgment or inference a whole that is not overtly there, works and guides thought's course. Torn from the background of the whole, thought has no signification.

signification.

That a judgment is rooted in a whole, may be illustrated thus: The judgment, The king can do no wrong, is not intelligible if taken singly without reference beyond its grammatical structure. The real significance of this judgment is involved in the body of the British Constitution from which it follows as a necessary consequence. My knowledge of the details of the British Constitution must operate within me before I arrive at this judgment. Without reference to this background, the judgment is merely a grammatical sentence bereft of any truth-claim. (Bosanquet's example from Implication and Linear Inference).

The systematic nature of thought becomes more clear from the consideration of inference. We say A is C, because A is B and B is C. It is the middle term through which the datum undergoes a modification leading to the new relation in the conclusion. The terms A and C that are given as differentials are synthesised on the basis of a common centre represented in the middle term. It is a very important syllogistic rule that the middle term must be identical in both the premises. This rule when elaborated means that the different elements in the inference must belong to a whole that remains identical in its operation. It may be objected that the middle term is merely a point of identity and does not admit of the above explanation as a totality

as a totality or whole. To this the reply is that there cannot be anything like a bare identity. No identity is realised except through a system of multiplicity of contents. When I say that A and C both bear reference to B, I cannot but mean that B is the basal principle that unites the different A and C. Unless we conceive of B as a system incorporating A and C, it at once becomes unintelligible how B is identifiable with two different A and C at the same time. It is only on the supposition that B is a synthetic whole unifying diversities, that the principle of identity justifying transition to a new relation in the conclusion of a syllogistic inference, can be understood. The operation of a whole in the middle term becomes more plain when we consider an inference involving spatial contents; A is to the right of B. B is to the right of C. Therefore A is to the right of C. "Here B is an identity which is characterised by the differences of its spatial relations to A and C". (P. of Logic). B is not an isolated particular that is now related to A and next to C. If such were the case, there would have been no warrant of inference. For where is the guarantee that the particular did not change in either of the relations? B, therefore, should be regarded as the spatial system underlying both A and C, and because of their identical location,

identical location, it is possible to connect A and C in a new relation. The wholeness of the middle term is further expressed by another important rule which says that the middle term must be distributed at least once. Unless the middle term is taken in its fullest range, the function of synthesising the differents cannot be performed. The middle term must appear in its universality so that it may furnish the basis of the unification of the major and the minor term.

Now to return to the main point of our discussion. The absolute whole to which these lesser wholes are sub-ordinated, operates in varying emphases in them with the result that the different judgments, inferences or thought-systems are characterised by different degrees of truth and untruth. From the absolute standpoint, of course, all sciences and patterns of thought are imperfect, for no science can reveal the universe in its entirety. Yet, the same amount of imperfection does not characterise all thoughts, because the expression of the whole is not fixed but varies. The absolute is in each of the thought systems, but it is not in all of them in equal degree, one system expressing it in a larger measure than another. The merit of a system is dependent upon the degree of its participation in the absolute wholeness. The absolute is the perfect system, and that is more real which " contains within its own limits a wider region of the absolute, and it possesses more

more intensely the type of self-sufficiency " (A. R. p. 382). But it is not to be supposed that Bradley means that the appearances that display a progression of excellence, are, just as they appear, equivalent to the absolute. On the contrary, the whole realm of appearances undergoes a thorough reconstruction in the Absolute, a transformation in which imperfection and discord do no longer jar and jolt. But that transformation is not a random levelling down, the excellences of the phenomenal order are not abolished, but are rather accentuated with their accompanying defects removed. The distinction of higher and lower among appearances does not lose its significance for the absolute. In the absolute the higher will " require less alteration, less destruction of its own special nature, in order to make this higher element completely real " (A. R. p. 382), whereas the alteration will be far more thorough in the case of the lower. This point will be discussed below.

"III"

Not only are there degrees within the realm of thought, but as between thought and other phases of experience also- and thought according to Bradley is not the only characteristic of the universe or experience- there is scope for graduation on the basis of harmony and inclusiveness. If we consider the ethical or the practical aspect of experience, we find that it involves more of life than mere thought,

thought, or discursive intelligence. The good or the ethical end is far wider than truth, and it lays a greater claim on the soul than the latter. It is the very essential peculiarity of the moral end that it promises perfection of the entire self. And perfection implies a system harmonious and thus inclusive of everything, beauty, truth, feeling and sensation-every imaginable matter must go to constitute perfection". And this is the goal of moral endeavour. The moral end represents the harmonisation of all the major drives of the soul. And the attainment of that end state is preceded by the disappearance of the boundaries of the finite personality. The individual's " perfection is not one thing apart from the rest of the universe, and he gains it only by appropriating, and by reducing to a special harmony, the common substance of all " (A. R. p. 416). Ultimately the ethical endeavour means that the soul is moved by the idea of the ~~community~~ community of interests, and in so far as it is thus moved, it progresses towards an individuality where all interests, urges and feelings are welded into a concordant whole, that is infinite in its implications. So long as one is confined within the narrow shell of one's private self, one is subject to discord, arising from the incompatibility of activities and interests. As soon as the good is ~~sought~~ sought in social good, one is lifted to the level where moral impediments dissolve and the self turns into

turns into the ordered whole of mutually harmonious interests and actions.

Now, we see that the drive towards the whole is stronger in the practical life and that the end aimed at is wider than and superior in inclusiveness to truth, the end of thought. So we are justified in affirming that morality possesses greater reality than thought or intellect. And this distinction is not obliterated in the absolute.

Again, as in the domain of truth one system of thought is higher than another in width and coherence, so also the lives of individuals differ in point of the range of their pursuits. The wider the ideal to which a life is devoted, the more individuality is it possessed of. The superiority of the life of a Gandhi results from the vast range of his activities and his continuous self-transcendence. But every life however insignificant is motivated by a complex of ideas and so far it is not wholly without some worth.

The absolute pulsates through every life but in varying rhythms. No life is too small to be the vehicle of the supreme principle, yet the manner of the manifestation of the principle is determined by the trend and direction of the life. The life of a saint contains a greater measure of "the vital function of perfection" than that of a villain and the saint and a villain, though both embraced by the absolute, do retain their qualitative distinction even at the ultimate stage. The absolute does not exclude any of its appearances,

but

" it is not all equally, but one appearance is more real than another" (A. R. p. 487).

This graded expression of the absolute can be illustrated from the individual life. The life of Mahatma Gandhi, for example, exhibits concord on every side. From his daily spinning right up to the guidance of the destiny of the Indian National Congress, there is no break in the inner harmony of that life. Yet it is undoubtedly correct to say the personality of the Mahatma has a deeper and fuller expression when he leads Satyagraha (Civil Resistance) than when, say, he is engaged in taking his scanty meal of goat-milk, at the usual hour. And it is at the same time true that both the functions are indissoluble part of the same harmonious life. Turning to the animal organism we find that the vital principle is focussed more on the internal working of the organism than on its external limbs although both are equally indispensable for the existence of the animal.

"1v"

Here we should consider one important point, wherein lies the distinctive thesis of Bradley. In spite of what has been said regarding the indispensability of appearances for the Absolute, and their ranks and degrees, it must be particularly noted that reality or the absolute is not to be equated with appearances. Appearances, however much they may tend towards the Absolute, are vitiated with

vitiated with defects, and as such are not ascribable to the Absolute in that condition. When Bradley says reality is appearance, what is meant by him is that reality is its appearances not as they fall within the finite experience, but as they are purified of their deficiency, bettered and completed. To identify the absolute with phenomena having all their imperfections in fact, would be nothing other than naturalism or shallow pantheism.

Thought, volition, and feeling, the components of experience, are all full of contradiction and discord. We have seen in previous chapters that thought having always had an other to it, can never reach the real, however much it may be widened and enlarged. There is an eternal separation of existence and idea in thought, existence ever eluding its ideal grasp. The same gulf exists in morality also, moral endeavour originates in the distinction between existence and idea, what is and what is to be.

Morality implies self that seeks to be realised in the end. Now self is an ideality cut loose from immediate experience which is prior to subject-object differentiation. As soon as the self grows out of the felt whole, there dawns the will which Bradley defines as "the self-realisation of an idea with which the self is identified" (Mind, 1902, p.437). Volition presupposes a feeling of dissatisfaction with what is here and now given, which dissatisfaction is the result of the operation of the idea or ideas of the satisfactory state. The self tries by acting to realise

to realise the ideas to change the given, and to arrive at rest and satisfaction. But the idea or ideas that the self works through and seeks to realise have an infinite number of relations and they constitute so to say a chain of innumerable links so that as soon as one link is realised, the next ^{link} forces up for realisation, and this process of realisation will not terminate, until the whole universe attains realisation within the self, resulting in the absorption in a supra-relational consummation. But the fullest realisation surpasses the limits of finitude and is as such denied to the finite individual. The finite moral endeavour is, therefore, bound to remain within the ideal plane with universals ever needing concrete filling. In morality the individual is devoted to something which is present to him only in the shape of an ideal construction. The very fact he desires it shows that it is yet to be and this desire never ceases, seeing that the desired end having finite ideal details that will have to be rendered into reality, is never fully accomplished. The ideal is the absolute itself and as such is unrealisable under finite conditions. Moral good is an object of endless seeking, and therefore, an idea bereft of existence and, therefore, appearance. As theoretically so also practically there is discrepancy between idea and existence.

In thought we

In thought we idealise the real which is inexhaustible by means of ideas, in morality we wish to realise the idea which never succeeds in reaching its counterpart of existence in full. So neither in thought nor in practice is there any escape from the opposition of ideality and reality.

Again, thought and practice are, neither of them, primary and self-explained. Every ideal connection or judgment that I make is determined by a series of connections that fall outside the present process. When I say, for instance, A is not B, the relation established is really beyond the judgment itself. You cannot all at once make any affirmation. It must result from a number of affirmations which are not manifestly in it. And even the system within which a particular judgment takes its rise, is not self-sustained, being itself worked upon by conditions that are nowhere contained within itself. No system is competent to furnish adequate replies to the questions like, why is it? what is it? without referring to some other complex of connections beyond itself. When, for instance, we are called upon to explain a political phenomenon our thought is driven beyond the ken of political currents to, say, socio-economic factors, and to history, which obviously do not fall within the present subject. And even then the explanation is not complete. Besides, every intellectual distinction is, on the ultimate analysis, a psychical growth. There must always be cumulation of conditions, the complex working of which results

of which results in the particular judgment. And these conditions being psychical are "foreign materials" which thought can never "absorb into essential functions" (A. R. p. 480). Thought or understanding, as Kant has said, is not self-sufficient. The system of relations it constructs, which Kant calls nature, owes itself ultimately to the materials which it does not make. Thought as well as will is not primary. "They are developed from a basis which is not yet either, and which never can fully become so. Their existence is due to psychical events and ways of happening which are not distinctive of thought or will. And this basis is, never, so to speak, absorbed by either. In other words, will and thought throughout depend on what is not essentially either, and without these psychical elements, which remain external, their process would cease". (A. R. p. 479).

Turning to volition, no activity is an isolated happening; there must always be an occasion for it. And "this is something outside the standing nature of the thing, and is accidental, in the sense of happening to that essential dispositions" (p. 65, A & R.). Looking deeper into the genesis of will, we are bound to come upon the discovery of its roots in psychobiological facts that have been at work over a long process of history, let alone the immediate psychical factors that occasion it. Only when one isolates practice from these

hidden bases

hidden bases and views it in abstraction that the illusion of self-containedness of the individual life in its practical or ethical aspect, arises. "We have to take into account factors in the man's "heredity", and again in his social and physical environment which form no part of the nature of this central dominant ideal and yet influence the manner of its fulfilment". (Elements of Metaphysics, Taylor, p. 114). The analysis of aesthetic expressions leads to the same conclusion. Aesthetic expression is, at first sight, an emotional whole of contents characterized by pleasantness. But it cannot enjoy itself; it must depend for its self-revelation on an enjoyer. Thus it has to stand in relation to a mind and thus being an object it remains an ideal. And so long as it remains an ideal, and does not coincide with the the spirit and existence of the enjoyer, there can be no aesthetic fulfilment. Externality also obtains between the aesthetic whole and the materials that go into its constitution. The canvas, the paint, the brush will always remain external to the expression that is conveyed by them; not only that, they even exercise a limitation on the aesthetic act, but for which the expression would be deeper and intenser. Here as elsewhere, this coercion of matter is the inevitable accompaniment of finitude. Beauty "is determined from outside and so internally must be in

must be in discord with itself....Beatiful object viewed as independent is no more than appearance" (A. R. p. 465).

"v"

These imperfections incidental to all sides of phenomenal order cannot remain unaltered, in the Absolute. The sins of finite existence must be shed, before admission into the sanctuary of the Absolute is obtained. As we have in Tagore, " এই মলিন বস্ত্র ছাড়তে হবে হবে হবে গো এবার তোমার এ মলিন অহঙ্কার "

"Must you discard this squalid garment, this miserable ego of yours". The defects of the phenomenal objects cannot find place in the Absolute; the Absolute has the phenomena with their imperfections remedied. The Absolute " is the unity in which all things coming are transmuted", but transmuted not in a uniform manner. There are degrees of transmutation determined by the degrees of the truth and value inhering in things. The Absolute is present throughout the realm of appearances, in fact, it is appearance, but we touch it more in love than in hate, more in beauty than in ugliness. Accordingly in the transmutation of the appearances, that which is higher in the scale will require less alteration than that which is the lower. So the degrees of reality to be interpreted in the light of the Absolute, mean the degrees of correction that the different aspects of the world will be ultimately subjected to. " In this one whole all appearances come together, and in coming

in coming together they in various degrees lose their distinctive natures" (p. 455 A. R.). The value-distinctions that are present in the finite centres of consciousness, point to the manner of the operation of the principle of perfection on the appearances. Though the finite distinctions as such are not present in the Absolute, they do in a way determine the varying phases of the absolute life. In our finite experience there are good and evil and ugliness, as also different grades of goodness, truth and beauty. The doctrine of degrees should not be taken to mean that these gradations as appraised by finite minds, continue in the absolute, but that these gradations supply us with clues to the variegated character of the absolute. Appearances reveal the real, but such revelation has little meaning if it is meant that the distinctions of value that are disclosed to finite appreciation have no place in the absolute. For that is tantamount to demolishing the appearances themselves. What are appearances besides systems of character? If the appearances carry themselves into the Absolute, they cannot leave their characters behind them, for that would be denying even themselves to the absolute. Corresponding to the gradations in the phenomenal world, there are gradations in the absolute though

absolute though one is in nowise a replica of the other. Bradley's distinctive view is that, appearances are neither conserved in the absolute in their finite empirical characters, nor are they annulled in the absolute, rendering the absolute a pure, blank being. The manner in which Bradley states this view on the relation between the absolute and the appearance, may strike one as self-contradictory at places. But this is only apparent. Indeed, he emphatically says, Reality is not anything beside appearances. If we dispense with appearances, we shall have to lose the real as well. Particular appearances are partial aspects of the real which is immanent in all of them. Reality inhabits every province of the world and every phenomenon is a necessary element in Reality. " Nowhere is there a single fact so fragmentary or so poor that to the universe it does not matter". If we omit any one element, the absolute is so much the poorer for that. In the absolute, no appearance is lost, even the delights and pains of flesh are not to be excluded. " In the absolute we must keep every item of our experience" (p. 172, A. R.).

Side by side with the above line of thought we find in Bradley the assertion that the process of transformation of " the elements of actual experience" may be so thorough as to change the special nature of the transmuted ingredients.

" We have",

"We have" Bradley declares in the concluding chapter of "Appearance and Reality", "an all pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all materials. And we can hardly say that the absolute consists of finite things, when the things as such are there transmuted, and have lost their individual natures". (p. 529). This is bound to strike one as taking by one hand what has been given by the other. First, he allows that the appearances are in the absolute, and then affirms that in the absolute they may be altered beyond recognition. Apparently, these are two voices conflicting with each other in the philosopher. The first is that of Hegel with whom Reality is real in and through the phenomenal diversities. The second is that of Sankara who considers the empirical order of Sansara as illusory or maya, and having no place in Brahman or the Absolute". *

It is important to note, however, that Bradley himself has noticed the difficulty his standpoint is likely to present. He anticipates that it will be urged against him that, if all characters are liquidated, empirical distinctions cease, "the absolute stands outside as an empty residue, a bare thing in itself". (A. R. p. 204). But he answers this objection by saying that though the absolute overrides the phenomenal order, it does

* I accept this interpretation of Sankara on the authority of one of the foremost interpreters of Indian thought, namely, Prof. Mahendranath Sarker. See his 'Vedantic Thought and Culture'. This is also the classical interpretation of Vedanta.

it does not follow on that account that the phenomena being taken up into the pattern of the absolute life are destroyed outright. Could we know how exactly the phenomenal discords are harmonised, could we know the *modus operandi* of the absolute in respect of the appearances, it would be no difficulty at all to see that the whole of the phenomenal variety are contained therein. When, therefore, it is said that all distinctions are fused in the Absolute, and all relations disappear, what is intended is that the appearances losing their relativistic characters enter into a new pattern of life which by our very finitude is beyond our experience and knowledge. " It does not follow from this that when the relational form is gone, the result is really poorer. Because in detail we cannot tell in what each solution (of finite discord) consists, are we therefore driven to assert that all the detail is abolished, that our absolute is a flat monotony of emptiness ? This would indeed be illogical ; for though we do not know in each case what the solution can be, we know in each case it contains the whole of the variety..... It is our ignorance only in which consists the poverty of our object". (A. R. p. 204).

Bradley's central affirmation is concerning the ~~super~~-relational character of the absolute reality, and in his anxiety to place it beyond even a shadow of relativism, he is led to speak as though appearances are negated in the absolute.

But such

But such statements should not be understood apart from the context of the main trend of his thought. The unity into which things enter in the absolute is no discursive unity or even an organic unity where also parts are distinguishable from one another, and from the whole. That unity is described by Bradley as feeling or sentient unity, the unity of experience where no separation exists " of feeling from the felt, or of the desired from desire, or of what is thought from thinking, or the division of anything from anything else" (A. R. p. 146). Expressions like blending, dissolving, transformation and transmutation of appearances, are intended to convey that no relations or qualities conjoined by ideal connections, operate in the accomplishment of the highest unity. And that such a unity is no phantasy, nor on the last analysis a tedious monotony of annihilated diversity, he proves with the help of the intimate experience that is present in the immediacy of undifferentiated feeling. And as a matter of fact, this feeling is regarded by Bradley as a prototype of the ultimate experience, so that to those who will deny any unity other than a synthetic or logical unity, he points to the unity of feeling or psychological unity, the inherent differences whereof are yet to develop into distinctions; and to those who consider the absorption of appearances into the suprarational form as a virtual denial of the being of the appearances, he refers to the

he refers to the presence of diversities in the feeling whole. Once the feeling totality is proved it is impossible to question the absolute of Bradley which is richer for every discord and for all diversity which it embraces; nor can his thesis be taunted as "disappearance of reality". It may help understanding of Bradley's position if we deal with this point a little longer. In comparing Bradley with Sankara, the classical Indian exponent of extreme Monism styled in Sanskrit Advaitism (non-dualism), it has been suggested that * Sankara is more consistent than Bradley in his treatment of appearance, in so far as he does not allow any place to appearances in the absolute. The absolute being supra-relational, must altogether exclude appearances. Anything like synthesis of appearances is impossible in the ultimate reality, and Sankara has not attempted the impossible. He has straightaway declared them as illusory and perishable with the emergence of perfect knowledge. Appearances, it is contended, are appearances or finite facts, or they are nothing. Their being consists in their finitude or partialness. Now, if as Bradley supposes, the partialness is removed, they are no longer what they are. If thought, will and feeling lose the very characteristics which mark them as elements in my finite focus, it becomes meaningless to say that my thought, will and feeling

*See Dr. M.N. Sarkar's article on Sankara and Bradley (Indian Philosophical Congress Proceedings).

and feeling endure in the absolute. With the disappearance of their finiteness, they themselves disappear leaving no trace of their existence in the Absolute. Either you must, urges the critic, be prepared to keep finite things unmodified in the Absolute, or maintain extreme monism by denying appearance outright. There can be no half-way house of the kind Bradley attempts by correcting appearances into perfection. Sankara rejects all compromise between the Absolute and appearances, and holds that Reality is non-relational, not as the transmuter of finite diversities but as the very negation of everything finite. He sees no bond of union between the Absolute and the relativistic order. The relativistic order ultimately dissolves beyond redemption.

Let us now examine the above charge and see if Bradley to be consistent should be driven to the position of Sankara. The above criticism rests on the assumption that no advance in thought or practice is possible from the plane of contradiction to that of perfection without demolishing the starting point. To put in the language of Logic the premises must be destroyed before the conclusion is reached. But the facts about spiritual advance is otherwise. In inference, for example, the premises with all their imperfections, carry the suggestion that they are transitional and as such must be transcended. The sense of contradiction is the beginning of enlightenment.

enlightenment. The very awareness of error sets one on the path of truth, and truth is nothing that flashes out of the blue, but it consists in the process of the correction of error which obviously is not outside the process, but is rather a component part thereof. Turning to practice, we find, morality consists in the transformation of the animal nature in chastening the passions that left to themselves cause anarchy of the soul. But it can and should not be deduced therefrom that moral perfection is achieved by the extinction of the nature, or in other words, in moral and nature and sensibility are destroyed. (Ethical principles-Seth). Modern psychology tells us of sublimation of instinctive drives. A sublimated instinct pursues a course that is altogether foreign to its original biological trend. It undergoes transformation and as a result assumes a higher value and destiny. But we cannot call this transformed force, an altogether new creation, seeing that it carries the original libidinal (in Jung's sense) energy, only with its end and direction altered. When Bradley says that every finite content is transformed, there can be no necessary implication that it is extinguished. If thought reaches its other, the existential counterpart, in that coincidence we certainly do not find thought discursive, but
there can be

there can be no denying that it is the thought converted, "thought present in a higher intuition". Similarly it will realise in its fulness the idea that for ever moves it, and beauty finds a whole where the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the object and its pleasantness mingle in one undivided happiness, the resultant totality of experience cannot be regarded as transcending will and feeling though, of course, they are taken into a superior pattern. If fulfilment in finite spheres is not a blank state, there is no reason why the ultimate consummation of the different sides of life will turn out to be their veritable annihilation. Bosanquet has rightly said."....." even if the character which things bore in our immediate world seems to be absorbed and disappear in their fuller realisation, this is a characteristic for which there is the strongest every-day analogy in the relation of our commonplace perception and sentiment not to the most remote abstractions, but to the full concrete apprehension of what life contains.....There is nothing in the world worth having, doing or being which does not involve a self-transcendence. Think of the attitude demanded of one by, say, a masterpiece of art. You say you do not want an absolute in which you would not recognise yourself. But you scarcely recognise yourself when for a moment Shakespeare or Beethoven has laid his spell upon you." (Bosanquet, *Individuality and Value*, Lect. v11, pp. 259-260).

Bradley is

Bradley is no hesitating Sankara, his conception of the absolute is distinctive. The ultimate perfection is accomplished by the fusion of the divergent aspects of experience, their inner inconsistencies tending towards the highest unity. There each of these one-sided aspects "gains itself" by blending with others. The differences only seem to be lost, because of "the fact that more is included there than these several isolated differences" (A. R. p. 173). In the absolute "We have much more" than the finite facts in their severality, or "this more may so supplement the elements of our actual experience that in the whole they may become transformed" (A. R. p. 172).

To deny that such a state of fruition is possible, is to deny the evidence of all the higher phase of experience. "Does not the soul lose itself in love?" asks Bradley. Yet in love the soul does not meet with extinction, only that its "ragged edges" dissolve in an inclusive experience.* To call this the dissolution of the soul itself is to limit its essence to its very

* It is interesting to note that according to Chaitanya Vaisnavism the highest phase of religious experience is Vivarta Vilas which consists in the abolition of the distinction between the lover and the loved, God and the devotee. In Chaitanya Charitamrita Rairamananda, Chaitanya's intimate disciple, explains to the latter that profoundest love-state by a lyric of Chandidas which runs

না সো রমনী না হাম রমনী, দুই মন মনোভব পেশল জানি

"The distinction of the lover and the loved disappears in that supreme erotic bliss."

very raggedness or imperfections. But the soul is possessed of an inner suggestibility beyond its finitude. We could correct Bradley by Sankara were we prepared to deny the indwelling implications towards perfection, that characterise the entire finite order, and make its being consist solely in its contradictions. In that case, the dissolution of the contradictions would mean the dissolution of the entire order leaving no residue behind. But the implications are there which, to use a rather hackneyed expression, point to the infinite possibilities of the finite. The finite is not finite, pure and simple, it is finite with an infinite drive. And the ultimate destiny of the finite must be that state in which the possibilities reach fruition, and as such it is finite becoming the infinite, not an infinite "shot out of the pistol".

Detailed Exposition of Bradley's

Main Thesis.

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Chapter V11

THE ABSOLUTISM OF BRADLEY

1

In the supplementary notes appended to the second edition of his main work, *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley has noticed various criticisms made against his theory of the Absolute—one such criticism being that the Absolute he conceives of is "a mere blank." Before examining the aptness of this criticism which is perhaps a common one let us elaborate the point in such criticism.

Professor Pringle Pattison, who in his book, *'Man's place in the cosmos'* has called his Absolutism a new Spinozism, writes, "Now strange as it may seem, Mr. Bradley's first book (of *Appearance and Reality*) is, in essence, neither more nor less than a restatement and reinforcement of this sceptical thesis, $A=A$, Socrates is Socrates the logic of abstract identity which he brings in against phenomena is fatal in the end to his absolute also, reducing it in spite of Mr. Bradley's disclaimer in spite of his sincere endeavour to avoid such consummation to the undifferentiated unity of Spinoza's substance". (Man's place in the cosmos, first edition pp. 151-152.)

What Pringle Pattison means is this: Bradley takes his stand upon the principle of contradiction according to which every real thing is identical with itself at all times in all circumstances. Strictly speaking, then, A can never become B, A is always A,

always A, B is always B, white is white. This principle as thus interpreted asserts permanence to the exclusion of change and unity to the exclusion of difference. That is, the problem of one and many is solved here by denying many altogether. And this denial, it will be urged, is due to the inability to see the true nature of thought.

This argument is reminiscent of the criticism of Kant's ideal of pure thought by Caird. According to Kant nothing is theoretically satisfying to the mind that is not reducible to the form A is A. Therefore the syntheses of understanding however necessary can not produce truth or reality. The world which they reveal is not the real world, it is merely an appearance of the real world which thought demands, but which remains ever beyond it. Against this doctrine of Kant, namely, that Reality is no architectonic unity accomplished through the formative understanding, the philosophy of Rationalist idealism holds that the ideal that inspires thought is never identity but identity in difference. The linking up of differentials which is the function of understanding and for which Kant refuses it ultimate significance is the supreme character from which thought does not desire to be divorced. The reality which thought demands is not alien to that character but, on the contrary, represents the very perfection of that character, unity-in-difference.

Through the

Through the ever widening activity of the understanding that perfect synthesis is being progressively approached. Reality, in other words, is not discontinuous with understanding or thought operative in our day to day experience, but is the fullest realisation of thought's principle of identity in difference. It is the consummation of all human thinking, and in it the demand of thought for an other ceases inasmuch as there thought and reality coincide.

Now the criticism of Pringle Pattison against Bradley's doctrine of the Suprarelational Absolute appears to be in line with the above argument against Kant's thing in itself. From the criticism of Pringle Pattison it would seem that the ultimate principle of Bradley is the same as the Abstract Identity which Kant contemplates as an antithesis to the world of nature, and therefore the Absolute of Bradley is open to the same charge as the thing-in-itself of Kant.

We should at once admit the resemblance in the attitudes of both Kant and Bradley to discursive thought which, according to both, lives in a reference beyond itself. There is no idea or proposition that does not need another idea or proposition as its support. I cannot conceive of A without being able to connect A with B or a not-A, that is

that is to say, knowledge of A is possible only through the mediation of B. Yet the theoretical satisfaction is not to be had by this connection which in its turn needs another idea or connection of ideas to make itself intelligible, and so on interminably. And here lies the weakness of thought. It ceaselessly demands an other to supplement it suggesting thereby the possibility of an ultimate supplementation which alone can impart perfection to its increasing demand. That ultimate supplementation is, according to both, impervious to thought discursive and relational. But while Kant regards it as absolutely beyond thought, with Bradley it is a consummation in which thought is taken up. Although in this his difference from Kant Bradley may appear to be Hegelian in his main outlook, his difference with Hegel in regard to the main character of the Absolute is not inconsiderable. According to Hegel consummation of thought is thought in its highest phase, the principle of unity in difference displayed in its perfection. But Bradley refuses to call the ultimate stage thought. If in that stage there remains nothing alien to thought, that is, the dualism inherent in thought is transcended, that according to Bradley could be no more than 'thought's suicide'. For "thought is relational and discursive, and if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide". (A. R. 170).

Thought is displayed in judgment, and judgment always expresses a distance between its content and the subject of which it predicates the content. Where there is no such distance, there is no thinking or judgment, so that the state of abolition of the distinction between the subject and the predicate, reality and thought, can not be characterised as thought. An other to thought or understanding is the assumption of both Kant and Bradley, but unlike Kant Bradley envisages a definite state where the otherness is extinguished, where thought discursive and relational is completely absorbed. That state according to Bradley is supra-rational because dualism from which thought draws its sustenance is no longer present there.

Turning to the criticism of Pringle Pattison, we can see now that it is thoroughly misplaced. Bradley's rejection of thought as the sole characteristic of the ultimate state or principle can not be interpreted as a commitment in favour of bare identity. The relational system that thought offers is rejected because it does not furnish the ideal (highest) unity in difference, a self-subsistent whole which is ultimate principle. Since thought-connections always need a ground extraneous to them, the order they accomplish cannot be said to have the integrity of a perfect whole.

All through

All through Bradley has been inspired by the ideal of a perfect whole, an all inclusive individual. His rejection of thought is due to the fact that its products are removed from that ideal. Identity is never Bradley's ultimate criterion. He has clearly said that he is in search of a principle "that must stand absolutely by itself. While wide enough to cover the facts it must be able to be thought without jarring internally. It is this -on which everything turns. The diversity and the unity must be brought to the light and the principle must be seen to comprehend these. It must not carry us away into a maze of relations, relations that lead to illusory terms, and terms disappearing into endless relations" (A. R. p. 120). And the suggestion of such a principle is afforded by immediate feeling which is ~~of~~ an experience of a totality. "From such an experience of unity below relations we can rise to the idea of a superior unity above them" (A. R. p. 522). Agreeing with the Hegelian thesis that reality is a coherent whole Bradley offers something fundamentally different from the Hegelian idea. Instead of Hegel's thought-absolute we have the feeling-absolute*. In Hegelian philosophy the absolute is an intelligible order throughout continuous with the working of intellect as it is present in ordinary experience. But Bradley denies that any organisation of phenomenal differences on intellectual

*I owe these two expressions to Sturt-see his *Idola Theatri*.

intellectual pattern, however elaborate that may be, can be equivalent to the absolute which has no other to it. If the Absolute is not conceived in the pattern of unity displayed in immediate experience, whatever is offered as the self-dependent whole will turn out, on analysis, to be no more than a shadow of the Absolute.

The genuine totality, to express the same idea in a different way, is available only in experience where will, thought and feeling intermingle (A. R. p. 160). The real to be real must be experience entire containing all elements in harmony. Intellect with which the Absolute is identified in Hegelian Philosophy is only one element, and hence a solely intellectual order is doomed to confront an other in the elements that are left out. "The delights and pains of the flesh, the agonies and raptures of the soul," these burning experiences must always remain a world outside thought's region. The idea of the Absolute can be reached only when every flame of passion chaste and carnal, beauty, pleasure and the like, have been acknowledged as belonging to it. To concentrate on one element only is to substitute for the infinite riches of the whole a fragment thereof. And in the most earnest words of Bradley expresses this deep seated conviction of his in closing his work on logic. "When in the reason's philosophy the rational appears dominant and sole possessor of the world, what place would be left to it, if the element excluded might break through the charm of the magic circle, and without growing rational, could find expression? Such an

Such an idea may be senseless, such a thought may contradict itself but it serves to give voice to an obstinate instinct. Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if thinking is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational. It may come from a failure in my metaphysics or from a weakness of the flesh which continues to blind me, but the notion that existence would be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of the world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a shadow of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. Though dragged to such conclusions, we can not embrace them. Our principle may be true, ^{^but} they are not reality. They no more make that whole which commands our devotion than some shredded dissection of human letters that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful." (P. L. pp. 590-591). It is not possible, therefore, to argue from Bradley's rejection of the relativistic order furnished by thought, that he in the end lands in a blank absolute. Bearing in mind that experience of which

of which the intellect is one among several other elements, is his ideal, one can see that his absolute is nothing but an all-inclusive and concrete principle.

Before passing on to the subject matter of the next section we should consider another point relevant to the above discussion. Most idealist thinkers assert that self consciousness furnishes a clue to the nature of Reality. According to them self-consciousness is the highest and best experience of the finite, and therefore if the highest principle is to be conceived, it should be conceived on its analogy. In self-consciousness, they hold, is found the true unity in difference, and hence it is the fully adequate category for the Absolute. The Absolute is a unity in which no reference to an other beyond itself obtains. Now what is self-consciousness ? It is in the words of Caird, firstly " a consciousness of self in opposition yet in relation to a not-self. Yet in this distinction a higher unity is presupposed ; for the self can be conscious of itself as so distinguished and related, only so far as it over-reaches the distinction between itself and its object. Thus beneath the conscious duality of self and not-self there is an unconscious unity, which reveals itself in the fact that the whole life of intelligence is an effort

an effort to overcome its own dualism- in knowledge to find itself, in action to realise itself, in an object or a world or objects, which at first presents itself as a stranger and even as an enemy". (Hegel, Blackwood's philosophical classics. pp. 182).

What Caird and kindred idealists point out is that in self-consciousness there is not merely an opposition to an other or not-self but of this opposition self is conscious. And when self is conscious of the not-self as such, it cannot be said that the not-self is beyond the self. The consciousness of the opposition which is a relation is impossible without the presence of a unity in which this relation of opposition falls. In other words, " the consciousness of the correlativity of the self and the world (not-self) implies a unity which finds expression in and transcends the correlated elements". (Hiralal Haldar-New Hegelianism- see Chapter on Caird). This refers to Kant's teaching in connection with the transcendental deduction of categories that sense-particulars exist only as a manifold referred through the categories to the unity of the subject, and the subject exists only as the unity of the manifold whose central principle of organisation it is. Drawing out the implication from this teaching of Kant it has been argued as follows:-

" If the self is aware of itself as that in distinction from and in relation to which the consciousness of the

181.

consciousness of the world takes place, it is because it is also the unity which goes beyond the distinction and makes it possible" (Haldar).

The finite self and not-self must be the aspects of a higher unity or a spiritual principle of unity realising itself in and through them. This unity is the very presupposition of the difference of the two terms, subject and object. In the fullest realisation of this unity the transcendence of the opposition will be complete, and there ultimate reality will be reached.

Let us examine the claim of self-consciousness to be the ideal unity in difference. The argument on behalf of self-consciousness emphasises that two terms, self and not-self are required for self-consciousness. There is no where bare awareness of self as such. The self " is known only through thoughts that are its predicates". (Caird-Critical philosophy of Kant p.25). Yet it is claimed that in the fullest self-consciousness this dualism or opposition will be extinguished. And here we feel compelled to ask, in the first place, what is the justification for calling that ultimate state Self's thinking of the not self, when self and not-self do no longer remain opposed to each other; secondly, we should ask whether the cognising self can overcome through thought the opposition between itself and its other, whether, that is to say, within thought there should not linger a twoness up to the last. It will be contended that the

contended that the opposition becomes less and less with spiritual growth, and therefore it is quite possible to argue that ultimately it will disappear. Our reply to such a contention is that if the opposition disappears, as it will certainly do, what right have we to call that a thought-state? Opposition is admittedly a relation. And to assert that in the perfect self consciousness the opposition ceases is tantamount to saying that the perfect stage is non-relational. *

* In Indian idealistic systems such as Vedanta and Sankhya, self is viewed as shining in its own light transcending the correlativity of subject and object. According to Sankhya "We get the notion of the Atman if we divest it of all that surrounds it, discriminate it from the bodily frame with which it is encompassed, strip it of all contents of experience; it is undifferentiated consciousness" (Nirvishesa Chinmatram)-- Radha. Krishnan Indian Philosophy volume 2 p 480. The self according to Sankhya is pure spirit different from the body of Prakriti (nature). Its nature is unfailing light (Sada prakasha swarupa). "It is without beginning or end without any qualities, subtle, omnipresent, and eternal seer beyond the senses, beyond the mind, beyond the sweep of intellect, beyond the range of time, space and causality which form the warp and woof of the mosaic of the empirical world (Ibid p. 22).

The conception of the ultimate principle as a logical unity of differentials has not appealed to Indian thinkers who had the vision to see that it is impossible for us to arrive at a genuine unity through the mechanism of the intellect or logic.

But from such a conclusion the exponents of self-consciousness will recoil. For they, relying as they do on the ultimacy of rational synthesis, would not acknowledge that the ultimate experience surpasses relations. They, zealous Hegelians, have always tried to retain for their absolute both relation and integrity of a perfect whole. But that is impossible. When they say self is related to not self and at the same time overleaps that relation, they indulge in expressions that contradict each other. Once you admit that self-consciousness involves consciousness of relation of self to an other, you cannot deny at least partial externality in regard to what you have assumed to be without an outside. It will convince nobody if remedy is sought in such expressions as "self-related" and "the whole going out of itself". Either you acknowledge relation as relation or you do not. If you do, you must be able to meet that defects of a relational mode of experience. If you do not, you should boldly pronounce the non-relational or supra-relational character of your ultimate principle. Since the self-conscious self must attempt to overcome the antithesis between itself and the other by thought its failure is inevitable, for thought is doomed to dualism.*

* The Hegelian doctrine that in order to be able to assign a limit to our thought we must in thought be in some sense beyond that limit, and that in this sense reality must be equal to thought, does not convince Bradley.

dualism. "Thought can never overleap the distinction of subject and object and so the highest for thought is the absolute subject with the object in it, but behind the subject and object we have (the indeterminate) Brahma (The Absolute)" (Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy ❖ II Advaita Vedanta of Sankara p. 561.)

11

Bradley's identification of reality with sentient experience is likely to strike one as solipsism or subjectivism. When one reads his statement, supporting his thesis, Reality is experience, one is at once reminded of Berkeley's indictment of materialism. For instance, Bradley in one place says, " We can find nothing but this (experience), and to have an idea of anything else is plainly impossible, for such a supposed idea is either meaning-less and so is not an idea, or its meaning will be found tacitly to consist in experience. The other (the independent material world) which it asserts is found on enquiry to be really no other. It implies against its will and unconsciously some mode of experience; it affirms something else, if you please, but still something else of the same kind.....show me your idea of an other not a part of experience, and I will show

will show you at once that it is throughout and wholly nothing else at all " (A. R. pp. 522-23.) Such a statement is certainly liable to be interpreted as countenancing subjectivism.

Bradley himself anticipates the charge of solipsism against him and deals with this in more than one place. If we closely examine the matter there is nothing very startling in Bradley's or any other philosopher's assertion that reality is feeling or sentient experience. At this moment I am at my writing table with books and notes strewn over it. The clock has just struck 8. The dog from the verandah is shouting at a stranger. In a neighbour's radio the metallic clang has already started. The child is crying in his bed, his mother having left him for household work. The perfume of the new blown " champaka" is being carried through the window; the window panes are reflecting the morning sun. In the midst of all these I am trying to gather my ideas and becoming pleased or displeased as I succeed or fail in doing so. Now the question is, can this complex of sight, smell, sound, will, pleasure, displeasure etc. be real without being given in my feeling? In other words, can it exist in the same condition with my psychological existence cut out? Commonsense says, the world is out there independent of, and unaffected by any mind. If that world is a mythical noumenon, an indefinable X, one need not have any quarrel with it. But if by the world is

world is meant the actual theatre of life, it is nothing, if it is not felt as coloured, odorous, sounding gay, sad, beautiful, ugly, fulfilling, frustrating and the like. The real world " forms the felt background of myself, my fellows, enters into or is the experience of each of us in a fashion uniquely tinged with our respective individualities" (Joachim-Nature of truth p. 24). The world exists in diverse aspects, because it is diversely focussed in our sentience-it is lived and enjoyed diversely.

But this position should not be confused with solipsism which argues as follows:- " I cannot transcend experience, and experience must be my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond my self exists; for what is experience is its states" (A.R.p.248). What the exponent of solipsism believes is, in brief, that all the world is merely a state of my self. If we have followed the exposition of Bradley's main position, it is not difficult to see that it disagrees with solipsism in a fundamental point. Self with Bradley is not the ultimate category and by experience he never means my experience alone. The primordial experience is the experience of this-mine. " It gives neither the mine as an adjective of the this, nor the this as dependent on and belonging to the mine. " (A. R. p. 250). There being no distinction at that stage the discrimination of self and its state does not occur. It is therefore incorrect to hold that self is given and

is given and that it cannot be transcended. Self is never given it is only a construction through an ideal process. Self is that which must endure for a time, and must preserve its self-sameness. But we have at the beginning a flux of presentations which, for the simple reason that it is a procession of psychical instants, has no room in it for the self the significance of which consists in "spreading out its existence beyond that which is actual and that which is lived in fleeting moments,* If, now, we are to speak of ultimate Reality as experience, we cannot mean by experience, correlativity of self and its states since that is not fundamental. And as soon as it is seen that the self-thing is not original, the hard exclusive experience upheld by solipsism will appear utterly unpalatable. What we mean is this: Solipsism is built upon the notion of private self as a substantive rigid and windowless. Existing as it does on its own account, there is no warrant,

* "We are so accustomed each to consider his past self as his own, that it is worth while to reflect how very largely it may be foreign. My own past is, in the first place, incompatible with my own present quite as much as my present would be with another.....my past not only may differ so as to be almost indifferent, but I may regard it even with a feeling of hostility and hatred. It may be mine mainly in the sense of a compulsory appendage joined in continuity and fastened by inference". (A. R. p. 256).

Existing as it does on its own account, there is no warrant, it is held, for supposing that the self can be transcended. But if self turns out to be the result of a construction on the basis of this and mine, it becomes, a secondary concept and does no more than represent a phase in a process of development that has commenced beyond it and also will not terminate within it. If we may follow what Bradley calls the irresistible lead of our content (of experience), we are bound to acknowledge the progressive dissolution of the confines of finite experience. The self-discrepancy of the content of feeling bursts the boundary of the mere this, and we arrive at the conceptual order where self and not self and a host of minor relativities supervene; then the contradictions of this order lead further beyond. So we see that finite experience, neither immediacy nor selfhood is the resting place for us. For Bradley both direct and indirect, immediate and mediate forms of experience in the finite centre are merely stages to be transcended for absorption in a fuller totality.

But he fully acknowledges the little truth that lies in solipsism. Though solipsism is wrong in so far as it seeks to regard self, an abstraction, as ultimate, it is undoubtedly right if its emphasis on self means that all I experience is my state-so far as I experience it, that Reality must appear within my psychical existence. "My way of contact with reality", Bradley clearly states, "is through

" is through a limited aperture. For I can not get at it except, through the felt this, and our immediate interchange and transfluence takes place through the small opening". (A. R. p. 260). What Bradley here asserts is the undoubted fact that givenness to feeling is an inexpugnable element in the real. But for this the real would surely 'hang in the air'. Reality must appear in my psychical existence; it can not in any sense be affirmed to be until my psychical awakening to it has taken place.

But Bradley's recognition of reality as the felt this should be distinguished from sensationism according to which the whole of reality is limited to my psychical focus. True, the real is my state of mind but that does not justify my assertion that it is nothing at all but my state. The felt reality is not shut and confined within my feeling. Nothing warrants the view of finite experience as shut in by a wall that is solid and recalcitrant*.

* "No man," says Bosanquet, "is confined even at a single moment within the limits of a single mood, or type of behaviour; every man has experience of being aided by greater characters, and intelligences or by great emergencies to surpass his habitual self and to apprehend the effect of an exaltation of his whole being upon the currently distinguished elements of his finite consciousness. (The Principle of Individualism and Value p. 278).

recalcitrant.

On the contrary, it is constantly breaking up, carrying itself beyond and is being interminably extended and amplified. In fact, the whole movement of the mind is a continuous disengagement from the mere this. The felt this cannot be regarded statically as fact on its own account. For it gives itself up in a process of transformation ending in an all inclusive experience which is "at once intuition and feeling and will". True the entire process of dissolution of the boundary of the this-mine till the endstate is reached is impossible for me to comprehend fully. But that is my imperfection. "Because I cannot spread out my window until all is transparent and all windows disappear, this does not justify me in insisting on my window frame's rigidity". (A. R. pp. 253-255). The one reality certainly comes to me directly through the window of a moment but its inner wealth far overlaps what is communicated in that moment. Reality in its fullest dimension comes to be through the transcendence of the edges of the felt. Yet Reality is nothing but the expansion of the felt essence, and "to know the universe we must fall

Must fall back upon our personal experience sensation". (A. R. p. 260) * This recognition of sentience or psychical being distinguishes Bradley's absolutism from rationalist idealism for which reality is out and out logical. The doctrine that "to be real is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience" (A. R. p. 146), is asserted by Bradley against Hegelian Rationalism. +

* "Truth, goodness and beauty", as Joachim says, "appear in the actual world and exist in finite experience.....To experience is no doubt to transcend the purely personal, the merely finite experience, but finite experience is the vehicle of their being. They live as the experience of finite subject. Truth, if it is, to be for, must enter into my intellectual endeavour and emerge in my conscious thought as the result of a personal process and as in a sense of my personal possession. (Nature of truth p. 21).

+ " The aim of knowledge" says Hegel, "is to divest the objective world that stands opposed to us, of its strangeness (i.e. immediacy) and as the phrase is, to find ourselves at home in it, which means no more than to retrace the objective world back to the Notion which is our inmost self". While for Hegel immediacy is strangeness and hence must be assimilated into thought, for Bradley perfect knowledge consists in recapturing immediacy that is lost in the process of idealising.

192.

rationalism.

111

The absolute is experience, or more correctly, perfect unity of all aspects of experience. Considered separately the particular constituents of experience are inconsistent and imperfect, but brought together in the absolute all ^{their} imperfections disappear. This doctrine of the Absolute of Bradley, has however, been qualified by him in the following way: " We have seen", says he, " that the various aspects of experience imply one another and that all point to a unity which comprehends and perfects them. And I would urge next that unity of these aspects is unknown. We never have or are a state which is the perfect unity of all aspects". (A. R. p. 468). In another place we have, " It is true that how in detail the plurality comes together we do not know" (Ibid 520). Again, " this total unity of experiencecannot as such be directly verified, we know its nature, but in outline only and not in detail". (A. R. p. 530).

According to some critics such statements betray failure of Bradley's idealism. In reference to Bradley Alfred Hoernle observes in his article, Absolutism versus Pragmatism, in Mind 1905, " The whole difficulty arises from the fact that the absolute being higher than all appearances, cannot

cannot properly be described from the point of view of an appearance. Thought moves in relations; and the Absolute is beyond relations. Hence an attempt to describe it in relational terms is bound to lead to contradictions. We must deny in the same breath what we affirm. The Absolute is and has, and includes and transmutes and submerges, and does a thousand other things which all imply relations, and yet it is beyond and above all relations". A similar criticism we have from Ruggiero who characterises Bradley's position as veiled scepticism. According to him Bradley's rejection of the concept of relation is an insuperable obstacle in his way of getting together appearances and the Absolute. "The strangest thing," says the critic, "is that after having denied the concreteness of relations and reduced this to a mere appearance, Bradley finds himself compelled to affirm that if the absolute is to mean anything, it must stand in relation to appearance... But it is a very strange unity: one which is both relation and not relation; it expresses all the indeterminateness characteristic of the Bradleian conception". (Modern Philosophy Eng. translation p. 275). What distresses these critics is the sup~~er~~arelati~~on~~al character of the Absolute. According to them, denial of relation in the Absolute on the part of Bradley is responsible for his despair that the Absolute as a whole is impenetrable by

impenetrable by mind. They seem to suggest that could Bradley conceive the Absolute as a relational whole of appearances, he would not have needed to tell us that the way in which the variety of phenomena is brought into unity remains in detail unintelligible. Such criticism is based on the assumption that it is possible to work out the nature of the Absolute in full, and that an ultimate explanation of things is within human competence. But one who has followed Bradley in the progress of his thought cannot fail to note that the principal aim of his philosophy is to strike at the root of this gnostic vanity. What he is not tired of repeating is that the Absolute or Absolute truth remains an unrealised ideal for human thinking which proceeds by judgment and inference. In judging we set ourselves over against an other and although it is thought's perpetual endeavour to overcome this division, this division remains the necessary condition of thought. However much we may supplement and alter our system of thought with a view to rendering it adequate to the other, the other cannot be exhausted by any system of judgments however elaborate. (And where it is exhausted, there is no human thinking at all). Considering, therefore, this impotence of discursive thought which is sole means of knowledge available to the finite a candid philosophy of the absolute must confess to the unintelligibility of the absolute, if by intelligibility is meant the grasp of the

of the principles of its nature.

To say that Bradley was at last in the predicament of not being able to reconcile appearances with the Absolute in consequence of his previous rejection of relation or discursive knowledge, and that he was as a result, driven to scepticism in spite to himself, is utter misreading of the main argument, as also the main purpose of his philosophy. That thought operates by way of relations, and cannot give ultimate satisfaction he proves at the outset. Relations try in vain to get differences into a perfect unity, since they cannot connect differences intrinsically, but only through a ground that remains always external. And this failure is at the root of the ceaseless movement of thought. "As a fact and given we have in feeling diversity and unity in one whole, a whole implicit and not yet broken up into terms and relations this immediate union of the one and the many is an ultimate fact from which we start". (A. R. p. 569). When this transitory unity breaks up and thinking ensues, the fact that differences were already somehow one, haunts thinking, so to say, and ultimately leads to its suicide in a whole superior to itself. To the whole thought can only 'point', but that whole "is known only in abstract character and could not be verified in its detail". (Ibid).

Bradley is never in the predicament of being unable to go back upon his rejection of relation or discursive process of knowing. On the contrary the felt union of the diversity---that is, immediacy, is the

is the criterion that he starts with and sticks to upto the last. His assertion that ultimate immediacy is in a sense beyond, and is impossible to construe fully to ourselves is not a note of sceptical weariness. It is rather the logical consequence of his central view of the absolute as nonrelational or suprarrelational. When, to repeat, the only mode of knowing we are capable of is thinking-judgment and inference, the suprarrelational Reality must be pronounced not to be fully intelligible to us. And this is what ~~we~~ are used to understand by scepticism. But if to be unable to assert the impossible, namely that Reality is fully knowable, and that no detail of its life is hidden from our view is scepticism, no true philosophy can be other than sceptical. Such scepticism Bradley has no hesitation in acknowledging.

He draws a distinction between absolute scepticism and intelligent doubt. Absolute scepticism is absurd. " Even the extreme of theoretical scepticism is based upon some accepted idea of truth and fact. It is because you are sure as to some main feature of truth and reality that you are compelled to doubt or to reject sceptical truths which are offered you. But, if so, you stand on an absolute principle and with regard to this, you ~~claim~~ tacitly or openly, to be infallible". (A. R. 512).

Even when

197.

Even when one says, " Truth is impossible to attain", one must stand on a positive criterion to be able to make this assertion, and at that point at least infallibility is assumed. No philosophical pursuit, polemical or constructive, is possible without a governing principle. To set out to philosophise without resorting to a definite intellectual bearing is, as Bradley says, like sitting down to a game without being prepared to play. A definite stand must be taken somewhere and with regard to that stand there should be no chance of doubt. This being the law of all speculative endeavour one cannot with consistency indulge in an ultimate doubt. When Bradley says reality is one undivided experience, he undoubtedly stands on a positive basis from which he refuses to be shaken. It will be no criticism of his position to say that this basis itself being the outcome of an intellectual process which is generally adjudged as defective, is of doubtful value. For, we should not forget that our business is philosophy which is thoroughly an intellectual pursuit. And within the orbit of this pursuit we must formulate the result of the pursuit intellectually. Even the impotence of the intellect has to be reasoned out by the intellect itself. And the actual process of reasoning must be regarded as infallible, if philosophy is not to be a meaningless affair. If we mean to speculate about the universe we must decline to consider

to consider the chance of a fundamental error within the speculative process and abide by a criterion. There can therefore be no scepticism in the accepted sense of the term.

But Bradley is emphatic that we cannot know more than formal characteristics of that which the intellect is led to accept as real. Reality is one and is harmonious experience-this is forced upon the intellect, but beyond this our philosophical construction cannot extend. When the contradictory nature of all appearances has been brought out and the weakness of finite knowledge discovered, the intellect is carried to the affirmation that Reality is an immediately present whole in which all appearances are contained. This is what Basanquet calls "Inference to the absolute, the passage from the contradictory and unstable in all experience alike to the stable and satisfactory" (Principle of Individuality and Value p. 268). But this transition is "misapprehended if we call upon it to put us in possession of an ultimate experience which is ex-hypothesi incompatible with our limited being". (Basanquet, *ibid*). The above affirmation about Reality is after all abstract; Reality does not come to us bodily in that affirmation, nor is the supplementation that the finite experience undergoes in order to be attuned to the harmony of the absolute known. To know how appearances are assimilated in
the absolute

the absolute would be omniscience which Bradley holds, ^{no} metaphysics should and need claim. Every considerable metaphysics ought to be able to give us the main character of reality. And the truth it so furnishes is absolute in the sense that it is not intellectually corrigible-" there is no intellectual alternative " conceivable which would carry us nearer to ultimate reality. Within the intellectual frame work of metaphysics the truth arrived at is the only possible truth. Nevertheless, this absolute truth is no more than mere general knowledge. It is unable to give us subordinate details. " In its general character reality is present in knowledge and truth which is distinguished and brought out by metaphysics. But the general character of reality is not reality itself" (A. R. p.547). The absolute truth about reality easily turns out to be error if we expect it to conjure up reality.

Reality we know only in vague outline and so far as this knowledge of the outline is concerned, it is, of course, infallible and unalterable . But compared with what we do not know and cannot know, this knowledge is nothing considerable. We do not know why there are appearances;

appearances; why appearances are of such various kinds; why the absolute breaks up into endless finite centres of experience. These constitute 'the main miracle' which must remain unsolved. Then again, the exact nature of transformation that finite facts undergo in the absolute also transcends our intellect. Having regard to these elements of our ignorance about the Absolute, it is quite justifiable to regard the Absolute as something for us unattainable by our cognitive endeavour. And Bradley recognises the limitation of the finite cognitive power in these forceful words: "We admit the healthy scepticism for which all knowledge in a sense is vanity which feels in its heart that science is a poor thing if measured by the wealth of the real universe. We justify the natural wonder which delights to stray beyond our daylight world and follow paths that lead into half known and half unknown regions. Our conclusion in brief, has explained and has confirmed the irresistible impression that all is beyond us." (A. R. 549).

In these lines Bradley merely echoes the profoundest convictions of many masters of philosophy and the whole host of mystics and of all religious persons whose singular passion of life was the Divine. That Reality over-passes our knowledge, that the 'depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God' is inexhaustible by the finite creature is the essence of the great

the great philosophical tradition which has come down to us from the Upanishadas, Plato, Plotinus, Sankara and Kant. The deepest religious experience consists in a sense of union with the higher than ourselves, that which is impossible for the finite to exhaust. 'Devotional Religion', says Radhakrishnan, in his Hibbert Lectures (An Idealist view of life), "is born of this haunting sense of otherness. We may know God but there is always a something still more that seems unknown and remains unspoken". In their anxiety to preserve christian theism Hegelians have been insistent that Reality is essentially knowable in the logical way and that God is no wonder or mystery. But far from being hostile to religion the position of Bradley and such others in regard to the absolute, expresses the highest religious sentiment. The attitude is not one of doubt and despair. On the contrary that the Divine is not fully knowable stimulates the yearning to lose and dissolve oneself in it. * And this yearning in the words of the devout "reveals the secrets of man's sin and imperfection and the way of his salvation. It is the homing instinct of the soul guiding her unerringly through the trackless variety of the manifold world with all its swirling confusion of phantom forms and things, back to the undivided unity and calm of God, then to yield up her distr-

aught and restless individuality and forget her
 * James says in The 'Varieties of religious experience', "The overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the absolute is the great mystical achievement". "The mystic experience ends with the words, 'I like-yet not I but God in me'.--Raceyac

forget her separate self and the separate selves of all other things in him". (From the articles of B. A. G. Fuller in the Hibbert Journal 1912 quoted by Unguhart in Vedanta and Western thought). It is a lower order of religion where God and the world or human soul are taken as terms of a relation, and when, that is to say, perfect god is set over against an imperfect world or the imperfect soul. Such a religion is involved in flat contradiction. It is impossible to conceive through an intellectual mode how Divine perfection goes with finite imperfection. God is no longer perfect if man's imperfect being continues to confront his nature. A related god is a finite god struggling to establish mastery over evil and imperfection. But this is not the God that authentic religious experience reveals. God in the word of Tagore, is 'the last fulfilment'.*

He is ultimate God where all aspirations of the human soul reach full and final consummation, all evil and imperfection are dissolved into supreme serenity. "God is not God, till he has become all and a God which is all in all is not the God of religion" i.e., lower religion as we have called it. (A. R. p.448).

*

ওগো আমার এই জীবনের

শেষ পরিপূর্ণতা

মরণ আমার মরণ তুমি

কণ্ড আমার কথা

যা পেয়েছি যা হয়েছি

যা কিছু মোর আশা

না জেনে ধায় তোমার পানে

সকল ভাববাসা।

203.

The mystic everlastingly yearnsⁿ for that god who claims from him " the complete ~~gift~~ and dissipation of his personality"* and who baffling as he does logical articulation ever remains shrouded in mystery. A determinate anthropomorphic, personal god feeling and willing does not satisfy the demand of the highest religious consciousness for which the only ideal is the Absolute, the super-personal which is invoked by the mystic poet as follows:-

Call me thou into thy
 darkness pure and serene.
 Liberate me in the deep, infinite
 unending
 abyss of thy being,
 Into thy tranquil night must this
 Outer crust of existence
 dissolve
 To make my inner being coincide with
 thy
 undivided life.
 (Tagore's Gitanjali).
 (Bengali)

* The life of a modern mystic, Paramhansa Ramkrishna illustrates the true mystical yearning. His spiritual career has been recently narrated by the French savant, Romain Rolland. The book has been published by the Mayabati Centre of Ramkrishna Mission (India).

["Its nature", says Rudolf Otto, " is that nothing can be affirmed of it, not existence, not essence, not life since it is that which transcends all these". The idea of the Holy p. 25).]

Here the idealist of Hegelian affiliation will be provoked to hurl Hegel's classical ridicule of Schelling's absolute " as a night in which all cows are black" which means that devoid of logical determinations the absolute resembles the dark in which colours have no existence. Western idealism since Hegel has been entrenched behind the view of the absolute as one containing many, and as possessing intellectual coherence throughout the length and breadth of its being. For it the rational is the real; the indeterminateness of the intuition and the mystery of Reality do not appeal to it. The real according to it is the real for thought, as single system manifesting one perfectly determinate principle. Whenever therefore any philosopher affirms the Absolute as reason-transcending, he will be charged either with having said nothing about or having denied ultimate principle. *

But there is nothing self-evidently untrue in this view of the absolute.

This doctrine does not merely reduce the absolute to a negative concept but also affirms the superabundance of the absolute life. " The

* It is well known to the student of the Indian thought that Sankara the exponent of Nirguna Brahma or the indeterminate Absolute was ridiculed as a disguised Buddhist. According to the Buddhist philosophy the ultimate is Sunya or void).

"The negative theology" says Rudolf Otto, "does not mean that faith and feeling are dissipated and reduced to nothing; on the contrary, it contains within it the loftiest spirit of devotion... A conception negative in form may often become the symbol or a content of meaning which if absolutely unutterable, is none the less positive in the highest degree... A negative theology can and indeed must arise from purely and genuinely religious roots, the experience of the numinous." (Idea of the Holy p. 189).

When it is said that the absolute is inscrutable and indeterminate, reference is always to the finite qua finite. The finite, because finite, cannot fully apprehend the infinite, the Absolute. However elaborate our conceptions of the nature of the Absolute may be, there is always a beyond that baffles our power of cognition. However confident we may be of the articulated relations between the Divine unity and the finite diversity, there are always further and more fundamental connections waiting to be explored. Our calling the ultimate principle the absolute, itself expresses our sense of the inadequacy of all terms and definitions, the humbling consciousness that, our knowledge and achievement are at no stage commensurate with life divine. There cannot be a deeper truth than this—the truth that finds expression in these words of

Bradley.

Bradley. " Fully to realise the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. In order this to know we should have to be and then we should not exist (as units) (A. R. 159).

No philosophy of the Absolute can deny it. Even Pringle Pattison while engaged in criticising Bradley's absolute echoes this fundamental note of Bradlian Absolutism. He says " It is, I say, in the nature of the case impossible that we should understand and be able to construct for ourselves the relation (between the absolute and the finite) in question; for to do so would be to transcend the conditions of our own individuality; to get as it were behind the conditions of finite existence and realise the Absolute experience". (Idea of God p. 293). The finite can never be in full possession of the secret of the Absolute life-to be in full possession of those secrets is to be the Absolute. " I am Brahma or the Absolute" says the Vedanta to describe the ultimate state. * The Absolute is of course not beyond or unknown when the finite is taken as embraced in it. But there, the question of knowledge is irrelevant seeing that all dualism of the knower and the known is extinguished and knowledge passes into realisation. But so long as we move within the province of philosophy and do not enter the field of realisation, the Absolute must be for us in a sense unknown. That is to say, every true philosophy must be mystical. All that philosophy should do and does is to undertake an

examination

* cf. অবিভাগেন দৃষ্টব্য

Badarayana (Brahma Sutra 4.4.4)

207.

examination of the world of experience with a view to arriving at the principle in which the world is rooted. A philosopher's task is accomplished, if he has been able to think consistently about the universe and bring out its ultimate significance. But his weapon being thought, he is able to give us no more than a general outline of what, by a process of reflection, he pronounces as Reality or Ultimate truth. What, in other words, philosophy gives in a reason-prompted description of the Real. But the life of the real is infinitely greater than a conceptual transcript of it. Being what it is, philosophy should aspire to do no more, and should not be condemned for what it is beyond its power to achieve.

This conclusion, of course runs counter to the triumphant optimism of the rationalist (Caird, for example) about the human power of cognition. According to him the Absolute is the highest concept of speculative philosophy and as such no veil of secrecy hides the absolute from thought. Philosophy, with him, is the final quest of the ultimate and does not require to be supplemented by anything like realisation or 'Sadhana'. But this speculative self-confidence is due to the narrowness of the field within which metaphysics is allowed to move. Out of the whole life of experience, the rationalist selects thought and conceives the

the ultimate principle in terms of it. He therefore finds it possible to affirm complete intelligibility of that principle.

But that is utter abstraction. Only a small part of the universe can be claimed by thought. There are, besides, feeling, will and emotion. The universe far outstretches what is expressible as truth in the theoretic sense of the word. Experience or life not intellect is the ultimate category. "The world is not", says Alexander, "what it is merely for intellect alone; its *nîsus* towards what is higher enters into its constitution and, as impregnated with this tendency, it affects the mind by ways other than cognition." (Space, Time, and Deity Vol 11 p. 137). Philosophy which is an intellectual affair cannot encompass the whole of life or experience. But philosophy is not without its significance. In Philosophy which is the highest phase of intellectual development, we have the discovery of intellect's limit, and through this discovery the sense of the ultimate or the whole and a yearning to be the whole dawn on the finite minds. And there lies the value of Philosophy.

Before bringing the present study to a close we would consider the objection that this

doctrine namely

doctrine namely that the absolute over-rides the finite undermines the very foundations of life, good, beauty and truth. If the finite individual loses his identity in the absolute, his moral and other ideas will also be frozen up in contact with the cold perfection of its life. And if the ultimate ground of things is such that our ideas and endeavours no wise matter to it, it is difficult to see how it is to be distinguished from unknowing atoms indifferent, if not hostile, to human aspirations and standards. It will make no sense to call such philosophy of the absolute idealism; idealism is the name for "all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe". (Prof. N Kemp Smith. Prolegomena to an idealist theory of knowledge p. 1) The philosophy that asserts that the ideal ends that give meaning to one's existence are nothings in ultimate reference is little removed from materialism from which we recoil in disgust.

Let us, now, examine this very grave objection. There can be no question that ideals operate in our experience. But it is at the same time true that ideals imply a distance between themselves and the actual facts of existence. Good, for instance, is what we desire to assimilate into the fabric of our life. Standing on what is given to us we strain for good, that is yet to be. The imperfections of the actual situation in which the individual finds himself

210.

himself prompt his endeavour for the good. From this it follows at once that good has meaning only in reference to the endeavour for it in the finite mind. If we cut out the need for satisfaction good does not remain what it implies for finite experience. Further, if we imagine that the individual has overcome his sense of want, all seeking for a better state of things on his part will cease, that is, he will have no good to strive for. In the individual's need to accomplish good, morality originates. If good is accomplished in its fullness, it will be good no longer in the sense of that which beckons the will from afar, and consequently morality will be transcended. Morality being striving for the unattained end, in the attainment of the end morality as God must disappear.

By placing the absolute above morality or moral value, the absolutist means to suggest that the absolute being perfect, it knows no struggle for perfection that is, there is no 'ought to be' waiting to be 'is'. The absolute does not cry like the finite moral agent, "

"যাহা কিছু চাই ভুল করে চাই যাহা পাই তাহা চাই না।" (Tagore).

"I seek for the wrong thing & what I succeed in having satisfies me not." "Rather are all things from eternity his (God's) own," (Royce quoted by Pringle Pattison in *Ideal of God* p. 279), and hence he is above all storm and stress. It is, of course
customary

customary to characterise the highest principle as infinite good, ~~finite~~ beauty etc. But a close examination shows that these attributes in ultimate reference mean more than what they do in one experience. What we find here, truer and more beautiful and better in our experience does not quench our craving; we are ever kept on their pursuit. But infinite good, beauty etc. imply ceassation of all unrest. Here the word infinite makes a world of difference. These ideas taken as infinite must infinitely differ in their characters from those that are revealed in finite experience. Infinite good is not the good that we are capable of comprehending; infinite beauty is not the beauty that commonly inspires us. So that even if we call the absolute, good, beauty and truth, we cannot consider it sharing in any way our human values.

Obviously this cannot be interpreted to mean that the absolute is either false, ugly or bad. What is meant is no more than a transvaluation of all values in the Absolute. Good, beauty and truth, as we experience them, are surely appearances, yet they put us on the track of the absolute. "Higher, truer, more beautiful, better and more real-these one the whole count in the universe as they count for us. For on the whole higher means for us a greater amount of that Reality outside of which all appearance is absolutely nothing." (A.R.p.550). Our values are not meaningless; they are determined by that one inexhaustible Reality which operates in all our estimates and appreciations as an implicit criterion. The absolute is the prime

prime mover behind all our spiritual endeavours but remains ever superior to them. It is this truth that Bradley expresses by saying that "The Absolute is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true". (Ibid 533), and that the Indian Absolutist by declaring " The absolute is eternal, all-satisfying, self-luminous, neither good nor evil ". (Sankar's commentary on the Brahma Sutra, 1-1-4) The absolutist philosophy consistently worked out must end in what Bradley calls intelligent worship of the unknown (A.R.p.551). To be one with the Absolute is the destiny of the finite. The finite is not to know the absolute but to dissolve it, to coincide with its infinite harmony. *

The outstanding impression with which one closes the study of Bradley is that of his mystical ardour **. The vision of destiny of man that he calls up before our mind is that " Man passes from the pure innocence of naive feeling through the guilt of knowledge to redemption in the Absolute".†

*cp 'God and the soul are made one thing in the unitive state' 'He and I become one I'-Eckhart.

** Critics like Ward have accused Bradley's ontology of mysticism; but we have maintained that far from being a weakness mysticism is the logical consequence of all Absolutist philosophy.

†These are the words of Rudolf Metz occurring in his summary of Bradley's thought in his Hundred years of British Philosophy.

APPENDIX.

INTELLECTUAL INTUITION IN KANT.

(Re-printed from the Philosophical Quarterly,

January, 1932.)

Intellectual intuition is a neglected concept of Kantian philosophy. With Kant it is an ideal never to be realized by man. Hence it receives nothing but a passing reference from the great thinker who treated of the metaphysics of human knowledge in the construction of the limits of experience. Today, when intuitionist philosophies are showing a "wonderful exuberance of creative energy bursting the bonds of a dry logical scholasticism", it may be of some interest to re-state the doctrine of creative understanding in the Critical philosophy.

Although knowledge is preeminently an activity of the knowing principle, it still carries a passivity which, as far as man is concerned, Kant thinks, is ineradicable and alien. You may explain a large part of cognitive facts in terms of mental activity, but there is a remainder that is different in character and hence requires a distinct explanation.

The sense-data represent this obscure factor of cognition. To use Hume's expression, they strike upon the mind and do not get themselves up to the cognitive principle. They are independent, being

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The sense-data represent this obdurate factor of cognition. To use Hume's expression, they strike upon the mind and do not own themselves up to the cognitive principle. They are independent, being the effects of an extra-mental existence. When this
brute

214.

brute datum is worked upon by the formative activity of the self, cognition of an object arises. In the case of knowledge of a coloured thing, for example, we receive a manifold of impressions, in the first place, whose only description is that they are visual occurrences not subjectively initiated. They are an unverbaised content possessing no cognitive value. In order that the chaotic mass may be intelligible it requires to be invested with intellectual determinations. The raw visual affections do not become definite awareness of a coloured object unless they are worked up by the forms of mind.

In a cognitive situation the mind, supplying as it does the form, has by far the larger role to play. It must nevertheless depend for its content on without. Understanding maketh nature out of the materials that it does not make, so goes the oft-quoted proposition. The sense-manifold constitutes the matter of knowledge and is independent of mind, but in itself it is meaningless and hence awaits to be intelligised by mind. Knowledge therefore reveals a disparity of form and content, each proceeding from a distinct source - sensa from things outside and formative principles from the self.

Thus

Thus the things that the sense-particulars imply and the self that relations indicate are two realities set over against each other. The result is that the former remain inaccessible to the latter. "It is incomprehensible", says Kant, "that the intuition of a present thing should make me know the thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot wander into my faculty of representations". "We can know things only as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. Things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing what they may be in themselves, knowing only their phenomena, that is, the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses". What happens is that things act on and evoke consciousness in the subject and the modifications which are the starting points of knowledge are wrought up into a system called the world or nature. The world that mind knows is a construction having no absolute objectivity. It exists "nowhere but in our thoughts" and is therefore other than the terra incognita of things.

This predicament, Kant thinks, is due to our perception being sensuous. In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant says, "The perception of our mind is always passive, and thus it is possible only in so far as something is able to affect ourselves". Had mind not to depend on the senses
for

for its materials of knowledge the case of human cognition would have been different.

The senses merely carry the impressions which the things without give rise to. These impressions, being merely sensuous affections, do not partake of the character of the reality that occasions them. They are merely effects produced on human minds by things, and had the texture of the senses been different the effects also would have varied. Kant did not believe like the neo-realists of today that sense-data are objective entities - constitutive, in a sense, of the outer world. Though mind has to derive its knowledge-content from the external world, the content so derived has no characteristic affinity with that which causes it. Even supposing that sense-particulars are what the realists take them to be, the case for human knowledge would not have improved in the least. For sense-materials, in the very act of being received by the mind, would have been -- thoroughly metamorphosed. Mind cannot receive them except by overlaying them by means of its forms or categories. The ordered *sensa* then -- become more or less a new creation, a mind-work.

Were the human mind self-sufficient, that is to say, could it supply content like form from within instead of depending for the former on without,

without, there would be no opposition or duality that makes knowledge relative.* If we were endowed with the faculty of intellectual intuition instead of sensuous perception, we would not have been limited to mere phenomena.

By 'intellectual intuition' is meant the mode of knowledge that possesses no receptivity, but is entirely spontaneous. The spontaneity of human knowledge consists in the formative activity that the mind exercises in the course of fashioning up the datum which is received, not created. But in intellectual intuition nothing is received and the whole process is the act of the spirit; mind there has not to be confronted with an other world from which it is to draw its content. In intellectual intuition the mind is autonomous. True knowledge betrays no dualism. There may be a synthesis of form and matter but the synthesis is not of two disparate elements derived from different sources

* Kant sometimes describes the ideal type of knowledge much on realistic lines. "Our sensuous representation", says Kant in Prolegomena, "is a representation not of things in themselves but the way in which they appear to us". It suggests that the representation of things as they are is the ideal type of knowledge; since human beings are incapable of direct representation, there is no knowledge of reality at all. Here Kant speaks more or less like the naive realist. True knowledge is direct apprehension of reality-revelation of reality, i.e. that which appears in knowledge is a finished and perfected experience needing no organisation by mind. Kant however does not stick to this conception for long.

but of these two originating in the unitary activity of cognition. Knowledge is not a mechanical fabrication out of two diverse factors but is a differentiated spontaneity of the subject.

Such intuition, according to Kant, is possible only in God. Divine cognition alone is spontaneous. "Our mode of perception...is called sensibility because it is not original, that is, it is not a perception through which the existence of the object of perception is given (this kind of perception so far as we can see belongs only to the divine being)". Divine perception is original-intuitus originarius. The objects of divine perception do not emanate from an outside source but are created in the very act of perception. For divine knowledge it is not necessary that the sense-manifold should stream down through the windows of sense. Materials come from the same source that supplies the principles of organisation. While human perception is dependent upon the existence of the object and is possible only because mind is acted upon by the object, objects are produced in and through God's intuition. God's perceiving is creative.

To perceive for Him is to create. Intellectual or creative intuition is thus similar to artistic vision in which creation and apprehension coincide.

As we have noted above, Kant attributes a kind of spontaneity to understanding. But that is purely formative. Our understanding is active inasmuch as its function is synthesising. But the act of synthesis cannot be exercised except in reference to a perceptive material. Without the manifold our understanding is ineffective. Understanding that works through the categories and thus orders the manifold of perception would have nothing but logical function, if divested of it. "Apart from this relation to possible experience", says Kant, "they (the categories) have no objective validity of any sort, but are a mere play of imagination with their respective representations". The contentless logical functions yield no experience but only "some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions".

But the perceptive material, through which understanding by its very nature works, is what it itself does not evolve. This is given to and not produced in knowledge by the subjective principle. Since the formative principle is not

creative

creative of content as well, there is a dualism, an opposition in knowledge.

Further, the want of intellectual intuition is responsible for there being no cognition of ego in the true sense. According to Kant, 'I think' accompanies the manifold of representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought. The representations given in intuition could not have been owned by the subject as belonging to it, if they were not in one self-consciousness. "The conjunction of representations into a conception of objects is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them but is on the contrary due to the faculty of conjoining-bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception". But there is no direct consciousness of the unity of self when the self is taken in separation from the elements of perception and the synthesis by which the manifold is combined into a unity. The empirical consciousness is in itself fragmentary and disunited; it becomes a unity in so far as the variety of elements of sense is combined by the understanding. But the consciousness of self appears only in the act of unification. As Watson states, "The consciousness of self as presupposed in this activity of understanding

understanding is reached only when the mind becomes conscious of what it has itself done in thinking or combining the elements of perception". Kant says, "Only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations".

The necessary implication of the above is that "the transcendental self (as is revealed in knowledge) has no content of its own through which it can gain knowledge of itself" (Norman Kemp Smith). The ego of human cognition is merely an empty identity. It has no determinations of its own, hence it is an analytic unity -- expressible in the judgment 'I am'. The analytic unity cannot be revealed on its own account. In and through the unification of the multitudinous details of perception the consciousness of the unity of self arises. As Watson explains, "The synthetic unity of various determinations of perception is the ground of that unity of self which is the necessary condition of every act of thought".

The unity of apperception is in itself a mere form. For its self-revelation it is in

need of content. Since it can supply from within no content, it has to depend on the given intuitions of perception. "Only in intuition", says Kant, "which is different from ego can the identity of self be given us...our understanding can only think and hence it must look for its intuition on sense. I am therefore conscious of my identical self in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in an intuition". There is thus the diversity of form and content which takes away from the significance of the knowledge of self. There is no knowledge of self in the natural unity of form and content, if by 'natural' be meant the state of form and content arising together from the same principle.

The character of our intelligence is to combine and organise given elements, but it has not the power of evolving them from within. The understanding which is perceptive, that is, one which not only orders the elements presented to it but also originates them, is not man's. So we become conscious of self only through the activity by which the elements of sensibility are organised into a unity. Our self-consciousness cannot create its content out of itself. If intellectual intuition were in the power of man, the apprehension of self in form and content would have been possible and no mediation in the form of a mechanical synthesis

would

would have been necessary. "The understanding or mind which created the manifold in intuition in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness, in other words, by and in the representations of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human understanding which thinks only and cannot act has absolute need" (Kant).

There is thus a sharp line of demarcation between human intelligence that is object-dependent and intellectual intuition which is pure spontaneity, creative of both form and content of knowledge. The consequence of this is that man is doomed to pseudo-knowledge, the highest cognitive ideal remaining ever beyond.

The distrust of the ideal type of knowledge which is the fundamental thesis of Kant cannot be understood except in its historical perspective. Viewing him in the light of his historical antecedents, we can appreciate why Kant started with a dualism.

Descartes dichotomised reality into mind
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and matter. This tradition found its full expression in the Lockean representative theory according to which knowledge consists of images or representations produced by external things on mind. Mind that is originally blank faces a thing and receives its image through some sense-organ or organs. The thing does not migrate into mind; it remains unknown.

The obvious difficulty of the representative theory is that if all that mind knows are images or ideas, how is it possible to get beyond them to the things, the alleged sources of sensations, and postulate their being? Therefore Berkeley and Hume dismissed the external substance altogether and held that "mind has never anything present to it but perceptions and cannot conceive of any kind of existence but those perceptions" (Hume). This was sensationalism. Humean sensationalism seemed to convey a great truth with Kant. He found it impossible to disagree with Hume when the latter said that the sensations were the ultimate data of knowledge. But he was unable to explain the passivity of sensations in terms of mind which he conceived as an active thinking principle. The Lockean theory

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of an external reality causing sensations was taken recourse to as the only explanation. With Locke he held that sensations were not made of the stuff that things were; they were merely the effects that the things produced in us through the sense-organs. The inability to explain passivity except by means of a thing outside is the crux of Kantian epistemology.

Kant regarded form and matter as fundamentally different and attributed the two to two different sources; the content being uncaused by mind, the activity of mind is simply constitutive and not productive. Intuition, therefore, with him means the act of receiving into space-time forms the thing-generated impressions.

Without repeating the oft-repeated criticism: how is it possible to know that the impressions are caused by things when things themselves are unknown? it may be asked, how are the sensations to be characterised and their being asserted? That sensations qua sensations have no cognitive value Kant himself admits. If sensations are prior to space-time forms, that is, the first intelligising activity of the mind, it is not possible to know them and

affirm

affirm that they are. Kant says, they are sensuous affections. But sensuous affections on which even the primary cognitive activity has not worked are difficult to understand. They have no experiential significance. Events that do not partake of the nature of things nor have psychic characteristics have no status. Croce aptly says, sensum is the limit of intuition--formless matter which spirit can never apprehend in itself as simple matter. This it can possess only with form and in form, but spirit is obliged to postulate the notion of it as a lower limit. Far from being an externality or effect of an external something, matter outside concrete experience is an unreality. "It is a conceptual limit; just as the concept of passivity is a limit to the pure concept of activity, so to every mental process we must oppose a mental content. The matter of intuition does not, however, stand over against the intuition to be seized and incorporated; its only existence is in the concrete experience itself." (Wildon Carr, *Philosophy of Croce*). Human experience even at the very earliest stage is formed and individual, - nowhere is there matter waiting to be invested with forms. It is only when we think about the knowledge process that we

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are called upon to enunciate a basic material. Matter, according to Croce, does not exist. "What exists is the form... When a philosopher speaks of matter he means only the concept which has been fashioned, by a work of abstraction and for a definite end, and which has no value except for that end. The concept matter may help us to make clear by contrast that the essence of art (intuition) is in the form, but it does not denote an effective reality. It can indeed be presented as if it referred to something existing; but in such case existence affirmed is simply metaphorical - a mode of expression useful in giving plastic form to our thought.....matter does not exist but it is posited for the convenience of exposition." (Croce)

The denial of matter automatically means the abolition of things in themselves; for if matter nowhere exists in knowledge, there is no necessity of supposing an external thing in itself as the precondition of the passive element in cognition. Knowledge thus ceases to be receptivity and becomes all spontaneous.

What Kant calls sensibility is unknown to
Crocean

Crocean theory of knowledge. While intuition with Kant is the process of giving form to impressions received from outside, the primary cognitive process in Croce is a creative one. It is called intuition also. But Intuition according to Croce means the image-forming activity, a kind of aesthetic activity that knows and brings forth simple immediate, individual objects. Wildon Carr in his exposition of Croce's philosophy describes intuition in the following manner :

"We are all familiar with the idle mood in which we relax the mind from its attention to serious ~~purpose~~ and leave the imagination free. We may be watching the cloud in a summer day, the waves on the sea shore, the sharp outlines against the sky in the evening dusk and as we contemplate the scene before us, strange and fanciful shapes weave themselves out of the fleeting forms of natural objects. The mind is inventing or creating, not perceiving or conceiving. Its inventions are images, and these images are as different from the real objects of the world as dreamless shapes are different from real ones. We are exercising a mental activity quite distinct from
conceiving

conceiving or perceiving. We are image-forming".

The first activity of mind is identical with this. A child's world, to use William James's vivid expression, is a blooming, buzzing confusion. But by this Croce will not understand that it is a nondescript medley of impressions. It is rather a blooming buzzing world of shapes and sounds that palpitate with individuality. And of these the child is the creator. Our first experience is not a chaos of characterless sensations but a panorama of objects having each a distinct tone and texture - fundamentally aesthetic facts. Man is never a passive recipient - he is initially and essentially an artist, a creator. Knowledge even at the first stage is both awareness and invention. The act of knowing is creating the objects that are known. Its first objects are individuals, not particulars which are alien and passive matter. They are individuals because they are mind's creations. It is because the first cognitive activity is spontaneous out and out that the experience is unique and individual.

Thus we find that the creative intuition that Kant thought to be unreachable by man Croce conceives to be the primary cognitive

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stage. His intuition is not a spatialising and temporalising function as Kant's necessitating a passive element. It is intuition creative of content which was the despair of the critical philosopher.

In this Croce simply follows the post-Kantian tradition from Fichte to Hegel. It is well known how the opposition of form and matter, subject and object, which Kant's system brought to great relief and which according to him was insurmountable supplied a problem to those who came immediately after him. What is more important to note is that "not only did Kant set the problem for his successors, but the very means which he took for emphasising this dualism seems to have suggested to some the way of escape. (Talbot, *Philosophy of Fichte*, P.19) Kant held out the ideal of intellectual intuition and showed that in comparison with this ideal human cognition was without much worth. True cognition would have been possible if self-consciousness, besides being a formal unitary principle, could have also been creative of cognitive content. This comparison was significant. None can say what blind alleys philosophical speculation would have run into, had not Kant bequeathed the concept (problematic though

though) of the organic unity of form and content the idea of both arising from the same principle, to the generation of thinkers that followed him. It is this cue that guides Fichte. The ideal that, Kant thought, was beyond human powers Fichte regarded as the unique characteristic of cognition. Our self-consciousness is not the simple 'I think', 'the poorest of all ideas', - it is rather 'I create'. Reality is the product of the activity of ego, will or spirit. There is no independent thing in itself. But the Fichtean concept of Anstoss set a further problem to philosophy.

The next attempt to actualise Kantian ideal is made by Schelling according to whom ego and non-ego, thought and being, are derived from a higher neutral principle which is neither the one nor the other. But the haze that shrouds the notion of an indifferent transcendent entity makes it unacceptable to rational metaphysics. At bottom it is an abstraction.

Hegel makes next the greatest attempt to bridge the duality. Ego and non-ego he describes as the modes of one progressive life.

The post-Kantian thought, in short, is the history of varied attempts to surmount the opposition of subject and object that Kant considered impossible to rise above. And it is significant that the problem that was epistemological in character became ontological the moment the thinkers attempted to solve it.

It was correctly apprehended that from the individualistic standpoint of Kant - a standpoint which was the mainspring of all 18th century thought - no solution of the opposition of sense and understanding, matter and form, object and subject, non-ego and ego, was possible. What was done, therefore, was to transfer the synthetic unity of apperception to the beginning of things - to the Absolute to which nothing can be given from outside and which must create its own matter if it is to realise its own spirituality. Thus the necessity of positing a matter that waits to get form and a form that waits for matter to begin its operation was obviated ; and although no two philosophers were agreed as to how the matter could, in spite of its origin out of the necessity of a spiritual life, assume an alien aspect and be accordingly regarded as being an other, it was admitted by all that somehow the two aspects of spiritual
life

life - sense and understanding - must be indissolubly connected or knowledge could never arise, - much less, absolute knowledge. Whether the projection of the matter (or non ego) was due to an unconscious operation (Fichte) or blind will (Schopenhauer) or the preponderance of the real aspect of the Absolute Substance (Schelling) or a necessity in the life history of the Absolute Spirit (Hegel) it was certainly not an accident : without that projection the spiritual principle of all being would not get any opportunity to reveal its own existence. The gradual mastery of mind over matter, the progressive spirituality of the world as a whole, is not brought about by a clash of opposing principles - one wholly other and contingently operative and another wholly spiritual and merely formative, but by a reorganisation of the different forces, all resident within the life of the spirit. It is in fact a conquest by the self of its own dark and hidden forces which are no less spiritual in their origin. In knowledge, therefore, we see enacted a drama of the triumph of spirit over its own unclear aspects and not a conflict of mind and matter. The shapeless fancies of the artist begin to get form under the dominating impulse of a creative imagination, and

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out of an apparent chaos a cosmos is produced. This is God's creation of the world out of nothing. In intellectual intuition man catches himself in a similar creative act; but inasmuch as he is finite, he is always oppressed with the impression that the materials that he is fashioning are not his own. This is true in a sense, for the finite aspect of spirituality can never be wholly creative and it is only when we feel that in the finite there is something infinite, that knowledge is in a sense both creation and communication from above, that in every act of knowledge we live, move and have our being in the life of God, that we can get rid of the oppressive feeling that we are living in an alien world that not only baffles understanding but also thwarts moral endeavour. Unfortunately, on this point Kant was destined to behave like Moses who could show the promised land from a distance but could not enter it himself.